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“Court: Law doesn’t bar sex-orientation discrimination on job” 
 
 
LA Times 
 
Kate Brumback 
 
July 23, 2018 
 
A federal appeals court in Atlanta this week 
reaffirmed its decision that workers aren't 
protected against workplace discrimination 
based on sexual orientation, though two of 
the 11 judges strongly disagreed. 
 
Gerald Lynn Bostock asserted in a lawsuit 
originally filed in May 2016 that he was fired 
from his job as a court child welfare services 
coordinator in Clayton County, just south of 
Atlanta, because he's gay. 
 
A federal judge last year dismissed his case, 
and a three-judge panel of the 11th U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals in May upheld that 
ruling. The panel said binding court 
precedent set by a 1979 decision says Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 law 
doesn't prohibit employers from 
discriminating against workers based on 
sexual orientation. The full court on 
Wednesday declined to reconsider that 
decision. 
 
Circuit Judge Robin Rosenbaum, joined by 
Judge Jill Pryor, dissented from this week's 
decision. 
"I continue to firmly believe that Title VII 
prohibits discrimination against gay and 
lesbian individuals because they fail to 
conform to their employers' views when it 
comes to whom they should love," 
Rosenbaum wrote. 
 
The binding precedent cited in the court's 
May decision includes no analysis of the 
issue, concluding simply that "Discharge for 
homosexuality is not prohibited by Title 
VII," she wrote, adding that a 1989 U.S. 
Supreme Court ruling suggests that courts 
should reach the opposite conclusion. 
 
Rather than clinging to a decades-old 
precedent, the full appeals court should 
consider the arguments and offer "a reasoned 
and principled explanation for our position 
on this issue," Rosenbaum wrote. 
 
"I cannot explain why a majority of our Court 
is content to rely on the precedential 
equivalent of an Edsel with a missing engine, 
when it comes to an issue that affects so many 
people," she wrote. 
 
Bostock's attorneys had already appealed the 
May ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court, and 
that petition is pending. 
 
"The issue of whether Title VII protects gay 
and lesbian employees is extraordinarily 
important not only for Mr. Bostock, but for 
all the gay and lesbian people working to earn 
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a living in this country," attorney Brian 
Sutherland said in an email Friday. 
 
The Supreme Court punted on the issue in 
December when it declined to take up another 
Georgia case. Jameka Evans had sued 
Georgia Regional Hospital in Savannah, 
saying she faced discrimination and was 
effectively forced out of her security guard 
job because she's a lesbian. 
 
As in Bostock's case, an 11th Circuit panel 
had ruled in March 2017 that Evans wasn't 
protected from workplace discrimination 
based on sexual orientation, and the full court 
declined reconsideration. 
 
In April 2017, the full 7th U.S. Circuit Court 
of Appeals in Chicago reached the opposite 
conclusion in a case filed by a former part-
time instructor who said an Indiana 
community college didn't hire her full time 
because she is a lesbian. The court stated 
decisively that the civil rights law's 
protections apply to gay and lesbian workers 
just as they prohibit discrimination based on 
race, religion or national origin. 
 
In January, the full 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals in New York reached a similar 
conclusion, ruling in favor of a gay skydiving 
instructor who said he was fired because he 
was gay. The opinion said that while that 
court and others had previously found that 
Title VII didn't cover sexual orientation, 
"legal doctrine evolves." 
 
The 2nd Circuit decision has also been 
appealed to the Supreme Court. The 
conflicting opinions of the 2nd and 11th 
circuits could prompt the high court to weigh 
in and settle the question. 
 
Bostock worked in the Juvenile Court of 
Clayton County. He'd worked for the county 
since January 2003 and had received good 
performance evaluations, his lawsuit says. 
 
He joined a gay softball league in January 
2013. His participation in that league and his 
sexual orientation were openly criticized by 
one or more people with decision-making 
power at his job, the lawsuit says. 
 
He was told in April 2013 that an audit was 
being conducted on program funds he 
managed. Bostock contends the audit was 
meant to provide a pretext to discriminate 
against him "based on his sexual orientation 
and failure to conform to a gender 
stereotype." 
 
He was fired June 3, 2013, "for Conduct 
Unbecoming of a Clayton County 
Employee." 
 
Lawyers for the county argued in a response 
to his lawsuit that Title VII "was not designed 
or written to include protections for sexual 
orientation." Bostock also fails to identify 
any characteristic that distinguishes him from 
a "typical male," undercutting his gender 
stereotyping claim, they wrote. 
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“7th Circ. Uphold Grocery Store Worker’s Title VII Win” 
 
 
Law360 
 
Danielle Nichole Smith 
 
August 3, 2018 
 
The Seventh Circuit has affirmed a jury 
verdict favoring a grocery store worker who 
alleged he was subjected to unwanted sexual 
touching and taunting by his male co-
workers, holding that his Title VII claim was 
valid since he presented evidence that female 
workers didn't receive the same treatment. 
 
A three-judge panel on Thursday rejected 
Rosebud Farm Inc.'s contention that the 
district court should have granted it summary 
judgment on Robert Smith's sexual 
harassment claims, finding that though the 
grocery store correctly asserted that Title VII 
didn't automatically provide relief for 
unwanted sexual behavior, Smith offered 
evidence that the conduct in question was 
discriminatory based on his sex. 
 
"Ample testimony — from both Smith and 
other witnesses — established that only men 
were groped, taunted, and otherwise 
tormented," U.S. Circuit Judge Amy C. 
Barrett wrote in the panel's published 
opinion. "Witnesses recounted the numerous 
times they saw men grabbing the genitals and 
buttocks of other men. No witness recalled 
seeing female Rosebud employees subjected 
to the same treatment." 
The panel was unconvinced by Rosebud's 
argument that Smith worked in an all-male 
environment because no women worked 
behind the meat counter where he was 
stationed and thus comparisons between 
men's and women's treatment were 
inappropriate. Even if the meat counter was 
separate from the rest of the store, it wasn't 
the only place harassment was alleged to 
have occurred, the panel said. 
Rosebud had appealed the lower court's 
denial of its request for an amendment of the 
findings and a new trial on Smith's claims 
after a jury awarded him $2.4 million in 
compensatory and punitive damages. The 
lower court did reduce the award to 
$477,500. 
 
The grocery store argued that while Smith 
presented evidence of "sexual horseplay and 
juvenile behavior," he didn't provide 
evidence that the conduct was sex-based. 
Smith didn't show that the male co-workers 
in question were gay, that there was hostility 
toward men in the store or that the activity 
was related to sexual gratification to support 
his claim, Rosebud said. 
Rosebud also asserted in its appeal that the 
lower court should have ruled in its favor on 
Smith's retaliation claim since there wasn't 
evidence that his co-workers even knew he 
had filed a charge at the Equal Employment 
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Opportunity Commission for sexual 
harassment and racial discrimination. And 
the store contended that a new trial on Smith's 
claims was warranted because of incendiary 
statements made by Smith's counsel during 
closing arguments that drew comparisons 
between the defendant's conduct and recent 
terror attacks in the Middle East. 
 
But the Seventh Circuit rejected those 
contentions as well, holding that the grocery 
store forfeited the arguments since they 
hadn't been brought up at the lower court. 
 
Though Rosebud did raise two objections to 
Smith's counsel's reference to terrorism, it 
didn't argue that the statements were 
prejudicial, the panel said. 
"If anything, the counsel's comments hurt 
Smith more than they hurt Rosebud," Judge 
Barrett said. "The district court observed a 
number of jurors grimacing in reaction to the 
bizarre terrorism analogy. These references 
would certainly not have been reason for the 
district court to set aside the jury's verdict and 
start over." 
Smith originally sued Rosebud in 2011, 
alleging that his co-workers and supervisors 
touched his buttocks and genitalia and made 
inappropriate racial comments to him. When 
he filed a charge at the EEOC over the 
alleged conduct, his coworkers retaliated 
against him by freezing him out and 
damaging his property, among other things, 
the complaint said. 
Smith said in his complaint that he ultimately 
had to quit because of the intolerable work 
conditions. 
 
Rosebud moved for summary judgment on 
the sexual and racial harassment and 
retaliation claims in June 2014, arguing that 
the alleged "horse play" didn't amount to 
sexual harassment under Title VII and that 
Smith's decision to quit wasn't a constructive 
discharge. But the lower court sent the claims 
to trial. 
Joseph Anthony Longo, counsel for Smith, 
told Law360 on Friday that workers shouldn't 
have to subject their bodies to harassment 
when they go to do their jobs and that he 
hoped that the ruling would have significance 
throughout the country in demonstrating that 
abuse at work must be stopped. 
Counsel and representatives for Rosebud 
didn't respond Friday to requests for 
comment. 
 
Judges Amy C. Barrett, William J. Bauer and 
Amy J. St. Eve sat on the panel for the 
Seventh Circuit. 
Smith is represented by Joseph Anthony 
Longo of Longo & Associates Ltd. 
 
Rosebud is represented by William D. Dallas 
and Steven M. Dallas of Regas Frezados & 
Dallas LLP. 
The case is Robert Smith v. Rosebud Farm 
Inc., case number 17-2626, in the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 
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“AGs Tell 8th Circ. Title VII Doesn’t Cover Sex Orientation” 
 
 
Law360 
 
Danielle Nichole Smith 
 
June 14, 2018 
 
A coalition of state attorneys general has told 
the Eighth Circuit that it should not join two 
other appellate courts in interpreting Title VII 
to bar sexual orientation discrimination, 
arguing that such an application was contrary 
to earlier legal and legislative understanding 
of the law.  
The states said in their Tuesday amicus brief 
that Mark Horton, who accused Midwest 
Geriatric Management LLC of religious and 
sexual discrimination for allegedly 
rescinding a job offer because he was gay, 
wrongly urged the Eighth Circuit to reverse 
its previous position that Title VII did not 
provide protections for discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation. The appeals court 
should not flout its own precedent or ignore 
Congress’ interpretation of the employment 
law, the states argued. 
“Our system of government demands that the 
courts defer to the legislative branch in 
matters of policymaking, and that 
foundational principle demands that Title VII 
be interpreted as understood in 1964, unless 
and until amended by Congress,” the states 
said. “This court should decline to overrule 
its own precedents in recasting Title VII as 
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual 
orientation” 
 
The states noted that until the Seventh Circuit 
and Second Circuit expanded Title VII to 
include protections for sexual orientation in 
April 2017 and February, respectively, 
federal appellate courts had been united in 
finding that Title VII’s scope did not include 
sexual orientation. 
And though Congress had numerous chances 
to amend the statute to include sexual 
orientation, it had chosen not to do so, the 
states argued. 
The states also said that even if the Eighth 
Circuit were not bound by its precedent, 
Horton’s arguments for sexual orientation 
protections in Title VII were unconvincing. 
He wrongly argued that sexual orientation 
discrimination would be "associational 
discrimination," or founded on a sex-based 
stereotype, the states said. 
Additionally, Horton misapplied the “but 
for” test for determining if sex discrimination 
was the real reason behind an employer’s 
action, which would require keeping 
everything consistent except for a single 
factor, the states said. In the scenario Horton 
described, whether a male employee would 
be treated differently from a female 
employee for having a relationship with a 
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man, both the sex and sexual orientation were 
shifted, the states argued. 
“It is my duty to protect the separation of 
powers written in the Constitution,” 
Arkansas Attorney General Leslie 
Rutledge said in a statement Wednesday. 
“Judges should apply the law as written by 
the people’s representatives in Congress and 
should not add to or ‘creatively apply’ the law 
because they believe a different law should 
have been written and applied." 
 
Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, 
Michigan, Nebraska, and South Dakota 
participated in the amicus brief with 
Arkansas. 
The Eight Circuit also received input 
Tuesday from the Becket Fund for Religious 
Liberty, a nonprofit law firm that defends 
religious beliefs. The organization threw its 
support behind Midwest Geriatric 
Management, criticizing Horton's appeal of a 
lower court's dismissal of his bias suit. 
 
“Sometimes a wolf comes as a wolf. This 
appeal is an open effort to enlist this court as 
a combatant in the culture wars over LGBT 
rights and religion, with the eventual goal of 
creating a vehicle for [U.S] Supreme Court 
review,” the Becket Fund said. “Happily, this 
court need not sign up for this duty.” 
 
The Becket Fund argued in its amicus brief 
that Horton could not make a religious 
discrimination claim based only on his belief 
that the owners of Midwest Geriatric 
Management were Jewish and that their 
Judaism was important to their professional 
lives, calling his argument “itself 
discriminatory.” Horton pled no other factual 
allegations for his religious claim, and 
further, he failed to show that he was 
discriminated against for his own religious 
beliefs, the organization said. 
The organization also echoed the states’ 
arguments that Title VII legal and legislative 
history demonstrated that it did not include 
protections for sexual orientation. 
Gregory R. Nevins, counsel for Horton, told 
Law360 on Thursday that the attorneys 
general asserted nothing that had not already 
been raised in the case. Nevins said that 
though the Becket Fund did bring new 
arguments, he did not think they were 
applicable to the case or accounted for the full 
scope of the law. 
Horton originally sued Midwest Geriatric 
Management in Missouri federal court in 
August, alleging that the company illegally 
discriminated against him by rescinding a job 
offer after discovering he had a husband. 
The lower court ruled in December that 
Horton’s claims failed because Title VII did 
not forbid discrimination based on sexual 
orientation. Horton appealed the decision in 
January. 
The Eighth Circuit has received amicus 
briefs supporting Horton from nearly 50 
business, the U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, and 18 states and 
Washington, D.C. 
 
Horton is represented by Gregory R. Nevins, 
Omar Gonzalez-Pagan and Sharon 
McGowan of Lambda Legal Defense and 
Education Fund Inc. and Mark S. Schuver 
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and Natalie T. Lorenz of Mathis Marifian & 
Richter Ltd. 
Midwest Geriatric Management LLC is 
represented by Michael L. Jente, Neal F. 
Perryman and Philip J. Mackey of Lewis 
Rice LLC. 
The amici states are represented by Arkansas 
Attorney General Leslie Rutledge, Lee 
Rudofsky, Nicholas J. Bronni and Dylan L. 
Jacobs. 
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty is 
represented by Eric C. Rassbach and 
Nicholas R. Reaves of the Becket Fund For 
Religious Liberty. 
The case is Mark Horton v. Midwest 
Geriatric Management, case number 18-
1104, in the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit. 
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 “Appeals Court Rules Anti-Gay Employment Discrimination is Already Illegal 
Under Federal Law” 
 
 
Slate 
 
Mark Joseph Stern 
 
February 26, 2018 
 
On Monday, the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled that federal law already 
prohibits anti-gay employment 
discrimination. Its 10–3 decision in Zarda v. 
Altitude Express is a landmark victory for 
gay rights, affirming the growing judicial 
consensus that sexual orientation 
discrimination constitutes discrimination 
“because of sex.” 
In his opinion for the court, Chief Judge 
Robert Katzmann provided three reasons 
why Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964—which prohibits sex discrimination in 
the workplace—protects gay employees. 
First, Katzmann explained that “sexual 
orientation discrimination is motivated, at 
least in part, by sex and is thus a subset of sex 
discrimination.” To “identify the sexual 
orientation of a particular person,” an 
employer must “know the sex of the person 
and that of the people to whom he or she is 
attracted.” He continued: 
Because one cannot fully define a person’s 
sexual orientation without identifying his or 
her sex, sexual orientation is a function of 
sex. Indeed sexual orientation is doubly 
delineated by sex because it is a function of 
both a person’s sex and the sex of those to 
whom he or she is attracted. Logically, 
because sexual orientation is a function of sex 
and sex is a protected characteristic under 
Title VII, it follows that sexual orientation is 
also protected. 
To bolster his conclusion, Katzmann 
deployed the “comparative test,” which asks 
“whether an employee’s treatment would 
have been different but for that person’s sex.” 
Here, the plaintiff, Donald Zarda, was 
allegedly fired after he revealed his sexual 
orientation—that is, his attraction to other 
men. If Zarda were a woman, he presumably 
could have kept his job. But because he was 
a man, his sexual attraction led to his 
termination. Thus, but for his sex, he would 
not have suffered discrimination. 
Katzmann then turned to a second 
justification for his decision: the “sex 
stereotype” theory. The Supreme Court 
has held that Title VII bars employers from 
punishing workers for their failure to 
conform to gender norms. For instance, a 
manager cannot reprimand a female 
employee because he deems her 
insufficiently “feminine” in her demeanor 
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and mannerisms. Homosexuality, Katzmann 
noted, “represents the ultimate case of failure 
to conform to gender stereotypes”—the 
expectation that men only date women, and 
women only date men. In this framing, 
discrimination against a gay employee on the 
basis of his sexual orientation constitutes 
“sex stereotyping,” a prohibited practice 
under Title VII. 
Finally, Katzmann explored perhaps the most 
persuasive theory of the case, 
the Loving principle. In Loving v. Virginia, 
the Supreme Court held that interracial 
marriage bans discriminated on the basis of 
race in part by punishing individuals for 
intimately associating with members of 
another race. Since then, the courts 
have extended this theory to the employment 
context—holding, for example, that a 
supervisor who fires a white employee for 
marrying a black person has engaged in 
unlawful racial discrimination. 
Discrimination on the basis of race and sex 
are equally forbidden under Title VII. So, 
Katzmann wrote, this principle of 
“associational discrimination” should apply 
to both traits, and an employee who suffers 
discrimination because of his associations 
with a partner of the same-sex has 
experienced illegal sex discrimination. “If a 
male employee married to a man is 
terminated because his employer disapproves 
of same-sex marriage,” Katzmann explained, 
“the employee has suffered associational 
discrimination based on his own sex.” Why? 
Because “the fact that the employee is a man 
instead of a woman motivated the employer’s 
discrimination against him.” 
In all, ten judges—including two Republican 
appointees—agreed with Katzmann that Title 
VII forbids sexual orientation discrimination. 
Only three disagreed. Judge José Cabranes 
found the case so easy that he wrote his own 
one-page decision concurring in the 
judgment. His reasoning constitutes one brief 
paragraph: 
This is a straightforward case of statutory 
construction. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 prohibits discrimination “because of 
… sex.” Zarda’s sexual orientation is a 
function of his sex. Discrimination against 
Zarda because of his sexual orientation 
therefore is discrimination because of his 
sex, and is prohibited by Title VII. 
That should be the end of the analysis. 
With its Zarda decision, the 2nd Circuit has 
aligned itself with the 7th U.S. Circuit Court 
of Appeals and the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, both of which 
assert that Title VII bars anti-gay workplace 
discrimination. (So have dozens of lower 
courts.) Zarda vigorously rejects the 
position put forth by the Trump 
administration that Title VII does not protect 
all gay employees. (The 11th U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals has also adopted that 
position.) Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ 
Department of Justice took the unusual step 
of filing an unsolicited brief in Zarda against 
gay rights, then arguing against gay 
employees in court. Given Monday’s 
lopsided outcome, the DOJ might as well 
have saved its breath. 
Eventually, the Supreme Court will have to 
resolve the scope of Title VII’s protections 
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for LGBTQ employees. But it is in no hurry 
to do so, and the defendants in Zarda have 
indicated that they won’t appeal Monday’s 
decision. For the foreseeable future, then, the 
ruling will remain the law of the land within 
the 2nd Circuit, which covers New York, 
Connecticut, and Vermont. And gay 
employees elsewhere can cite Zarda to 
demonstrate that, no matter what the Trump 
administration says, Title VII protects their 
right to work free from homophobia. 
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“SCOTUS Asked to Ignore Circuit Split on Sexual Orientation Discrimination” 
 
Law.com 
 
R. Robin McDonald 
 
August 10, 2018 
 
An attorney defending Clayton County, 
Georgia, in a discrimination lawsuit filed by 
a gay employee asked the U.S. Supreme 
Court Friday to let stand an appellate ruling 
that federal laws do not prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation. 
Freeman Mathis & Gary attorneys Jack 
Hancock and William Buechner Jr. defended 
the May 10 ruling by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Atlanta in 
their response to a petition for a writ of 
certiorari filed by Gerald Lynn Bostock on 
May 25. 
Bostock is represented by Brian Sutherland 
and Thomas Mew IV of Atlanta’s Buckley 
Beal. 
Bostock was assigned to Clayton County’s 
juvenile court as a child welfare services 
coordinator in 2013 when he began playing 
in a gay recreational softball league that he 
would later claim generated criticism and led 
to an internal audit of county funds he 
managed. 
Bostock was subsequently fired for conduct 
unbecoming a county employee, prompting 
the lawsuit. The county claimed the firing 
was legitimate, nondiscriminatory and 
unrelated to Bostock’s sexual orientation. 
Magistrate Walter Johnson and Senior 
District Judge Orinda Evans dismissed the 
case after determining Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits 
employment discrimination based on race, 
color, religion or sex, does not bar 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
The Eleventh Circuit agreed and noted in an 
unpublished opinion issued in May that 
“Discharge for homosexuality is not 
prohibited by Title VII.” The Atlanta-based 
appellate court rejected Bostock’s petition 
to hear the case en banc. In July, the 
court rejected an unusual motion from its 
own bench for an en banc hearing—despite 
dissents by Judges Robin Rosenbaum and Jill 
Pryor. 
In asking the Supreme Court to take up the 
case, Bostock points out federal appellate 
courts in the Second and Seventh Circuits 
have split from the Eleventh in holding that 
Title VII does prohibit discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation. 
But Freeman Mathis lawyers argued the 
Supreme Court has turned down cases when 
circuits have been split on the underlying 
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legal issues before. Last year, the high court 
denied certiorari in another Georgia 
employment discrimination case that the 
lawyers said “presented the identical issue 
that [Bostock] seeks to present to the Court in 
this case.” 
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“EEOC backs gay employee in latest appellate battle over workplace rights” 
 
 
Reuters 
 
Alison Frankel 
 
March 16, 2018  
 
President Donald Trump has nominated two 
Republicans to serve on the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission 
alongside a Trump-appointed acting chair, 
and two holdover Democrats from the 
Obama administration. (One of them has 
been re-nominated by Trump.) At their 
Senate confirmation hearing in September, 
the Republican EEOC nominees pointedly 
refused to commit to the commission’s 
position that Title VII of the Civil Right Act 
protects gay and lesbian employees against 
workplace discrimination based on their 
sexual orientation. My Reuters colleague 
Robert Iafolla, who covered the hearing, 
described the Trump nominees’ position on 
gay employees’ rights as “murky.” 
 
The Senate has not yet voted on Trump’s 
EEOC nominees, so, at the moment, the 
EEOC is composed just of acting chair 
Victoria Lipnic, a Republican, and two 
Democratic appointees, Chai Feldblum and 
Charlotte Burrows. And there’s nothing at all 
murky about this commission’s stance on 
Title VII and gay rights. Last week, the 
EEOC filed an amicus brief in the 8th U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals, backing Mark 
Horton, a gay man who claims Midwest 
Geriatric withdrew a job offer when he 
mentioned his same-sex partner in an email 
to the company’s co-director. 
The 8th Circuit will be the fourth federal 
appellate court in the last year and a half to 
consider whether Title VII’s protection 
against sex discrimination encompasses 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
This foment follows a pathbreaking 2015 
EEOC decision in Baldwin v. Foxx, in which 
the EEOC interpreted U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent – most notably on sex 
stereotyping, same-sex 
harassment and interracial marriage – to bar 
discrimination against gay and lesbian 
employees under the umbrella of the law’s 
prohibition on gender-based discrimination. 
In March 2017, the 11th Circuit rejected that 
reasoning in Evans v. Georgia Regional 
Hospital, but the following month, the en 
banc 7th Circuit held in Hively v. Ivy Tech 
Community College that Title VII protects 
gay and lesbian employees. Just last month, 
the en banc 2nd Circuit sided with the 7th 
Circuit in Zarda v. Altitude Express, 
deepening a circuit split that won’t go away 
regardless of what the 8th Circuit decides in 
the Horton case. 
 
Now that the EEOC is on the record in 
support of Horton at the 8th Circuit, the big 
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question is whether the Justice Department 
will file an amicus brief backing Horton’s 
would-be employer, a chain of nursing home 
and assisted living facilities. You may 
remember that DOJ caused a stir in the en 
banc Zarda case at the 2nd Circuit when it 
disavowed the EEOC’s amicus brief backing 
gay employees. In a rare instance of two 
executive-branch agencies publicly 
espousing contrary positions in litigation, 
DOJ argued that discrimination against gay 
and lesbian employees isn’t the same as sex 
discrimination and isn’t prohibited under 
Title VII. (DOJ and the EEOC both enforce 
Title VII and neither, apparently, is entitled 
to Chevron deference in interpreting the 
statute.) 
 
Both the Justice Department and the EEOC 
declined my request for comment on DOJ 
plans for the Horton case. I also emailed 
Midwest Geriatric lawyers Philip 
Mackey and Michael Jente of Lewis 
Rice but didn’t hear back. 
 
I’ve previously discussed how the 2nd 
Circuit majority in Zarda disposed of one of 
the Justice Department’s key arguments 
against extending Title VII protection to gay 
and lesbian employees. DOJ contended that 
the test for sex discrimination is to compare 
workers who are the same in every way 
except for their gender. So under DOJ’s 
theory, to figure out if sex discrimination 
encompasses prejudice against gays and 
lesbians, you have to look at whether an 
employer treats gays and lesbians the same – 
not whether lesbian workers are treated 
differently than straight women or gay men 
experience discrimination straight men are 
not subjected to. Unless the employer is more 
inclined to discriminate against gay men than 
lesbians (or vice-versa), DOJ argued, it’s not 
engaged in sex discrimination. 
The 2nd Circuit said the Justice Department 
is pushing the wrong comparison test. Based 
on the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in City 
of Los Angeles v. Manhart, which struck 
down a city water department rule requiring 
female employees to contribute more than 
men to the employee pension fund because 
women live longer, the 2nd Circuit said the 
Title VII analysis should focus on sexual 
orientation as a function of sex, like life 
expectancy or “ladylike” behavior. Using the 
test DOJ advocated “would not illustrate 
whether a particular stereotype is sex 
dependent but only whether the employer 
discriminates against gender non‐conformity 
in only one gender,” the 2nd Circuit said. 
 
Of course, Justice can still present its 
comparison test argument to the 8th Circuit, 
along with other arguments for why Title VII 
doesn’t protect gay and lesbian workers, 
including decades of Congress failing to 
amend the statute and pre-2015 precedent 
from the federal appellate courts, including 
the 8th Circuit. My guess is that the Justice 
Department will opt to file an amicus brief in 
Midwest Geriatric, given the EEOC’s brief 
probably does not reflect the views of the 
Trump administration. 
 
Presumably, this issue will end up at the 
Supreme Court, although the justices 
declined to grant review last December of the 
11th Circuit’s Evans decision. By then, 
Trump’s EEOC nominees will probably have 
been confirmed – too late, however, to undo 
 462 
 
the commission’s support for gay and lesbian 
rights at the 2nd and 8th Circuit
“EEOC Argues that Sexual Orientation Discrimination by a Heterosexual Person 
can Constitute a Protected Activity” 
 
 
Lexology 
 
Seyfarth Shaw LLP 
 
June 14, 2018 
 
The EEOC argues that O’Daniel need only 
“reasonably believe[]” the opposed conduct 
was unlawful and that O’Daniel’s belief was 
reasonable when viewed in the context of 
recent decisions reached by the Southern 
District of Texas, Second Circuit, Seventh 
Circuit, and the EEOC. The EEOC also cites 
the ongoing national debate regarding sexual 
orientation issues as another reason 
O’Daniel’s belief was reasonable. 
Plaintiff Bonnie O’Daniel filed suit against 
her employer, Plant-N-Power, and its parent 
company (Defendants) in the Middle District 
of Louisiana alleging, amongst other things, 
retaliation on the basis of her sexual 
orientation—heterosexual. O’Daniel alleged 
that Defendants terminated her employment 
because of one of her Facebook posts. In the 
post, she included a photograph of a man 
wearing a dress at a Target store and 
expressed discontent with his ability to use 
the women’s restroom and/or dressing 
rooms. O’Daniel alleged that this offended 
the President of Plant-N-Power, a member of 
the LGBT community, and that the president 
subsequently suggested O’Daniel’s 
termination. 
Defendants responded to the lawsuit with a 
motion to dismiss and argued that O’Daniel’s 
retaliation claim failed in part because she did 
not “plead any protected activity … under 
Title VII.” By consent of the parties, a 
magistrate judge heard Defendants’ motion 
to dismiss. The magistrate judge ultimately 
agreed with Defendants and dismissed 
O’Daniel’s retaliation claim because it was 
“unreasonable for [O’Daniel] to believe that 
discrimination based on sexual orientation 
constitutes protected activity” and cited the 
Fifth Circuit’s 1979 holding in Blum v. Gulf 
Oil Corp. to support its holding. The trial 
court noted that while Title VII may protect 
gender-non-conformity, O’Daniel did not 
allege discrimination on this basis. O’Daniel 
appealed the magistrate judge’s decision to 
the Fifth Circuit. 
On May 2, 2018, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission filed an amicus 
curiae brief with the court, taking issue with 
the trial court’s finding that it was 
“unreasonable” for O’Daniel to believe that 
opposition to discrimination based on sexual 
orientation was a protected activity. In 
arguing this, the EEOC pointed out that the 
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employee need only “reasonably believe[] 
the opposed conduct was unlawful.” The 
EEOC maintains that, “given recent appellate 
decisions …, the EEOC’s view that Title VII 
prohibits sexual orientation discrimination, 
and the rapidly changing legal landscape,” 
O’Daniel had a reasonable belief that 
discrimination based on sexual orientation 
was impermissible. 
The EEOC pointed to a number of decisions 
in the Southern District of Texas, the Second 
and Seventh Circuits, as well as holdings 
from the commission itself, to demonstrate 
that the “law on sexual orientation 
discrimination” had evolved and that at least 
some courts prohibit sexual orientation 
discrimination in employment. In addition, 
the EEOC noted the ongoing national debate 
regarding sexual orientation issues and the 
Supreme Court’s landmark decisions 
endorsing the right of gay and lesbian 
individuals to be free from discrimination 
in Obergefell v. Hodges and United States v. 
Windsor. Given this context, O’Daniel—“a 
layperson without legal expertise”—could 
“reasonably conclude that Title VII’s 
prohibition against sex discrimination 
encompasses discriminatory conduct based 
on sexual orientation.” This would extend, in 
the EEOC’s view, to discrimination on the 
basis that an employee is heterosexual. 
The EEOC similarly noted that Fifth Circuit 
precedent did not preclude an individual from 
harboring a reasonable belief that sexual 
orientation is unlawful. To argue this, the 
EEOC distinguished Blum, in which the 
Court held that “[d]ischarge for 
homosexuality is not prohibited by Title 
VII.” The EEOC argued that Blum was 
decided on the issue of pretext and not on 
whether Title VII protected against 
discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation. Moreover, according to the 
EEOC, there were post-Blum decisions that 
recognize that Title VII prohibits 
discrimination based on sex stereotyping, to 
include Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins and EEOC v. Boh Brothers 
Construction, Co. Thus, O’Daniel could have 
relied on these post-Blum holdings to arrive 
at a reasonable conclusion that Title VII 
protected against discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation. 
Defendants have not yet filed their appellate 
brief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 464 
 
 
 
“Ending Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Employment” 
 
 
Law.com 
 
Gay Crosthwait Grunfeld and Marc J. Shinn-Krantz 
 
February 16, 2018 
 
Twenty-two states, including California, and 
the District of Columbia, Guam, and Puerto 
Rico, protect both public and private 
employees from discrimination on the basis 
of their sexual orientation. But in more than 
half the country, a gay person can get married 
legally on Saturday, and for doing so be fired 
legally on Monday, so far as state and local 
law are concerned. For gay employees 
in 28 states, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 is the only possible protection. 
Indeed, the U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) received 
1,762 LGBT-based sex discrimination 
charges in FY 2017, up from 1,100 in FY 
2014. 
Prior to 2017, every federal circuit to 
consider the question of whether Title VII’s 
prohibition of discrimination based on sex 
includes sexual orientation answered 
negatively. But since the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s holding in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 
S. Ct. 2584 (2015) that same-sex marriage is 
a constitutionally protected fundamental 
right, the EEOC began asserting that sexual 
orientation discrimination is inherently sex 
discrimination under Title VII. Courts, the 
EEOC and the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ) are grappling with the issue. 
There is a circuit split over whether Title VII 
makes it illegal for employers to discriminate 
based on sexual orientation. Last year, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
held en banc by a vote of 8 to 3 that it 
does, Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College 
of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017), 
while panels of the Second and 
Eleventh circuits held to the contrary. The 
Eleventh Circuit denied en banc rehearing, 
and in December 2017, the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari.  The Second Circuit 
reheard arguments en banc in September—a 
decision is pending. Supreme Court review of 
the question is inevitable. 
The plaintiff in the Seventh 
Circuit Hively case was a female lesbian part-
time adjunct professor who alleged sexual 
orientation discrimination. The court held 
that two separate analyses—a comparator 
analysis, which analyzes the variable of sex 
by comparing the plaintiff to an otherwise 
identically situated person, and an 
associational analysis—each led to the 
conclusion that sexual orientation 
discrimination is sex discrimination under 
Title VII. 
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Citing Hively, a First Circuit panel recently 
noted “the tide may be turning” on this 
issue. Franchina v. City of Providence, No. 
16-2401, 2018 WL 550511, at *13 n.19 (1st 
Cir. Jan. 25, 2018). Franchina’s procedural 
posture precluded considering sexual 
orientation as a standalone claim; 
nevertheless, the panel upheld a jury verdict 
awarding emotional and front pay damages to 
a female firefighter claiming sexual 
orientation as a “plus-factor” under Title VII. 
Under Hively’s comparator analysis, a 
plaintiff successfully claims sex 
discrimination if she alleges a set of facts 
whereby changing only her sex would lead to 
different treatment. The court noted it is 
critical to the comparator analysis that the 
only variable be the plaintiff’s gender. The 
court noted that a policy could constitute sex 
discrimination even if it did not discriminate 
against every member of a gender. A policy 
discriminating against the subset of women 
like Hively—just like a policy discriminating 
against the subset of women not wearing high 
heels—is sex discrimination. In Hively’s 
case—that of a woman attracted to women—
the plaintiff could allege sex discrimination 
by claiming she would have been treated 
differently if she were a man attracted to 
women. The court also noted that, viewing 
this case through the lens of Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) 
(establishing the gender nonconformity 
theory of liability), there is no distinction 
between a gender nonconformity claim and a 
sexual orientation claim; Hively’s 
homosexuality was itself nonconformance 
with the gender stereotype of female 
heterosexuality. 
In its associational analysis, the Hively court 
drew on a line of cases beginning with the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), that a prohibition 
on interracial marriage violates the 
Constitution. Subsequent circuit court cases 
held that discrimination based on a plaintiff’s 
interracial associations constitutes 
discrimination because of the 
plaintiff’s own race.  The Hively court held it 
follows that discrimination against Hively 
because of the sex of a person she associates 
with is discrimination based on her own sex. 
Judge Richard Posner concurred in Hively, 
powerfully applying a third and more 
straightforward analytical approach to 
conclude that Title VII prohibits sexual 
orientation discrimination. He considered 
that Title VII’s original meaning may not 
have prohibited such discrimination. He 
asserted that the courts should not act as 
“obedient servants” of the 88th Congress, 
which passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
Instead, courts should take advantage of over 
a half century of evolving views on 
homosexuality—and consider what the 
country has become—to interpret the 
statutory language for today’s era and 
culture. 
In sharp contrast to the Seventh Circuit, a 
divided Eleventh Circuit panel held that 
Title VII does not protect sexual 
orientation. Evans v. Georgia Regional 
Hospital, 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017) 
involved a female lesbian former security 
officer alleging discrimination based on her 
sexual orientation. The panel decided it was 
bound by precedent to hold that, although 
gender nonconformity claims are actionable 
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under Title VII, sexual orientation claims are 
not. This holding drew a dissent from Judge 
Robin S. Rosenbaum, who asserted that the 
Supreme Court’s 1989 gender stereotyping 
decision in Price Waterhouse, “eviscerated” 
the majority’s main precedent, Blum v. Gulf 
Oil, 597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979) (pre-
division of the Fifth and Eleventh circuits in 
1981). Judge Rosenbaum reasoned that a 
woman alleging sexual orientation 
discrimination necessarily fails to conform 
with the gender stereotype that women 
should only be sexually attracted to men. 
Two Second Circuit panels held that they are 
bound by circuit precedent to hold that 
Title VII does not encompass sexual 
orientation. Zarda v. Altitude Express, 855 
F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017); Christiansen v. 
Omnicom Group, 852 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 
2017). The Second Circuit granted 
rehearing en banc of Zarda, a case about a 
male gay former skydiving instructor 
asserting sexual orientation discrimination. 
In an unusual executive branch split, both the 
EEOC and the DOJ filed conflicting amicus 
briefs and appeared at argument in 
September 2017. 
As one district court within the Second 
Circuit observed, “the law with respect to this 
legal question is clearly in a state of flux, and 
the Second Circuit, or perhaps the Supreme 
Court, may return to this question 
soon,” Philpott v. New York, 252 F. Supp. 3d 
313, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (finding sexual 
orientation claim cognizable). The Second 
Circuit’s en banc decision in Zarda is 
pending. 
Despite the variegated decisions and opinions 
of judges in different circuits, the dueling 
positions of the DOJ and the EEOC, and 
congressional inability to clarify the law, the 
trend in public opinion is clear. In 1996, when 
Gallup first polled the issue, only 27 percent 
of respondents indicated support for same-
sex marriage. By 2017, 64 percent of 
respondents thought same-sex marriage 
should be legal and 72 percent supported 
same-sex relations.  Increasing enactment or 
enforcement of state and local laws 
prohibiting workplace discrimination based 
on sexual orientation reflect this trend. 
It behooves employers throughout the 
country to begin acting now as though such 
discrimination is illegal as well as unwise. 
Even employers in states lacking anti-
discrimination statutes have no business 
reason to permit discrimination. As Apple 
CEO Tim Cook wrote in support of federal 
legislation to prohibit sexual orientation 
discrimination, “embracing people’s 
individuality is a matter of basic human 
dignity and civil rights.  It also turns out to be 
great for the creativity that drives our 
business.” Given the increasing legal risks of 
permitting sexual orientation discrimination, 
the lack of any business reason for doing so, 
and this country’s evolving consensus in 
support of equal rights, employers should not 
wait for the remaining states and federal 
circuits to catch up to Hively. Employers 
throughout the country should adopt policies 
and practices that protect their employees 
from employment discrimination based on 
sexual orientation. Certainly for national 
employers, this is the only sensible approach; 
it will reduce possible administrative burdens 
and risks of getting it wrong as to some 
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employees who may move within the 
company from state to state, with unexpected 
legal cost, and it will enhance consistency 
and fairness within the enterprise. All 
employers that follow Hively’s holding will 
benefit from reduced liability, increased 
equality, and a more competitive workforce.
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“Justice Department Says Rights Law Doesn’t Protect Gays” 
 
 
New York Times 
 
Alan Feuer 
 
July 27, 2017 
 
The Justice Department has filed court papers 
arguing that a major federal civil rights law 
does not protect employees from 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, 
taking a stand against a decision reached 
under President Barack Obama. 
The department’s move to insert itself into a 
federal case in New York was an unusual 
example of top officials in Washington 
intervening in court in what is an important 
but essentially private dispute between a 
worker and his boss over gay rights issues. 
“The sole question here is whether, as a 
matter of law, Title VII reaches sexual 
orientation discrimination,” the Justice 
Department said in a friend-of-the-court 
brief, citing the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which 
bars discrimination in the workplace based 
on “race, color, religion, sex or national 
origin.” “It does not, as has been settled for 
decades. Any efforts to amend Title VII’s 
scope should be directed to Congress rather 
than the courts.” 
The department filed its brief on Wednesday, 
the same day President Trump announced on 
Twitter that transgender people would be 
banned from serving in the military, raising 
concerns among civil rights activists that the 
Trump administration was trying to 
undermine lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender rights won under previous 
administrations. 
The filing came in a discrimination case 
before the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit involving Donald Zarda, a 
skydiving instructor. In 2010, Mr. Zarda was 
fired by his employer, a Long Island 
company called Altitude Express. Before 
taking a female client on a tandem dive, Mr. 
Zarda told the woman he was gay to assuage 
any awkwardness that might arise from his 
being tightly strapped to her during the jump. 
The woman’s husband complained to the 
company, which subsequently fired Mr. 
Zarda. Mr. Zarda then sued Altitude Express, 
claiming it had violated Title VII. 
Under Attorney General Jeff Sessions, the 
Justice Department has now stepped into the 
fray. In its brief, the department noted that 
every Congress since 1974 has declined to 
add a sexual-orientation provision to Title 
VII, despite what it called “notable changes 
in societal and cultural attitudes.” The brief 
also said that the federal government, as the 
largest employer in the country, had a 
“substantial and unique interest” in the 
proper interpretation of Title VII. 
In 2015, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, under Mr. Obama, issued a 
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contrary ruling, deciding on a vote of three 
Democrats to two Republicans that 
discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation was illegal. That ruling, which 
was reviewed by the Obama administration’s 
Justice Department, did not formally bind the 
federal courts, although courts often defer to 
federal agencies when they interpret laws that 
come under their jurisdiction. 
In its brief, the Trump administration’s 
Justice Department said the E.E.O.C., which 
had also filed court papers supporting Mr. 
Zarda, was “not speaking for the United 
States.” 
In 2014, Eric Holder, Mr. Obama’s attorney 
general, issued a memo stating that in any 
litigation that came before it, the Justice 
Department would take the position that the 
protections afforded by Title VII would be 
extended to include a person’s gender 
identity, including transgender status. The 
future of that memo under Mr. Trump 
remains unclear. 
Mr. Holder noted the Trump administration’s 
moves on Twitter on Thursday. 
While the Obama administration’s legal 
approach to gay rights evolved over time, it 
never declared that bans on sex 
discrimination applied to sexual orientation 
alone, absent some evidence that the 
discrimination targeted a person based on 
gender stereotypes. Rather, it adopted a wait-
and-see attitude as the law continued to 
develop. 
Against that backdrop, the Trump Justice 
Department’s decision to file the brief 
strongly declaring that sex discrimination 
does not encompass bias based only on 
sexual orientation was a striking shift in tone. 
It was unclear why the Justice Department 
filed the brief when it did and whether it was 
a stand-alone effort or part of a larger 
ideological push. 
In 2015, a lower court on Long Island first 
considered Mr. Zarda’s case and ruled 
against him, deciding, despite the E.E.O.C. 
ruling, that sexual orientation was not 
included in the civil rights law’s prohibition 
against discrimination based on “sex.” In 
April, the Second Circuit in New 
York upheld that court’s decision, even 
though it noted “a longstanding tension in 
Title VII case law.” 
Federal appeals courts have issued 
contradictory rulings on the matter. In 2000, 
while considering the case of a Long Island 
postal worker, Dwayne Simonton, who was 
abused at work for being gay, the Second 
Circuit ruledthat the language of Title VII did 
not bar discrimination based on sexual 
orientation. The ruling also noted that 
Congress had repeatedly declined to include 
such a provision in the law. 
“There can be no doubt that the conduct 
allegedly engaged in by Simonton’s co-
workers is morally reprehensible,” the court 
wrote in 2000. It added, however, that “the 
law is well-settled in this circuit.” 
Shortly after the new brief was filed, civil 
rights activists attacked it. In a statement on 
Wednesday, Vanita Gupta, who ran the 
Justice Department’s civil rights division 
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under Mr. Obama, said the Trump 
administration’s court filing “contravenes 
recent court decisions and guidance issued by 
the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission.” 
On Twitter on Wednesday night, Ms. Gupta, 
who is the president of the Leadership 
Conference on Civil and Human Rights, 
noted that only political appointees, not 
career employees, from her former office at 
the Justice Department had signed the brief. 
The American Civil Liberties Union called 
the brief a “gratuitous and extraordinary 
attack on L.G.B.T. people’s civil rights.” In a 
statement, James Esseks, the director of the 
organization’s L.G.B.T. and H.I.V. Project, 
added, “The Sessions-led Justice Department 
and the Trump administration are actively 
working to expose people to discrimination.” 
In his own statement, Devin O’Malley, a 
Justice Department spokesman, said the brief 
was “consistent with the Justice 
Department’s longstanding position and the 
holdings of 10 different courts of appeals.” 
Mr. O’Malley added that the filing “reaffirms 
the department’s fundamental belief that the 
courts cannot expand the law beyond what 
Congress has provided.” 
Some states like New York have their own 
laws banning bias in the workplace based on 
sexual orientation, but several states do not. 
“Without a federal standard,” said Douglas 
Wigdor, a prominent New York City 
employment lawyer, “many people could be 
exposed to discrimination at work just 
because they’re gay.” 
Mr. Zarda brought claims against his 
employer under both federal and state law, 
according to his lawyer, Gregory Antollino. 
But the state case failed in October 2015 
because state law requires a higher burden of 
proof than federal law to show 
discrimination, and because by the time it 
went to trial, Mr. Zarda had died, Mr. 
Antollino said. 
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“Post-Kennedy Court Likely To Take Narrow View of Title VII” 
 
 
Law360 
 
Braden Campbell 
 
June 28, 2018 
 
A circuit split on whether Title VII's ban on 
workplace sex discrimination includes bias 
based on sexual orientation had civil rights 
advocates hoping the U.S. Supreme 
Court would declare that federal law protects 
gay workers, but Justice Anthony 
Kennedy's retirement means that's a long 
shot, experts say. 
 
Justice Kennedy’s reputation as a swing 
voter derived largely from his siding with the 
high court’s liberal wing on gay rights, most 
notably casting the deciding vote and 
authoring the opinion in Obergefell v. 
Hodges, which made same-sex marriage 
legal nationwide. 
 
But attorneys say his successor may be more 
willing to toe the conservative line on gay 
rights should the post-Kennedy court take up 
one of two pending petitions for certiorari on 
the question of Title VII’s reach. 
 
“[Justice Kennedy’s] legacy is in this area … 
this is what he stood for, as being kind of the 
deciding vote in all these different cases,” 
said Michelle Phillips, a Jackson Lewis 
PC attorney whose practice focuses on 
LGBT issues. “I think whoever is vetting the 
potential candidates, they’re going to be 
careful to ensure a conservative position is 
maintained on the court.” 
Kennedy’s retirement comes amid debate 
among federal courts about how to interpret 
Title VII’s ban on discrimination on the 
“basis of … sex.” 
 
For the first half-century after Congress 
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, every 
appeals court to consider whether its ban on 
workplace discrimination covers sexual 
orientation said it doesn’t. But in the last few 
years, that blanket of precedent has frayed. 
 
The Seventh Circuit became the first to break 
from its sister courts in April 2017, ruling in 
an en banc opinion that it’s “impossible to 
discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation without discriminating on the 
basis of sex.” And the en banc Second 
Circuit deepened the split in February, 
abandoning nearly 20-year-old precedent and 
reviving gay skydiving instructor Donald 
Zarda’s bias suit against Altitude Express 
Inc., his former employer. Zarda died in 
2014, and his family has pursued the suit. 
 
But not every court has followed this trend. 
The Eleventh Circuit last July declined to 
reconsider en banc hospital security guard 
Jameka Evans’ allegations she was fired 
because she is a lesbian, and last month 
denied Georgia municipal worker Gerald 
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Bostock’s bid for a rehearing on claims he 
was a victim of anti-gay bias. 
 
Bostock and Altitude Express appealed their 
losses to the Supreme Court over a five-day 
span last month. If either petition is accepted, 
Kennedy’s departure means its authors will 
argue before a very different bench than the 
one they appealed to. 
 
Though Kennedy was appointed by Ronald 
Reagan and sided with the court’s 
conservatives in many matters, he frequently 
voted with the liberal wing on LGBT issues. 
In his three decades on the bench, Kennedy 
penned opinions that blocked states from 
proscribing laws making sexual orientation a 
protected class, struck down state laws 
against sodomy, and gave same-sex couples 
the right to marry. 
 
Given his track record, Kennedy’s retirement 
has LGBT advocates worried. 
 
“There are no guarantees, nor do we count on 
any one particular justice, but [Justice 
Kennedy] is somebody who had shown to be, 
at least in the realm of LGBT rights, an ally,” 
said Lambda Legal attorney Omar Gonzalez-
Pagan, who is involved in Zarda and other 
recent cases. “So we do have some concern.” 
 
If Kennedy’s loss weren’t enough, it’s likely 
he’ll be replaced by someone hand-picked for 
his or her conservative views on social issues, 
attorneys say. President Donald Trump 
is reportedly choosing from a list of a few 
dozen people, any one of whom would likely 
be to Kennedy’s right on gay rights. 
 
“Everybody feels this is where we’re going to 
see the most change,” said Collin O’Connor 
Udell, a Supreme Court litigator at Jackson 
Lewis PC. “President Trump has said he 
wants to nominate people that want to 
overturn Roe v. Wade … I imagine that with 
respect to gay rights, it’ll be like that as well.” 
 
But it’s not a foregone conclusion that Justice 
Kennedy’s successor will be a conservative 
hard-liner, Littler Mendelson PC attorney 
Stephen Melnick said. 
 
With Republicans holding just a 51-seat 
majority in the Senate, the president may 
have to nominate someone in the middle to 
stock the court quickly, he said. 
 
“It’s possible that the president would want 
to appoint someone who is a moderate in 
LGBT issues, to tamp down any strong 
dissent to the appointment,” Melnick said. “If 
not … it is likely that a more solidly 
conservative court would interpret Title VII 
narrowly.” 
 
The dispute is one of statutory construction at 
its heart, so there’s some hope for gay rights 
advocates at the post-Kennedy court. 
 
While a ruling in Zarda or Bostock would 
expand or shrink gay rights, the underlying 
legal question is semantic: Does the word 
“sex” in Title VII’s ban on discriminating 
against workers on the “basis of … sex” 
encompass sexual orientation? Judges have 
so far answered that question in a variety of 
ways. 
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“If you read all the varying decisions in the 
Zarda case, the concurrences and the 
dissents, there’s not disagreement on whether 
it’s a good policy to protect people from 
sexual orientation discrimination,” Abrams 
Fensterman employment practice head 
Sharon Stiller said. “But there is substantial 
disagreement on what Title VII means.” 
 
Gay rights advocates have three main 
arguments against the narrower 
interpretation: it treats men who date men 
differently than it does women who date men, 
it treats workers differently based on the sex 
of those they date and it punishes gay workers 
for failing to meet the stereotype of dating 
members of the opposite sex. 
 
Though conservative appointees are viewed 
as predisposed to rule against gay rights, the 
Seventh and Second Circuits ruled for 
workers “by lopsided margins” that don’t 
align with the courts’ political makeups, 
Gonzalez-Pagan said. 
 
“Of those arguments, different judges of 
different persuasions have adopted and 
endorsed different ones,” Gonzalez-Pagan 
said. “It’s a full menu of possibilities.”
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“Justice Kennedy’s Masterpiece Ruling” 
 
 
The Atlantic 
 
Garrett Epps 
 
June 4, 2018  
 
When the Supreme Court opened its October 
term last year, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission—the 
“gay wedding cake” case—loomed as a 
blockbuster, a major step toward resolving 
conflicts between religious freedom and anti-
discrimination laws protecting LGBT people 
in general and same-sex married couples in 
particular. 
 
But someone left the cakeshop in the rain. 
 
On Monday, the Supreme Court produced the 
melted remnant. By a contentious majority of 
7–2, the Court held for the religious baker, 
Jack Phillips, who had refused to sell a cake 
to a same-sex couple, Charlie Craig and Dave 
Mullins, for a post-hoc celebration of their 
out-of-state wedding. It used a rationale 
applicable only to this case, which sheds no 
light on the larger civil-rights issues. 
 
It was obvious at oral argument in December 
that the case had what Supreme Court 
insiders call “vehicle problems”—meaning 
that the facts and the record did not clearly 
tee up the issue the parties were seeking to 
resolve. (Some years ago, The New York 
Times’ Adam Liptak cogently explained the 
concept of a “clean vehicle.”) 
On Monday, a majority opinion by Justice 
Anthony Kennedy listed the reasons why this 
case turned out to be a lemon. First, is what 
the couple asked for—a cake for a private 
celebration—really “speech” or “free 
exercise of religion” at all? Second, the 
record was unclear whether Phillips refused 
only to bake a cake with a “wedding” 
message or refused to provide any cake at all 
for Craig and Mullins’s celebration. Third, 
the events occurred before the Court’s 
decision, in Obergefell v. Hodges, that same-
sex couples have a right to marry. Thus, 
Phillips in part based his denial on the fact 
that, at the time, Colorado did not permit 
same-sex marriage—that “the potential 
customers ‘were doing something illegal.’” 
Fourth, as Justice Kennedy pointed out at oral 
argument, the record was muddled by anti-
religious statements made by state officials 
who considered the case below. 
 
And finally, though the Court did not discuss 
this aspect, Phillips’s attorneys (from the 
religious-right legal powerhouse Alliance 
Defending Freedom) and the Trump 
administration made extravagant claims. 
They suggested that the Court skip the 
religious-freedom issue altogether and decide 
the case on pure free-speech grounds. Had it 
done so, a decision for Phillips would have 
given constitutional protection to an 
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unknown number of discriminations against 
LGBT people and couples, and indeed—by 
the government’s own concession—called 
into question laws protecting women and 
racial minorities. 
 
All told, the Court would have done well to 
do to Cakeshop what it had done the week 
before to an obscure case with a muddled 
record called City of Hays, Kansas v. Vogt—
dismissed the writ of certiorari 
as “improvidently granted.” A better case—
with a clean record, decided 
after Obergefell, and perhaps with more 
careful briefing—would be sure to come 
along. 
 
Instead, the Court decided the case, but on the 
narrowest grounds imaginable—that the 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission during its 
consideration of the case had shown anti-
religious bias. The result was a decision that 
provides almost no guidance for lower courts 
facing similar cases. “In this case,” Kennedy 
wrote, “the adjudication concerned a context 
that may well be different going forward.” 
Thus, “the outcome of cases like this in other 
circumstances must await further elaboration 
in the courts.” 
 
The action in the Cakeshop opinions, in fact, 
involved jockeying for position in those 
future cases between the moderate liberals, 
led in this case by Justice Elena Kagan, and 
the hard-right conservatives, led here by 
Justice Neil Gorsuch. 
 
Kennedy’s opinion began by setting out his 
vision of the conflict of two constitutional 
principles. “The first is the authority of a state 
… to protect the rights and dignity of gay 
persons who are, or wish to be, married”; the 
second is “the right of all persons to exercise 
fundamental freedoms under the First 
Amendment.” Jack Phillips claimed the 
commission’s order violated his rights of free 
speech and free exercise; Kennedy found him 
half right. The opinion was written entirely in 
terms of “free exercise” of religion—a 
narrower ground than the free-speech 
argument. 
 
Kennedy found no problem with civil-rights 
statutes protecting gays and lesbians; the 
opinion repeated long-established religion 
that religious scruples do not necessarily 
overcome civil-rights laws. (Kennedy even 
cited Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, a 
1968 case that rejected a claim for religious 
exemption for a barbecue joint whose owner 
asserted that serving black people offended 
his religion.) Instead, Kennedy said, the 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, in its 
hearing, did not afford Phillips “neutral and 
respectful consideration of his claims” for 
religious exemption. 
 
As evidence, Kennedy cited statements by 
commissioners “that religious beliefs cannot 
legitimately be carried into the public sphere 
or commercial domain.” He coupled those 
with another statement in which a member 
said “freedom of religion and religion has 
been used to justify all kinds of 
discrimination through history, whether it be 
slavery, whether it be the Holocaust.” That 
kind of claim, the commissioner said, “is one 
of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that 
people can use to … hurt others.” 
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Kennedy saw this as anti-religious bias in “at 
least two distinct ways: by describing 
[religion] as merely rhetorical” and by 
comparing it to “defenses of slavery and the 
Holocaust.” These statements infected the 
judgment below with hostility to religion, he 
said. 
 
In addition, Kennedy said, the commission 
had earlier dismissed complaints brought 
against three other bakers by a conservative 
Christian named William Jack. Jack asked 
them to create cakes depicting gay couples 
with a cross-out mark, and Bible verses 
denouncing homosexuality. As Kennedy read 
the record, the commission had dismissed 
Jack’s complaint because it found the 
messages “offensive.” The decision, thus, 
was based on “the government’s own 
assessment of offensiveness,” which the First 
Amendment forbids. 
 
The latter part of the opinion seems fairly 
dubious to me. I don’t read the commission’s 
language as he does; I read it as saying that 
the bakers refused the message because they 
found it offensive. Under a proper civil-rights 
law, businesses cannot discriminate against a 
customer because of his or her race, or 
religion, or sexual orientation; businesses, 
however, aren’t bound by the First 
Amendment and can reject messages—as 
long as they would reject the same message 
from any customer. 
 
The commission below found that 
Masterpiece had denied a wedding cake to 
Craig and Mullins because they are gay. The 
bakeries in the Jack cases had refused only a 
very specific cake—and not because Jack 
was a Christian but because the specific 
message offended them. Civil-rights laws 
protect individuals, not messages. 
 
This part of Kennedy’s opinion set off the 
battle of the concurrences. Kagan, joined by 
Justice Stephen Breyer, warned lower courts 
that discrimination against messages is not 
religious discrimination. Phillips denied 
service to Craig and Mullins because they are 
gay. The other bakers would not bake an anti-
gay cake for anyone of any race, creed, color, 
or sexual orientation, she said. Thus, “the 
bakers did not single out Jack because of his 
religion, but instead treated him in the same 
way they would have treated anyone else.” 
 
Gorsuch, joined by Alito, argued that this was 
a distinction without a difference. He cited 
first the bakers’ statements that they would 
not make anti-gay cakes for anyone, then a 
statement by Phillips that he “would have 
refused to create a cake celebrating a same-
sex marriage for any customer, regardless of 
his or her sexual orientation.” Thus, Gorsuch 
wrote, “the two cases share all legally salient 
features.” A lot will ride on which of these 
arguments future courts find most persuasive. 
 
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote separately to 
say that the case should have been decided on 
free-speech grounds. Gorsuch joined this 
opinion as well, signaling his openness to this 
broader claim. 
 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, dissented. In her 
view, the commission’s decision was entirely 
proper. First, “Phillips submitted no evidence 
showing that an objective observer 
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understands a wedding cake to convey a 
message, much less that the observer 
understands the message to be the baker’s.” 
Second, the Jack case and Masterpiece are 
quite different, she argued: “While Jack 
requested cakes with particular text 
inscribed, Craig and Mullins were refused the 
sale of any wedding cake at all. They were 
turned away before any specific cake design 
could be discussed.” 
So after prolonged labor, on Monday the 
Court brought forth what can only generously 
be called a mouse. The issue should have 
been saved for a better case. That it wasn’t, I 
suspect, results from Kennedy’s interest in 
this particular set of facts. Twenty-six years 
ago, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. 
City of Hialeah, he wrote a major opinion on 
religious animus that relied in part on public 
statements of local officials. He may not have 
been able to resist returning to, and 
reaffirming, that opinion in the autumn of his 
career. 
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“Baker claims religious persecution again—this time after denying cake for 
transgender woman” 
 
 
Washington Post 
 
Amy B. Wang 
 
August 15, 2018 
 
Add another layer to the legal drama 
surrounding the Colorado baker who refused 
to make a wedding cake for a same-sex 
couple — and took his case all the way to the 
Supreme Court. 
Jack Phillips, owner of Masterpiece 
Cakeshop in Lakewood, Colo., on Tuesday 
filed a federal lawsuit against the state 
alleging religious discrimination. 
This time, the cake at the center of the 
controversy was not for a wedding. In June 
2017, Colorado lawyer Autumn Scardina 
called Masterpiece Cakeshop to request a 
custom cake that was blue on the outside and 
pink on the inside. 
The occasion, Scardina told the bakery’s 
employees, was to celebrate her birthday, as 
well as the seventh anniversary of the day she 
had come out as transgender. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop ultimately refused 
Scardina’s order on religious grounds. 
“Phillips declined to create the cake with the 
blue-and-pink design because it would have 
celebrated messages contrary to his religious 
belief that sex — the status of being male or 
female — is given by God, is biologically 
determined, is not determined by perceptions 
or feelings, and cannot be chosen or 
changed,” the complaint stated. 
More than a year later, on June 28, the 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission ruled that 
there was probable cause that Phillips had 
discriminated against Scardina on the basis of 
gender identity. 
In refusing to make a cake for the transgender 
woman, Phillips had “denied her equal 
enjoyment of a place of public 
accommodation,” Aubrey Elenis, director of 
the Colorado Civil Rights Division, wrote in 
her ruling. 
The commission’s latest decision came two 
weeks after the Supreme Court ruled 
narrowly in favor of Phillips in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission, a case that had originated when 
Phillips refused to bake a wedding cake for a 
same-sex couple in 2012. 
As The Washington Post’s Robert Barnes 
reported, the 7-to-2 Supreme Court decision 
was in favor of Phillips — but focused on his 
treatment by the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission and did not necessarily set a 
standard for future similar cases: 
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“The neutral and respectful 
consideration to which Phillips was 
entitled was compromised here,” 
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote, 
adding that the commission’s 
decision that the baker violated the 
state’s anti-discrimination law must 
be set aside. 
But Kennedy acknowledged that the 
decision was more of a start than a 
conclusion to the court’s 
consideration of the rights of those 
with religious objections to same-sex 
marriage and the rights of gay people, 
who “cannot be treated as social 
outcasts or as inferior in dignity and 
worth.” 
Future cases that raise those issues 
“must be resolved with tolerance, 
without undue disrespect to sincere 
religious beliefs, and without 
subjecting gay persons to indignities 
when they seek goods and services in 
an open market,” he wrote. 
The Alliance Defending Freedom, a 
Christian legal nonprofit that funded 
Phillips’s previous case, said Colorado 
officials were “doubling down on their anti-
religious hostility” in their treatment of the 
baker, according to a statement regarding this 
new lawsuit, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. 
Elenis. 
“You would think that a clear Supreme Court 
decision against their first effort would give 
them pause,” the group stated. “But it seems 
like some in the state government are hellbent 
on punishing Jack for living according to his 
faith. If that isn’t hostility, what is?” 
The group pointed out that Scardina’s request 
for a blue-and-pink cake came on the same 
day — June 26, 2017 — that the Supreme 
Court announced that it would 
hear Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission, indicating Phillips 
had been “targeted” by some Colorado 
citizens. 
“The first time around, it looked like 
Colorado was biased against people of faith,” 
the group stated. “Now it just looks like the 
state is biased against people named ‘Jack 
Phillips.’ In moving ahead on this new case, 
the government is yet again confirming that 
it applies its law in an arbitrary and unequal 
way, which the Supreme Court has already 
said it cannot do.” 
A representative for the Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission said that the commission 
could not comment on pending or active 
litigation and, by law, could not verify or 
disclose the existence of charges detailed by 
Phillips. 
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“Federal Law On Transgender, Sexual Orientation Bias a Mixed Bag” 
 
 
Bloomberg 
 
Jon Steingart 
 
April 11, 2018 
 
Some workers and employers are uncertain 
about what’s prohibited under a federal law 
against sex discrimination in the workplace 
in light of a patchwork of legal 
interpretations. 
 
“For large national employers, regardless of 
how Title VII is interpreted, you have some 
number of states, cities, or federal contractors 
who have explicit laws that clearly protect 
employees from discrimination based on 
sexual orientation or gender identity,” Mike 
Eastman, managing counsel at NT Lakis, told 
Bloomberg Law. NT Lakis helps large 
employers comply with workplace 
obligations. 
 
Several federal appeals courts in recent years 
have reached different conclusions about 
whether Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act prohibits discrimination based on sexual 
orientation or transgender status. 
The Seventh Circuit in April 2017 became 
the first to rule that sexual orientation 
discrimination is a form of sex 
discrimination. The Second Circuit joined it 
in February 2018. The Eleventh Circuit, 
meanwhile, reached the opposite conclusion 
in March 2017. The circuit split has 
fueled speculation that the U.S. Supreme 
Court will take up the question. 
 
The Tenth Circuit in September 2007 said 
Title VII doesn’t cover transgender 
discrimination. However, the Sixth Circuit in 
August 2004 said Title VII prohibits it as a 
form of unlawful sex stereotyping. 
 
Several cases rely on precedent in which the 
U.S. Supreme Court established “sex 
stereotyping” as a prohibited form of sex 
discrimination. The court ruled that a woman 
could prove a discrimination case because 
she didn’t carry herself the way stereotypes 
about how women behave suggest she 
should. 
 
The Eleventh Circuit compared 
discriminating against a transgender person 
to stereotyping on the basis of “gender-based 
behavioral norms” in a 2011 ruling. The 
Sixth Circuit earlier this year expanded its 
interpretation of Title VII and said a worker 
can bring a sex discrimination claim based on 
transgender identity alone, without having to 
go into stereotyping. In the ruling, the Sixth 
Circuit also rejected the employer’s 
argument that its action was protected under 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 
 
Differing views have been voiced within the 
executive branch. The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, which investigates 
charges of discrimination under Title VII and 
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enforces it in private sector and federal 
workplaces, holds the expansive view of the 
law’s scope on sexual 
orientation and transgender status. The 
Justice Department, which enforces Title VII 
in state and local public sector workplaces, 
takes the narrower view with respect 
to sexual orientation and transgender status. 
 
Employers are trying to deal with “real 
practical challenges” rather than the question 
of “is it covered or not?” Eastman told 
Bloomberg Law. As examples, he listed 
questions employers with transgender 
employees ask: “What’s the best way to deal 
with a transitioning employee? What are the 
sort of things we have to think through? What 
kind of plans are we going to make? How can 
we be helpful?” 
 
Employers ask these questions because 
they’re concerned with doing what’s right, 
not with doing the minimum that the law 
says, he said. “There’s good reason to go 
beyond what the law requires,” he said. 
“They rarely say they’re going to have an 
anti-harassment policy that just barely 
satisfies Title VII.” 
 
Fifth Circuit May Be Next 
 
One circuit that hasn’t ruled on sexual 
orientation or transgender discrimination 
under Title VII is the Fifth Circuit. It covers 
federal courts in Texas, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi. 
 
Phillips 66, a downstream energy company, 
prevailed April 4 in a Title VII transgender 
discrimination lawsuit. Nicole Wittmer said 
the company rescinded a job offer after 
learning she was transgender. She said the 
company used a discrepancy in her 
employment history to conceal its 
discriminatory intent. 
 
Recent rulings in other circuits were 
persuasive for concluding that Title VII 
covers transgender status, Judge Lee H. 
Rosenthal of the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas said. 
She ruled against Wittmer because the 
evidence showed Phillips 66 rescinded her 
job offer for reasons unrelated to her sex. 
“The record shows no evidence that Phillips 
knew about Wittmer’s status as a transgender 
woman until after it had decided to rescind 
the offer,” she wrote. 
 
Even though Rosenthal ruled against 
Wittmer, her lawyer was encouraged that 
Rosenthal took a more expansive view of 
Title VII. 
 
“While we are certainly disappointed that the 
judge didn’t see this particular set of facts in 
a way to allow Ms. Wittmer to get to a jury, 
what she did say is if you’re transgender, 
you’re allowed to get protections under law,” 
Alfonso Kennard with Kennard Law, P.C. in 
Houston, told Bloomberg Law. 
 
Kennard “can’t say at this time” whether 
Wittmer will appeal to the Fifth Circuit. But 
even if Rosenthal’s ruling is the last word in 
Wittmer’s case, it will be persuasive for other 
Title VII transgender discrimination cases, he 
said. “Anyone looking to make sense of the 
current status of law on this topic in the Fifth 
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Circuit needs look no further than this order 
by Judge Rosenthal,” he said. 
 
A ruling against a transgender worker that 
embraces an expansive view of Title VII isn’t 
a complete loss, Shawn Meerkamper, a staff 
attorney with Transgender Law Center in 
Oakland, Calif., said. “The plaintiff won on 
the law but lost on the facts,” Meerkamper 
told Bloomberg Law. A ruling like this lays 
the groundwork for more rulings in favor of 
broad Title VII coverage, they said. 
 
Proceeding with a patchwork of Title VII 
interpretations at the trial and appeals court 
levels isn’t ideal, said Greg Nevins, 
employment fairness project director for 
Lambda Legal, an LGBT civil rights 
advocacy group. Lambda Legal and 
Transgender Law Center are and have been 
involved in cases urging a more expansive 
interpretation, either by directly representing 
workers or filing amicus briefs. 
 
“That is at least an issue by proceeding with 
judicial rulings rather than statute that it can 
leave an issue where people’s rights are less 
clearly understood by employers and workers 
and judges and lawyers,” the Atlanta-based 
Nevins told Bloomberg Law. “Even though I 
adamantly believe that Congress already 
passed a law that protects the LGBT 
community from discrimination in 
employment, it wouldn’t be a bad idea if they 
passed one that makes it explicit.” 
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“Transgender Workers Gain New Protection Under Court Ruling” 
 
 
New York Times 
 
Robert Pear 
 
March 24, 2018 
 
Employers are moving to adopt or strengthen 
policies to prevent bias against transgender 
people after the latest in a series of court 
rulings that have extended protections for an 
increasingly diverse work force. 
A federal appeals court, rejecting the position 
of the Trump administration, ruled this month 
that transgender people are protected by a 
civil rights law that bans workplace 
discrimination based on sex. 
Lawyers who specialize in employment cases 
said that the decision, by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in 
Cincinnati, was highly significant. The court 
held that job discrimination on the basis of 
transgender status was inherently sex 
discrimination, and that the employer in this 
case could not claim an exemption from the 
law because of his religious beliefs. 
The case was brought by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, an 
independent federal agency, on behalf of a 
funeral director who had been fired by a 
Michigan funeral home after informing the 
owner that she intended to transition from 
male to female and would dress as a woman 
while at work. 
Job discrimination based on a person’s 
transgender status violates Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court ruled. 
Under the law, it said, “gender must be 
irrelevant to employment decisions.” 
The court’s conclusion is at odds with a 
position taken by Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions in October. In a memorandum to 
Justice Department lawyers, he said that 
“Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination 
encompasses discrimination between men 
and women but does not encompass 
discrimination based on gender identity per 
se, including transgender status.” 
The funeral home maintained that it did not 
violate federal law by requiring the employee 
to comply with a sex-specific dress code. 
Moreover, the owner of the home, Thomas 
Rost, who has been a Christian for more than 
65 years, said that forcing him to employ the 
transgender worker would impose a 
substantial burden on his sincerely held 
religious beliefs and would therefore violate 
another law, the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993. 
The court disagreed, saying that employees 
may not be discriminated against because 
they fail to conform to “stereotypical gender 
norms” — in this case, an employer’s notion 
of “how biologically male persons should 
dress, appear, behave and identify.” 
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Discrimination based on transgender status is 
a form of sex discrimination, said the 
decision, written by Judge Karen Nelson 
Moore for a unanimous three-judge panel, 
because “an employer cannot discriminate 
against an employee for being transgender 
without considering that employee’s 
biological sex.” 
Scott Rabe, an expert on employment law at 
the firm Seyfarth Shaw, said that the ruling 
was important because “it addresses two hot-
button topics in employment law: the scope 
of the definition of ‘sex discrimination’ under 
Title VII and the impact of laws protecting 
the free exercise of religion in the 
workplace.” 
“The ruling is a big win for the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission and 
for transgender people,” Mr. Rabe said. “The 
court sent a strong message that the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act has minimal impact 
on the E.E.O.C.’s authority to enforce the 
anti-discrimination laws under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act.” 
In an interview, the employee at the center of 
the case, Aimee Stephens, 57, said she had 
been shocked by her dismissal. 
“I had a hard time believing that a company 
or a person could get away with firing me 
because I was transgender,” Ms. Stephens 
said. “It didn’t seem right.” But, she said, she 
has since learned that “it’s a pretty common 
occurrence for transgender people to be fired 
because they are transgender or don’t meet 
the expectations of what another individual 
thinks they should be.’’ 
In court papers, Mr. Rost said he wanted to 
run his business in keeping with his religious 
belief that “a person’s sex (whether male or 
female) is an immutable God-given gift and 
that people should not deny or attempt to 
change their sex.” 
The court decision is binding in states 
covered by the Sixth Circuit: Kentucky, 
Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee. But its 
reasoning could have influence elsewhere. 
As it embraced a broad view of protections 
under Title VII, the court also rejected an 
expansive interpretation of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act. 
That law figured prominently in dozens of 
court cases in which employers challenged an 
Obama-era rule that required them to provide 
insurance coverage for contraception under 
the Affordable Care Act. The Trump 
administration has proposed to roll back that 
requirement by offering an exemption to any 
employer that objects to covering birth 
control on the basis of religious beliefs. 
Doron M. Kalir, a law professor at Cleveland 
State University in Ohio, said the court ruling 
showed how judges were “extending the 
protection of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
to a more diverse work force of gays, lesbians 
and transgender people.” 
The funeral home has not said whether it will 
appeal the ruling. Mr. Kalir said that at least 
several Supreme Court justices, if presented 
with the issue, would probably vote to 
overturn the ruling on the ground that 
Congress was not thinking about transgender 
people when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. (Mr. Kalir wrote a friend-of-the-court 
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brief for a civil rights group, Equality Ohio, 
that was quoted by the appeals court.) 
In a separate case last year, Judge Richard A. 
Posner of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit, in Chicago, said the 
meaning of the civil rights law and the word 
“sex” had changed over the years. 
“It is well-nigh certain that homosexuality, 
male or female, did not figure in the minds of 
the legislators who enacted Title VII,” wrote 
Judge Posner, who retired from the federal 
bench in September. But, he said, the law 
“invites an interpretation that will update it to 
the present,” and the word “sex” in Title VII 
can now, after more than a half-century, be 
“understood to include homosexuality.” 
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“U.S. anti-bias law does not protect transgender workers: Justice Dept” 
 
 
Reuters 
 
Daniel Wiessner and Sarah N. Lynch 
 
October 5, 2017 
 
The U.S. Department of Justice has reversed 
course on whether federal law banning sex 
discrimination in the workplace provides 
protections for transgender employees, 
saying in a memo that it does not. 
 
The memo sent to U.S. Attorneys’ offices on 
Wednesday by Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions says Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 only prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of a worker’s biological sex, and not 
their gender identity.  
 
Sessions rescinded a Justice Department 
memo from 2014 that said Title VII does 
protect transgender people, a position also 
taken by several federal appeals courts in 
recent years. 
 
It was the Trump administration’s latest 
move to roll back Obama administration 
policies on LGBT issues. In August, 
President Donald Trump signed a memo 
directing the U.S. military not to accept 
transgender men and women as recruits, 
reversing a policy that allowed transgender 
people to serve openly.  
 
And last month, the Justice Department 
appeared before a federal appeals court in 
Manhattan to argue that Title VII does not 
provide protections to gay and lesbian 
workers.  
 
The Democratic National Committee 
criticized Wednesday’s memo in a statement, 
and urged Congress to pass a law explicitly 
protecting LGBT workers from 
discrimination.  
 
Department of Justice spokesman Devin 
O’Malley said in a statement on Thursday 
that the government could not expand the law 
beyond what Congress had intended. 
 
“Unfortunately, the last administration 
abandoned that fundamental principle, which 
necessitated today’s action,” he said.  
 
But Sharon McGowan of LGBT group 
Lambda Legal, who worked at the Justice 
Department during the Obama 
administration, said the memo “blatantly 
ignores” a growing body of court decisions 
that said discrimination against transgender 
people is a type of sex bias.  
 
“We are confident that the courts will see this 
flip in position for what it is - an anti-LGBT 
political pronouncement that finds no support 
in the law,” she said.  
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All three federal appeals courts to consider 
the issue over the last two decades have said 
discrimination against transgender workers is 
unlawful.  
 
Most recently, an appeals court in Atlanta in 
2011 said the Georgia state legislature 
unlawfully fired a transgender woman after 
she told her supervisor she planned to 
transition from male to female. 
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“Title VII In Transition? Texas Federal Court Rules That Anti-Discrimination 
Statute Protects Transgender Individuals” 
 
 
Lexology 
 
Stephen Fox and Jonathan Clark 
 
April 19, 2018 
 
In a landmark ruling, a federal court judge in 
Texas issued an opinion holding—
unequivocally—that Title VII protects 
transgender individuals from discrimination 
based on their gender identity. Wittmer v. 
Phillips 66 Company, No., 4:2017-cv-02188 
(S.D.Tex, April 4, 2018). The ruling is the 
first of its kind in Texas and will likely have 
a major impact in Texas workplaces. Indeed, 
recent studies have shown that approximately 
430,000 workers in Texas identify either 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender 
(LGBT). Of that number, 79% of transgender 
workers in Texas have reported—either 
formally or informally—some kind of 
discrimination in the workplace, including 
harassment, discriminatory hiring practices, 
and promotion denials. Texas employers 
should take note of the recently-issued 
decision. 
Wittmer v. Phillips 66 
Company Background & Holding  
Nicole Wittmer, a transgender woman, sued 
Phillips 66 Company for sex discrimination, 
claiming her job offer from Phillips was 
rescinded after the company learned she was 
transgender. Phillips claimed the offer was 
withdrawn because Wittmer lied during the 
interview/application process. Phillips 
believed that Wittmer had falsely claimed she 
was still working for her former employer at 
the time of the interview when, in fact, she 
had been terminated days prior to the 
interview. Wittmer claimed that this 
justification was pretextual because, in her 
view, Phillips’ actually withdrew the offer 
because she is a transgender woman. 
On April 4, 2018, Judge Lee Rosenthal, the 
Chief Judge for the Southern District of 
Texas, rejected Phillips’ argument that 
Wittmer’s transgender status was not 
protected under federal law, holding 
unequivocally that Title VII protects 
transgender individuals from sex 
discrimination. Ironically, after issuing this 
monumental determination, Judge Rosenthal 
tossed Wittmer’s lawsuit, ruling that Wittmer 
had failed to make a prima facie case of sex 
discrimination and, even if she had, Phillips 
had put forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
and non-pretextual reason for rescinding the 
employment offer. 
A Shifting Legal Consensus 
This opinion joins a chorus of recent 
decisions by various federal circuit and 
district courts expanding Title VII to 
transgender and homosexual individuals. In 
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her decision, Judge Rosenthal relied heavily 
on the Supreme Court’s seminal 1989 case 
of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins in 
concluding Title VII covers transgender-
based sex discrimination. In Hopkins, the 
nation’s high court held Title VII protects 
individuals from discrimination based on 
their perceived failure to conform to gender 
stereotypes. As Judge Rosenthal noted, 
the Hopkins holding has recently been 
expanded by several federal courts to include 
protection of both transgender and 
homosexual persons. In particular, both the 
Sixth and Second circuits, relying on Price 
Waterhouse, ruled this year that Title VII 
covers gender-identity and sexual-orientation 
based discrimination claims.[1] These 
opinions correspond with the Seventh 
Circuit’s 2017 decision in Hively v. Ivy Tech 
Cmt. Coll. of Ind., which held discrimination 
based upon an individual’s sexual orientation 
was a “paradigmatic sex discrimination” 
claim, squarely within Title VII’s ambit. 
Judge Rosenthal found the reasoning from 
these recent decisions persuasive. 
Future Conflict 
The recent national judicial trendline is 
clear—Title VII coverage is expanding 
throughout the federal courts to protect 
individuals from discrimination based on 
their gender identity and sexual orientation. 
But the story is not over. First, Texas-based 
employers in particular should note that the 
usually-conservative Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has not weighed in on the issue. And 
to the extent it does (a question of ‘when’ and 
not ‘if’), there are no guarantees it will fall in 
line with this movement. Indeed, Fifth 
Circuit precedent still holds that a discharge 
based solely on homosexuality is not 
prohibited by Title VII. Blum v. Gulf Oil 
Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979). 
And as recently as last year, the Eleventh 
Circuit, citing Blum, held that a plaintiff-
employee could not state a claim under Title 
VII for workplace discrimination based on 
sexual orientation. Evans v. Georgia Reg’l. 
Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017). 
Second, regardless of trendlines or 
predictions, one thing is abundantly clear: the 
Trump Department of Justice believes, 
unambiguously, that Title VII “does not 
encompass discrimination based on gender 
identity [and] transgender status.” 
Specifically, in October 2017, Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions issued a memorandum 
and amicus brief arguing for a narrow 
interpretation, contending the statute bars 
only discrimination between men and 
women. The memorandum retracts a position 
established during the Obama administration 
and, further, remains at odds with the EEOC. 
Accordingly, the not-too-distant future will 
likely involve a battle before the Supreme 
Court to settle Title VII’s scope in the context 
of sexual orientation and gender identity once 
and for all. 
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“Transgender Student in Bathroom Dispute Wins Court Ruling” 
 
 
New York Times 
 
Matt Stevens 
 
May 22, 2018 
 
A federal judge in Virginia has found in favor 
of a transgender student whose efforts to use 
the boys’ bathrooms at his high school 
reached the Supreme Court and thrust him 
into the middle of a national debate about the 
rights of transgender students. 
In an order handed down on Tuesday, Judge 
Arenda L. Wright Allen of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia denied a motion by the Gloucester 
County school board to dismiss the lawsuit 
brought by the student, Gavin Grimm. 
The school board had maintained that Mr. 
Grimm’s “biological gender” was female and 
had prohibited administrators from allowing 
him to use the boys’ restrooms. He sued the 
school board in July 2015, alleging that its 
policy violated Title IX as well as the equal 
protection clause of the Constitution. 
The board had argued in essence that its 
policy was valid because Title IX allows for 
claims only on the basis of sex, rather than 
gender identity, and that its policy did not 
violate the equal protection clause. 
But Judge Wright Allen disagreed, writing 
that Mr. Grimm’s transgender status 
constituted a claim of sex discrimination and 
that the bathroom policy had “subjected him 
to sex stereotyping,” violations of the law. 
“There were many other ways to protect 
privacy interests in a nondiscriminatory and 
more effective manner than barring Mr. 
Grimm from using the boys’ restrooms,” she 
continued. “The Board’s argument that the 
policy did not discriminate against any one 
class of students is resoundingly 
unpersuasive.” 
In Tuesday’s order, the judge directed 
lawyers for both parties to schedule a 
settlement conference within 30 days. 
“I feel an incredible sense of relief,” Mr. 
Grimm, now 19 and headed to college in the 
fall, said in a statement after the ruling. 
“After fighting this policy since I was 15 
years old, I finally have a court decision 
saying that what the Gloucester County 
School Board did to me was wrong and it was 
against the law. I was determined not to give 
up because I didn’t want any other student to 
have to suffer the same experience that I had 
to go through.” 
In a statement issued late Tuesday, the 
Gloucester County school board said it was 
“aware of the District Court’s decision.” It 
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was not clear whether the board planned to 
appeal. 
A spokeswoman for the Justice Department 
declined to comment on Judge Wright 
Allen’s ruling on Tuesday. 
One of Mr. Grimm’s lawyers said Tuesday 
that he had moved to Berkeley, Calif., and 
would attend college in the Bay Area. The 
lawyer, Josh Block, said they were seeking 
nominal damages and a declaratory judgment 
that the bathroom policy violated Mr. 
Grimm’s rights under Title IX. 
“Title IX protects trans people, and that’s 
what courts have been saying for years,” said 
Mr. Block, a senior staff attorney with the 
A.C.L.U. who was the lead lawyer on Mr. 
Grimm’s case. “Even though this 
administration wants to try to roll back 
protections, they can’t change what the law 
says.” 
At issue in Mr. Grimm’s case is whether Title 
IX, a provision in a 1972 law that bans 
discrimination “on the basis of sex” in 
schools that receive federal money, also bans 
discrimination based on gender identity. 
President Barack Obama concluded that it 
did. 
But in February 2017, President Trump 
rejected the Obama administration’s position 
and rescinded protections for transgender 
students that had allowed them to use 
bathrooms corresponding with their gender 
identity. 
The practical effect of the Trump 
administration’s change in position was 
limited, however, as a federal court had 
previously issued a nationwide 
injunction barring enforcement of the Obama 
administration’s guidance. 
Then, the next month, the Supreme Court 
announced that it would not decide whether 
Mr. Grimm could use the boys’ bathroom at 
his high school. Although the court decided 
not to take his case at the time, some 
predicted that it would almost certainly return 
there eventually. 
The March 2017 decision was a setback for 
transgender rights advocates, who had hoped 
the Supreme Court would aid their cause in 
much the same way it had helped same-sex 
marriage advocates two years before. 
Instead, in a one-sentence order, the Supreme 
Court vacated an appeals court decision in 
favor of Mr. Grimm, and sent the case back 
to the federal appeals court in Virginia for 
further consideration in light of the new 
guidance from the Trump administration. 
The case was later returned to the District 
Court to consider whether the school 
district’s policy had violated Mr. Grimm’s 
rights. 
Mr. Grimm’s case is just one of several on 
transgender rights that have been litigated in 
lower courts or been the subject of federal 
civil rights investigations in recent years. In 
her order, Judge Wright Allen cited several 
cases with arguments similar to Mr. 
Grimm’s. Even with Tuesday’s federal order, 
there remains a thicket of conflicting state 
laws and local school policies on bathroom 
use. 
Mr. Grimm’s journey into the 
spotlight began in 2014, when he was 15 and 
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starting his sophomore year. At that time his 
family told his school, Gloucester High 
School, that he was transgender. 
Administrators were supportive at first and 
allowed him to use the boys’ bathroom. 
But amid an uproar from some parents and 
students, the school board barred Mr. Grimm 
from using the boys’ bathrooms and adopted 
a policy requiring students to use the 
bathrooms and locker rooms for their 
“corresponding biological genders.” The 
board added that “students with gender 
identity issues” would be allowed to use 
private bathrooms. 
The A.C.L.U. argued that requiring Mr. 
Grimm to use a private bathroom had been 
humiliating and had, quoting him, “turned 
him into ‘a public spectacle’ before the entire 
community, ‘like a walking freak show.’” 
In its statement, the school board said that it 
“continues to believe that its resolution of this 
complex matter fully considered the interests 
of all students and parents in the Gloucester 
County school system.” 
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“The Trump Administration May Have Doomed Gavin Grimm’s Case” 
 
 
The Atlantic 
 
Emma Green 
 
March 6, 2017 
 
The Supreme Court sent an important case 
concerning a transgender student in Virginia 
back down to the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals on Monday, in part because of the 
Trump administration’s new position on the 
issues involved in the case. 
In Gloucester County School Board v. G.G., 
Gavin Grimm sued his school district for the 
right to use the boys’ bathroom, which 
corresponds with his gender identity. Under 
the Obama administration, it looked like 
Grimm might have a strong chance of success 
at the country’s highest court, potentially 
setting a precedent for school districts across 
the country. Now, that’s looking less likely. 
The Trump administration has rolled back 
Obama’s former policies, meaning that 
transgender students like Grimm may have to 
follow policies on bathroom use and other 
accommodations set by individual school 
districts. 
Grimm’s case has been winding its way 
through the court system for nearly two 
years. In the summer of 2015, a federal 
district court dismissed Grimm’s claims. The 
judges’ decision turned on their interpretation 
of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972, which prohibits sex discrimination in 
schools that get federal funds. Courts have 
disagreed about the meaning of sex 
discrimination: Some have held that it covers 
gender identity, meaning that it prohibits 
discrimination against transgender people 
like Grimm. Others, like the district court in 
Grimm’s case, have disagreed. The Obama 
administration supported the inclusive 
interpretation, instructing schools to 
accommodate transgender students. 
Last April, the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals handed down a decision in Grimm’s 
favor: They held that the courts should defer 
to the administration’s interpretation of Title 
IX, meaning in effect that Gloucester County 
should have to let Grimm use the bathroom 
of his choice. The Supreme Court stayed the 
opinion and the school district appealed. In 
October, the Supreme Court agreed to hear 
the case. Arguments were set for late March. 
But in February, the Trump 
administration withdrew the Obama 
administration’s guidance, arguing that 
“there must be due regard for the primary role 
of the States and local school districts in 
establishing educational policy.” This was a 
clear sign that Trump is backing away from 
the Obama administration’s inclusive 
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interpretation of Title IX, favoring the 
previous status quo in which individual 
school districts decided how to deal with 
transgender students according to state and 
local laws. 
While Grimm’s attorneys encouraged the 
Supreme Court to move forward with the 
case despite the Trump administration’s new 
letter, the justices declined to do so on 
Monday, remanding the case back to the 
Fourth Circuit for further consideration “in 
light of the guidance document issued by the 
Department of Education and Department of 
Justice on February 22, 2017.” 
The Supreme Court’s decision not to hear the 
case at this point is a sign that this issue is 
likely to remain unresolved, at least for the 
near future. The courts have long been 
conflicted about the meaning of Title IX and 
other civil-rights statutes that deal with sex 
discrimination, in part because the law is 
arguably unclear about what sex 
discrimination means. 
In wrestling with cases like Grimm’s, they 
have consistently looked to the executive and 
legislative branches for guidance. So far, 
Congress hasn’t passed a law that clearly and 
incontrovertibly prohibits gender-identity 
discrimination in the context of education, 
employment, or other arenas. In practice, that 
has meant the White House and other 
agencies have had an outsized influence in 
determining how cases like Grimm’s should 
be handled. 
With its guidance letter to schools, the 
Obama administration set up transgender 
kids for success in making anti-
discrimination claims in court. That’s largely 
why Grimm was victorious at the Fourth 
Circuit. Now, the Trump administration has 
reversed their fortunes, making it less likely 
that students like Grimm will prevail. 
When Gloucester County is argued before 
the Fourth Circuit for a second time, Grimm 
will be missing much of the support that 
helped him win the first time—including the 
support of the White House. 
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“Judge sides with Gloucester transgender student on bathroom access issue” 
 
 
Daily Press 
 
Peter Dujardin 
 
May 22, 2018 
 
A federal judge on Tuesday sided with a 
Gloucester transgender student on whether he 
should have been able to use the bathroom of 
his choice in the public schools — with the 
judge rejecting the Gloucester County School 
Board’s bid to dismiss the case. 
U.S. District Judge Arenda L. Wright Allen 
sided with the student, Gavin Grimm, who 
contends in a federal lawsuit that a School 
Board policy requiring him to use a separate 
bathroom — rather than the boys’ rooms — 
stigmatized him and turned him into an 
outcast at Gloucester High School. 
Wright Allen, who sits in Norfolk, did not 
rule on the case’s overall merits Tuesday. But 
she denied a motion from lawyers with the 
Gloucester School Board to toss the case, and 
she ordered that Grimm’s lawyers and the 
attorneys for the board contact the court 
within 30 days to schedule a settlement 
conference to resolve the issue. 
“The Board’s argument that the policy did 
not discriminate against any one class of 
students is resoundingly unpersuasive,” 
Wright Allen concluded in her 31-page order. 
But the judge’s ruling, while significant, is 
unlikely to be the last word in the case — 
with the ultimate outcome expected to be 
determined by higher courts. The case still 
has the potential to set a legal precedent — 
one way or the other — in the heated social 
debate over transgender issues. 
David P. Corrigan, the lead attorney 
representing the Gloucester School Board, 
did not return a phone call Tuesday seeking 
comment on what the board plans to now do. 
Gloucester School Board chairwoman Anita 
Parker did not immediately return a phone 
call, while vice chairman William Lee also 
could not immediately be reached. 
“The School Board is aware of the District 
Court’s decision denying the motion to 
dismiss (Grimm’s) Amended Complaint,” 
the board said in a statement released late 
Tuesday. “The School Board continues to 
believe that its resolution of this complex 
matter fully considered the interests of all 
students and parents in the Gloucester 
County school system.” 
Grimm, now 18, was born a female but later 
told his parents — and then the school system 
— that he identified as a male, and he later 
underwent hormone therapy. He graduated 
from Gloucester High in June 2017, with the 
school board having argued unsuccessfully 
 497 
 
that the case was now moot in light of his 
graduation. 
Grimm said Tuesday that Wright Allen’s 
ruling brought him “an incredible sense of 
relief.” 
“After fighting this policy since I was 15 
years old, I finally have a court decision 
saying that what the Gloucester County 
School Board did to me was wrong and it was 
against the law,” he said in a statement 
released by the ACLU of Virginia, which has 
represented Grimm in the lawsuit. “I was 
determined not to give up because I didn’t 
want any other student to have to suffer the 
same experience that I had to go through.” 
According to Wright Allen’s ruling, Grimm 
and his mother initially approached 
Gloucester High School administrators in 
August 2014, saying that he is transgender 
and “would be attending school as a boy.” 
Though Grimm initially requested to use a 
restroom in the nurse’s office, that was 
located in a remote part of the school, “and 
left Mr. Grimm feeling stigmatized and 
isolated,” his lawsuit said. The location 
caused him to be late for class because it was 
so far from his classrooms, the suit added. 
That was when Grimm sought permission 
from the principal to use the boys’ room. He 
got that permission, and began using the 
boys’ room in October 2014, using it 
“without incident” for about seven weeks. 
Grimm would later say that he experienced 
“no problems from students” during that 
time. 
It was only after “several adults in the 
community” learned of Grimm’s use of the 
boys’ room, Wright Allen’s ruling said, that 
the matter began to become an issue. The 
school initially planned to rectify those 
concerns by increasing partitions between 
urinals, adding privacy strips on stalls and 
designating certain single-stall restrooms for 
use by all students. 
But speakers at a School Board meeting in 
December 2014 overwhelmingly said those 
ideas fell short. 
At that meeting, the board passed a new 
policy, by a 6-1 vote, that said that the use of 
restrooms and locker rooms in the schools 
“shall be limited to the corresponding 
biological genders,” and that “students with 
gender identity issues shall be provided an 
alternative private facility.” 
The rules were immediately put into effect. 
Grimm asserted that he not only felt excluded 
by those rules, but that they made him often 
refrain from using any restroom at all — 
leading him to be unable to concentrate in 
class and developing a urinary tract infection. 
The case has taken a long route through 
several courts. 
In late 2015, Senior U.S. District Judge 
Robert G. Doumar ruled in favor of the 
Gloucester School Board, saying in part that 
the privacy rights of other male students 
trump Grimm’s desire to use the boys’ room. 
The ACLU appealed that ruling to the 4th 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which 
reversed Doumar’s decision. In part, the 
appeals court cited a U.S. Department of 
Education guidance under former President 
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Barack Obama that said that transgender 
students should be allowed to use the 
restrooms of their choice. 
The Gloucester County School Board 
appealed the 4th Circuit’s decision to the U.S. 
Supreme Court — and the Supreme Court 
initially agreed to hear the case. 
But then the Trump administration, to 
include Attorney General Jeff Sessions and 
Education Secretary Betsy DeVos, reversed 
the Justice Department’s and Department of 
Education’s guidance on the issue. That led 
the Supreme Court to decide not to hear the 
case after all. Instead, in March 2017 the high 
court sent the case back to the lower courts 
for more proceedings. 
But instead of Doumar — an old-school 
federal judge who is now 87 years old — the 
case went to Wright Allen, one of the 
younger judges on the Norfolk federal bench. 
A former federal public defender, Wright 
Allen is often seen as a more liberal-leaning 
judge. She made a big ruling in the same-sex 
marriage debate a few years ago, saying that 
gays and lesbians have the constitutional 
right to marry in Virginia. 
It couldn’t be determined Tuesday why 
Doumar didn’t get the case the second time, 
given that cases traditionally are sent back to 
the same judge who heard them the first time. 
But Tuesday’s ruling makes clear that Wright 
Allen views the merits of the case very 
differently than did Doumar. 
“Preventing Mr. Grimm from using the boys’ 
restrooms did nothing to protect the privacy 
rights of other students, but certainly singled 
out and stigmatized Mr. Grimm,” Wright 
Allen wrote. She said there were “many other 
ways to protect privacy interests in a non-
discriminatory and more effective manner 
than barring Mr. Grimm from using the boys’ 
restrooms.” 
“It’s obviously a strong ruling in favor of 
Gavin Grimm,” said Carl Tobias, a law 
professor at the University of Richmond. “I 
haven’t read it all, but she rejects the 
argument made by the School Board. I think 
(Grimm) can claim that this is a victory.” 
Tobias said he thought the Gloucester School 
Board would appeal the case. “My sense is 
that the School Board has been fighting it 
pretty vigorously, so why would they stop 
now?” he said. “They have fought it all the 
way along.” 
Joshua Block, an ACLU attorney handling 
the case, agreed — saying the Gloucester 
School Board “has been fighting tooth and 
nail on this issue.” 
There are very few facts in dispute in the 
litigation, Block said, with the two sides 
sparring excluively over varying 
interpretations of the law on the issue. Block 
said he thought that the school board’s 
lawyers might ask to be allowed to file "an 
early appeal” based on Wright Allen’s ruling, 
“or ask that a final judgment be entered” so 
that the court’s final decision can be more 
quickly appealed. 
“But for this case, I stopped making 
predictions long ago,” Block said. 
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“6th Circ. Revives EEOC’s Funeral Home Trans Bias Suit” 
 
 
Law360 
 
Braden Campbell 
 
March 7, 2018 
 
The Sixth Circuit issued a published decision 
Wednesday reviving a U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission suit 
accusing a Michigan funeral home operator 
of violating federal anti-discrimination law 
by firing its funeral director after she said she 
would transition from male to female, 
holding that the company wasn't protected by 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.  
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. 
violated Title VII by discriminating against 
Aimee Stephens and wasn't entitled to a 
defense under RFRA when it did so, the Sixth 
Circuit panel said in the unanimous opinion, 
handing a win to trans rights advocates. 
RFRA blocks the government from enforcing 
a “religiously neutral” law that “substantially 
burdens” people’s “religious exercise,” 
unless that law is the “least restrictive way to 
further a compelling government interest.” 
The company’s owner, Thomas Rost, had 
argued it went against his Christian beliefs to 
employ Stephens, who was born biologically 
male, if she dressed and acted like a woman. 
“RFRA provides the funeral home with no 
relief because continuing to employ Stephens 
would not, as a matter of law, substantially 
burden [owner Thomas] Rost’s religious 
exercise, and even if it did, the EEOC has 
shown that enforcing Title VII here is the 
least restrictive means of furthering its 
compelling interest in combating and 
eradicating sex discrimination,” wrote 
Circuit Judge Karen Nelson Moore in 
overturning a lower court ruling that said the 
funeral home was protected by RFRA. 
The opinion overturns U.S. District Judge 
Sean F. Cox’s August 2016 ruling that 
employing Stephens burdened Rost’s beliefs 
and that Title VII’s bar on discrimination 
based on sex, which the EEOC had argued let 
Stephens act and dress like a woman, was not 
the least restrictive means of protecting her 
rights. 
But far from being too restrictive of his 
rights, Title VII’s requirement that Rost 
tolerate Stephens’ gender identity didn’t 
“substantially” burden his religious beliefs, 
the panel said Wednesday. 
Rost had argued that letting Stephens wear 
women’s clothing would “create 
distractions” for the funeral home’s 
customers “and thereby hinder their healing 
process,” and that making him tolerate her 
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transition would push him to leave the funeral 
industry and “end his ministry to grieving 
people.” However, neither alleged burden is 
“substantial,” the panel said. 
“A religious claimant cannot rely on 
customers’ presumed biases to establish a 
substantial burden under RFRA,” Judge 
Moore wrote, adding that “tolerating 
Stephens’ understanding of her sex and 
gender identity is not tantamount to 
supporting it.” 
Though Judge Cox had found Rost violated 
Title VII under a so-called sex stereotyping 
theory, which is one based on allegations a 
business mistreated a worker because they 
didn’t act in accordance with their sex, he 
said transgender status is not protected in 
itself. Here, too, he was wrong, the panel said 
Wednesday. 
“It is analytically impossible to fire an 
employee based on that employee’s status as 
a transgender person without being 
motivated, at least in part, by the employee’s 
sex,” Judge Moore wrote. 
The panel likened firing Stephens based on 
her gender identity to firing a gay worker 
based on their sexual orientation, citing the 
Seventh Circuit’s landmark Hively v. Ivy 
Tech decision, which was the country’s first 
appellate ruling that discriminating against 
gay workers violates Title VII’s ban on sex 
discrimination. 
Gregory Nevins, director of the employment 
fairness project at LGBT legal advocacy 
group Lambda Legal, told Law360 the ruling 
was an “emphatic clarification that 
transgender workers are covered under Title 
VII.” He also praised the court for finding 
Rost was not shielded by the RFRA. 
“[The opinion] really said, in very common 
sense fashion, that you could have religious 
beliefs and [the government has to] respect it, 
but there are also legal requirements for 
dealing with your employees,” said Nevins, 
who filed an amicus brief backing Stephens. 
“One is not a violation of the other.” 
Alliance Defending Freedom attorney Gary 
McCaleb, who represented the funeral home, 
was less pleased, saying the opinion 
“radically rewrites Title VII far beyond the 
plain meaning of sex being either male or 
female.” McCaleb said the decision 
“revolves around a severe misreading of the 
Price Waterhouse case” that established the 
sex stereotyping theory. 
“The court … has taken the term sex, which 
means male and female, and written into that 
the concept of gender,” he said. “Gender is a 
continuum of self-perceived gender as 
ranging from very masculine to very 
feminine. It’s actually contrary to 
understanding sex as being male or female, as 
written in the law.” 
He added the group is considering its 
“options for further appeal.” 
Representatives for the EEOC and attorneys 
for Stephens did not immediately respond 
Wednesday to requests for comment. 
Judges Moore, Helene White and Bernice 
Donald sat on the panel for the Sixth Circuit. 
The EEOC is represented by Anne Noel 
Occhialino. 
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The funeral home is represented by Douglas 
Wardlow and Gary McCaleb of the Alliance 
Defending Freedom. 
Stephens is represented by John Knight of 
the American Civil Liberties Union 
Foundation. 
 
The case is EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris 
Funeral Homes Inc., case number 16-2424, in 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit. 
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“Trump Says Transgender People Will Not Be Allowed in the Military” 
 
 
New York Times 
 
Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Helene Cooper 
 
July 26, 2017 
 
President Trump abruptly announced a ban 
on transgender people serving in the military 
on Wednesday, blindsiding his defense 
secretary and Republican congressional 
leaders with a snap decision that reversed a 
year-old policy reviled by social 
conservatives. 
Mr. Trump made the declaration on Twitter, 
saying that American forces could not afford 
the “tremendous medical costs and 
disruption” of transgender service members. 
He said he had consulted generals and 
military experts, but Jim Mattis, the defense 
secretary, was given only a day’s notice 
about the decision. 
Mr. Trump elected to announce the ban in 
order to resolve a quietly brewing fight on 
Capitol Hill over whether taxpayer money 
should pay for gender transition and hormone 
therapy for transgender service members. 
The dispute had threatened to kill a $790 
billion defense and security spending 
package scheduled for a vote this week. 
But rather than addressing that narrow issue, 
Mr. Trump opted to upend the entire policy 
on transgender service members. 
His decision was announced with such haste 
that the White House could not answer basic 
inquiries about how it would be carried out, 
including what would happen to openly 
transgender people on active duty. Of eight 
defense officials interviewed, none could say. 
“That’s something that the Department of 
Defense and the White House will have to 
work together as implementation takes place 
and is done so lawfully,” Sarah Huckabee 
Sanders, the White House press secretary, 
said. 
Still, the announcement pleased elements of 
Mr. Trump’s base who have been dismayed 
to see the president break so bitterly in recent 
days with Attorney General Jeff Sessions, a 
hard-line conservative. 
Civil rights and transgender advocacy groups 
denounced the policy, with some vowing to 
challenge it in court. Pentagon officials 
expressed dismay that the president’s tweets 
could open them to lawsuits. 
The ban would reverse the gradual 
transformation of the military under 
President Barack Obama, whose 
administration announced last year that 
transgender people could serve openly in the 
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military. Mr. Obama’s defense secretary, 
Ashton B. Carter, also opened all combat 
roles to women and appointed the first openly 
gay Army secretary. 
And it represented a stark turnabout for Mr. 
Trump, who billed himself during the 
campaign as an ally of gay, lesbian, bisexual 
and transgender people. 
The president, Ms. Sanders said, had 
concluded that allowing transgender people 
to serve openly “erodes military readiness 
and unit cohesion, and made the decision 
based on that.” 
Mr. Mattis, who was on vacation, was silent 
on the new policy. People close to the defense 
secretary said he was appalled that Mr. 
Trump chose to unveil his decision in tweets, 
in part because of the message they sent to 
transgender active-duty service members, 
including those deployed overseas, that they 
were suddenly no longer welcome. 
The policy would affect only a small portion 
of the approximately 1.3 million active-duty 
members of the military. Some 2,000 to 
11,000 active-duty troops are transgender, 
according to a 2016 RAND Corporation 
study commissioned by the Pentagon, though 
estimates of the number of transgender 
service members have varied widely, and are 
sometimes as high as 15,000. 
The study found that allowing transgender 
people to serve openly in the military would 
“have minimal impact on readiness and 
health care costs” for the Pentagon. It 
estimated that health care costs would rise 
$2.4 million to $8.4 million a year, 
representing an infinitesimal 0.04 to 0.13 
percent increase in spending. Citing research 
into other countries that allow transgender 
people to serve, the study projected “little or 
no impact on unit cohesion, operational 
effectiveness or readiness” in the United 
States. 
Lt. Commander Blake Dremann, a Navy 
supply corps officer who is transgender, said 
he found out his job was in danger when he 
turned on CNN on Wednesday morning. 
Commander Dremann came out as 
transgender to his commanders in 2015, and 
said they had been supportive of him. 
He refused to criticize Mr. Trump — “we 
don’t criticize our commander in chief,” he 
said — but said the policy shift “is singling 
out a specific population in the military, who 
had been assured we were doing everything 
appropriate to continue our honorable 
service.” 
He added: “And I will continue to do so, until 
the military tells me to hang up my boots.” 
The announcement came amid the debate on 
Capitol Hill over the Obama-era practice of 
requiring the Pentagon to pay for medical 
treatment related to gender transition. 
Representative Vicky Hartzler, Republican 
of Missouri, has proposed an amendment to 
the spending bill that would bar the Pentagon 
from spending money on transition surgery 
or related hormone therapy, and other 
Republicans have pressed for similar 
provisions. 
Mr. Mattis had worked behind the scenes to 
keep such language out of legislation, quietly 
lobbying Republican lawmakers not to attach 
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the prohibitions, according to congressional 
and defense officials. 
But Mr. Trump was concerned that the 
transgender medical care issue could imperil 
the security spending measure, which also 
contains $1.6 billion for the border wall that 
he has championed, and wanted to resolve the 
dispute cleanly and straightforwardly, 
according to a person familiar with his 
thinking, who insisted on anonymity to 
describe it. That prompted his ban. 
Republican congressional leaders were aware 
Mr. Trump was looking into whether 
taxpayer money should be spent on medical 
procedures for transgender service members, 
but had not expected him to go so far as to bar 
transgender people from serving altogether. 
Mr. Trump and Republican lawmakers had 
come under pressure from Tony Perkins, the 
president of the Family Research Council, a 
leading Christian conservative group, and an 
ally of Mr. Trump’s. Mr. Perkins opposed the 
bill over spending on transgender medical 
costs and lobbied lawmakers to do the same. 
“Grant repentance to President Trump and 
Secretary Mattis for even considering to keep 
this wicked policy in place,” the Family 
Research Council said in one of its daily 
prayers last week. “Grant them 
understanding, courage and willpower to 
stand up to the forces of darkness that gave 
birth to it and wholly to repeal it.” 
Opponents of allowing openly transgender 
service members had raised a number of 
concerns, including what they said was the 
questionable psychological fitness of those 
troops. They said the military was being used 
for social experimentation at the expense of 
national security. 
“This was Ash Carter on his way out the door 
pulling the pin on a cultural grenade,” Mr. 
Perkins said on Wednesday. “Our military 
leaders are saying this doesn’t help make us 
a better fighting force; it’s a distraction; it’s 
taking up limited resources.” 
Mr. Carter objected to the decision, for its 
effect on the military and on those 
considering joining. 
“To choose service members on other 
grounds than military qualifications is social 
policy and has no place in our military,” he 
said in a statement. “There are already 
transgender individuals who are serving 
capably and honorably. This action would 
also send the wrong signal to a younger 
generation thinking about military service.” 
While some conservative lawmakers, 
including Ms. Hartzler, praised Mr. Trump, 
the president drew bipartisan condemnation 
on Capitol Hill and outrage from civil rights 
and transgender advocacy groups. 
“There is no reason to force service members 
who are able to fight, train and deploy to 
leave the military — regardless of their 
gender identity,” said Senator John McCain, 
Republican of Arizona and the chairman of 
the Senate Armed Services Committee. 
He called Mr. Trump’s move “yet another 
example of why major policy announcements 
should not be made via Twitter.” 
Senator Jack Reed, Democrat of Rhode 
Island and the ranking member of the Armed 
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Services Committee, noted the irony of Mr. 
Trump’s announcing the ban on the 
anniversary of President Harry Truman’s 
order to desegregate the military. “President 
Trump is choosing to retreat in the march 
toward equality,” he said. 
In June, the administration delayed by six 
months a decision on whether to allow 
transgender recruits to join the military. At 
the time, Mr. Mattis said the delay would give 
military leaders a chance to review the shift’s 
potential impact. Mr. Mattis’s decision was 
seen as a pause to “finesse” the issue, one 
official said, not a prelude to an outright ban. 
The delay on recruits “was largely based on a 
disagreement on the science of how mental 
health care and hormone therapy for 
transgender individuals would help solve the 
medical issues that are associated with 
gender dysphoria,” Gen. Paul Selva, the vice 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said 
during his reconfirmation hearing last week. 
“I am an advocate of every qualified person 
who can meet the physical standards to serve 
in our uniformed services to be able to do so,” 
he said. 
Mr. Mattis, a retired Marine, has not been a 
major proponent of allowing transgender 
people to serve in the military, in part because 
medical accommodations, including 
hormone injections, could open the Defense 
Department to claims from other people not 
allowed to serve, like Type 1 diabetics, who 
also need regular injections. 
But Mr. Mattis and the Pentagon’s military 
leadership all seemed to have accepted that 
transgender people already serving in the 
military would be allowed to remain. A 
senior adviser to Mr. Mattis, Sally Donnelly, 
represented the Palm Center, an organization 
that advocated on behalf of the L.G.B.T. 
community in the military during the debate 
that led up to the Obama administration’s 
decision to allow transgender people to serve, 
defense officials said. 
Mr. Trump’s abrupt decision is likely to end 
up in court; OutServe-SLDN, a nonprofit 
group that represents gay, lesbian, bisexual 
and transgender people in the military, 
immediately vowed to sue. 
“We have transgender individuals who serve 
in elite SEAL teams, who are working in a 
time of war to defend our country, and now 
you’re going to kick them out?” Matthew F. 
Thorn, executive director of OutServe, said 
in an interview. 
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“Trump Cut From Transgender Military Suit Against Gov’t” 
 
 
Law360 
 
Daniel Wilson 
 
August 6, 2018 
 
A Washington, D.C., federal judge on 
Monday cut President Donald Trump from a 
suit challenging his administration’s policy 
banning many transgender people from 
military service in order to avoid 
“unnecessary constitutional confrontations,” 
but refused to dismiss the suit outright, 
saying a change to the policy had not 
eliminated the basis for the challenge. 
 
U.S. District Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly 
granted the government’s bid for partial 
summary judgment in the challenge to the 
government’s “transgender ban,” dismissing 
claims against Trump and dissolving a 
related preliminary injunction as applied 
against the president. As a result, a move for 
a protective order blocking discovery against 
the president was effectively moot, she ruled. 
 
“Because no relief will be granted directly 
against the president in this case, the court 
will dismiss him as a party to avoid 
unnecessary constitutional confrontations,” 
Judge Kollar-Kotelly said, pointing to a line 
of decisions finding that courts cannot 
impose injunctions or declaratory judgments 
on the president. 
But in a separate order, she refused to dismiss 
the suit outright or dissolve the preliminary 
injunction as applied to the government more 
broadly after it had argued that the 
transgender ban policy as challenged by the 
plaintiffs — both current and aspiring 
servicemembers who are transgender — was 
no longer in existence, meaning their suit is 
effectively moot. 
The original transgender ban policy, issued in 
August in the form of a presidential 
memorandum, would have outright banned 
any open military service by transgender 
people, but Trump issued an updated policy 
in March. 
The updated policy allows transgender 
people to join or serve in the military, but 
only if they don’t have gender dysphoria — a 
disconnect between biological sex and 
perceived gender — that causes them distress 
or functional impairment, and have not 
already transitioned between genders, with a 
narrow “grandfathered” exception for some 
current troops. 
This was effectively a new policy, the 
government argued. But the plaintiffs still 
would be harmed if the updated policy is 
allowed to take effect, and despite the 
 507 
 
government’s arguments, it is not 
“meaningfully distinct” enough from the 
original transgender ban to moot their claims, 
Judge Kollar-Kotelly ruled. 
“Instead, at a fundamental level, the [U.S. 
Department of Defense] implementation plan 
is just that — a plan that implements the 
president’s directive that transgender people 
be excluded from the military,” she said. “For 
largely the same reasons, the rationale for the 
court’s preliminary injunction maintaining 
the status quo ante until the final resolution of 
this case remains intact.” 
The judge further noted that tossing direct 
claims against the president didn’t mean that 
the court lacks the ability to review the 
legality of the president’s actions, and the 
challengers can still obtain all the relief 
they’re looking for if those actions are found 
to be unconstitutional. 
Judge Kollar-Kotelly also said that the 
challengers can continue to pursue discovery 
related to the president, with rulings on 
claimed deliberative process or presidential 
communication privilege to come later. 
This will likely come after a similar dispute 
is addressed on appeal in another case 
challenging the transgender ban, Karnoski v. 
Trump, a dispute noted by the judge in a 
related footnote. In that case, the district 
court recently ordered the government to 
cough up purportedly privileged documents. 
 
Jennifer Levi, the transgender rights project 
director at GLBTQ Legal Advocates & 
Defenders, which represents the plaintiffs, 
said in a statement Monday that Judge 
Kollar-Kotelly's decision was evidence that 
the judge “isn’t buying” the administration’s 
arguments, which she claimed were “full of 
sweeping generalizations and false 
stereotypes about transgender people.” 
“Anyone who meets the standards should be 
able to serve,” Levi said. “There is no reason 
to subject transgender people to 
unconstitutional and discriminatory 
treatment, unlike the way the military treats 
any other group.” 
The DOJ does not typically comment on 
pending litigation. 
The dispute is one of four cases around the 
country challenging aspects of the 
transgender ban, including the Karnoski case. 
In the most recent development in that 
dispute, the government urged the Ninth 
Circuit in a brief Friday to expedite argument 
in the case, saying the district court’s recent 
discovery order had “imposed extraordinary 
discovery obligations on the president and 
the military.” 
The servicemembers are represented by Paul 
R.Q. Wolfson, Kevin M. Lamb, Alan E. 
Schoenfeld, Christopher R. Looney, Harriet 
Hoder, Adam M. Cambier and Nancy Lynn 
Schroeder of WilmerHale, Jennifer Levi and 
Mary L. Bonauto of GLTBQ Legal 
Advocates and Defenders, Shannon P. 
Minter, Amy Whelan and Christopher F. 
Stoll of the National Center for Lesbian 
Rights and Claire Laporte, Matthew E. 
Miller, Daniel L. McFadden, Kathleen M. 
Brill, Michael J. Licker, Rachel C. 
Hutchinson, Lauren Godles Milgroom and 
Theresa M. Roosevelt of Foley Hoag LLP. 
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The government is represented by Chad A. 
Readler, Brett A. Shumate, Brinton Lucas, 
John R. Griffiths, Anthony J. Coppolino and 
Andrew E. Carmichael of the U.S. 
Department of Justice. 
The case is Doe 2 et al. v. Trump et al., case 
number 1:17-cv-01597, in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia. 
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“Lawsuit challenges Texas abortion curbs” 
 
 
Reuters 
 
Jonathan Stempel 
 
June 14, 2018 
 
An abortion provider that in 2016 persuaded 
the U.S. Supreme Court to void parts of a 
restrictive Texas law on Thursday filed a new 
lawsuit challenging dozens of that state’s 
other curbs on the procedure as 
unconstitutional.  
Whole Woman’s Health Alliance and six 
nonprofits providing abortion-related 
services said Texas’ licensing, parental 
notification, waiting period, ultrasound and 
other requirements violated women’s due 
process rights.  
They said the requirements impose an undue 
burden on women’s ability to abort nonviable 
fetuses, with a disproportionate impact on the 
poor, minorities and immigrants.  
The complaint was filed in the federal court 
in Austin, Texas against state officials 
including Attorney General Ken Paxton and 
health services Commissioner John 
Hellerstedt, and seeks to block enforcement 
of the challenged laws. 
Marc Rylander, a spokesman for Paxton, 
called the challenged requirements 
“common-sense measures” that protect 
women’s lives and reproductive health, and 
said the Supreme Court has upheld many 
similar requirements in the past.  
“It is ridiculous that these activists are so 
dedicated to their radical pro-abortion agenda 
that they would sacrifice the health or lives of 
Texas women to further it,” he said.  
In June 2016, the Supreme Court by a 5-3 
vote struck down Texas’ requirements that 
doctors who perform abortions have 
admitting privileges at nearby hospitals, and 
that abortion clinics have costly hospital-
grade facilities.  
Critics said the requirements could have 
forced many Texas clinics to close, especially 
outside major metropolitan areas.  
The majority decision in Whole Woman’s 
Health v Hellerstedt was the court’s strongest 
endorsement of abortion rights since its 1992 
reaffirmation of the constitutional right to 
abortion. 
“It set a new standard of scrutiny, that states 
cannot pass restrictions without proof of 
medical evidence and scientific facts to 
justify them,” Amy Hagstrom Miller, chief 
executive of Whole Woman’s Health, said in 
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an interview on Thursday. “The decision 
gave us leverage to look at other restrictions 
that Texas has long been enforcing. We call 
it the ‘big fix.’”  
Many U.S. states, like Texas often led or 
dominated by Republicans, have imposed 
new abortion limits in recent years.  
There has long been speculation that 
Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, 
81, who joined the majority in the 2016 
abortion case, may retire soon, giving 
President Donald Trump a chance to make 
the court more friendly to abortion 
opponents.  
“The Supreme Court is always something we 
watch,” Miller said. “We don’t have a magic 
8-ball to predict its makeup, but women are 
being affected by these laws every single 
day.”  
The case is Whole Woman’s Health Alliance 
et al v Paxton et al, U.S. District Court, 
Western District of Texas, No. 18-00500.
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“7th Circ. Backs Ind. Abortion Law Stay During Legal Challenge” 
 
 
Law360 
 
Bonnie Eslinger 
 
July 25, 2018 
 
The Seventh Circuit on Wednesday affirmed 
a lower court decision granting Planned 
Parenthood’s request to stay an Indiana law 
requiring women to have an ultrasound at 
least 18 hours before an abortion, finding 
there’s a likelihood the organization will 
prevail on its claim the law is 
unconstitutional. 
“The State asserts that its reason for this new 
eighteen hour ultrasound requirement is to 
persuade women not to have an abortion. 
There is no doubt that this is a legitimate 
position for a state to take,” the panel said in 
its ruling. “But it is also true that women have 
the right to choose to have an abortion, albeit 
with some limitations.” 
Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky 
filed suit against the commissioner of 
the Indiana State Department of Health and 
the prosecutors of several counties in July 
2016, claiming the state’s new law 
unconstitutionally burdens a woman’s right 
to choose to have an abortion. The 
organization also asked for a preliminary 
injunction blocking the implementation of 
the law during the pendency of the litigation. 
The district court judge granted the 
temporary hold in March 2017. 
“We agree with the well-reasoned 
conclusions of the district court opinion,” 
U.S. Circuit Judge Ilana Diamond Rovner 
wrote in Wednesday's opinion. 
The panel noted that it began its review by 
looking at the 1992 landmark U.S. Supreme 
Courtcase Planned Parenthood v. Casey . 
 
“The basic premise from which we must 
begin our review of the district court opinion 
is that the Supreme Court has recognized and 
affirmed ‘the right of the woman to choose to 
have an abortion before viability and to 
obtain it without undue interference from the 
State … [without] the imposition of a 
substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective 
right to elect the procedure’,” the opinion 
said. 
 
The district court properly weighed the 
evidence regarding the burdens and benefits 
created by the new ultrasound law, the panel 
said. 
 
The burden created by the new law stems 
from the lengthy distances women would be 
required to travel for an ultrasound 
appointment at least eighteen hours prior to 
an abortion — and then to return a day later 
for the procedure, the Seventh Circuit noted. 
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Current state law requires an ultrasound but 
allows it to take place the day of the abortion. 
Planned Parenthood has only six facilities in 
the state with ultrasound equipment. 
 
The law also creates a financial strain with 
the need for an overnight stay, employment 
problems with the need to take time off and 
child care issues, among other concerns, the 
Seventh Circuit noted. 
A Planned Parenthood expert confirmed that 
many low-income women “do not have 
employment that pays them when they miss a 
day of work or they may have precarious job 
situations in which they could be fired for 
excessive absences,” the panel said. "A 
second lengthy trip for an ultrasound 
appointment likely requires a second missed 
day of work.” 
In addition, with women having to make two 
appointments at the Planned Parenthood 
facilities with ultrasound equipment, 
appointment slots became more scarce and 
women had to wait longer to have an 
abortion, the opinion noted. 
“This precluded the option of medication 
abortions for some women and any abortion 
choices for others,” the panel added. 
 
The state’s strongest evidence that the 18-
hour requirement is beneficial came from the 
testimony of a board-certified OB-GYN who 
said she had a patient who had an abortion but 
regretted it later. She told the doctor that she 
felt that an ultrasound waiting period would 
have given her more time to consider her 
decision and change her mind, the court 
noted. 
 
This evidence was compelling because it 
focused on the 18-hour delay, rather than just 
the benefit of the ultrasound, which is already 
required, the panel said. 
“The State’s argument that the additional 
eighteen hours gives women time for deeper 
reflection and to absorb information, actually 
does address the question at issue in the case, 
but its argument is unsupported by anything 
other than ... one anecdote,” the judge wrote 
in the opinion. 
In conclusion, Judge Rovner wrote, with U.S. 
Circuit Judge William J. Bauer concurring, 
that the requirement that women have the 
ultrasound 18 hours prior to the abortion 
wasn’t supported by evidence that it serves 
the goal of persuading women to carry a 
pregnancy to term. 
“Instead, it appears that its only effect is to 
place barriers between a woman who wishes 
to exercise her right to an abortion and her 
ability to do so,” the judge wrote. 
In a separate concurring opinion, U.S. Circuit 
Judge Michael S. Kanne added that he was 
persuaded by the travel burden and because 
the state “offered little evidence to show that 
an 18-hour wait following an ultrasound 
would persuade those seeking an abortion to 
preserve fetal life.” 
Representatives for the parties could not 
immediately be reached for comment late 
Wednesday. 
In April, the Seventh Circuit ruled that 
another portion of Indiana’s 2016 abortion 
law — banning abortions based on a fetus’ 
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race, sex or disability — was 
unconstitutional. 
 
The panel found that certain provisions 
within the 2016 law, signed by then-Gov. 
Mike Pence, “clearly violate” the Supreme 
Court’s landmark 1973 decision in Roe v. 
Wade , which established that a woman is 
within her rights to terminate her pregnancy 
prior to viability, “and that the state may not 
prohibit a woman from exercising that right 
for any reason," U.S. Circuit Judge William 
J. Bauer wrote for the majority. 
U.S. Circuit Judges William J. Bauer, 
Michael S. Kanne and Ilana Diamond Rovner 
sat on the panel. 
 
Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky 
is represented by Kenneth J. Falk of 
the ACLUof Indiana. 
The commissioner of the Indiana State 
Department of Health is represented by 
Thomas M. Fisher of the state attorney 
general's office. 
The case is Planned Parenthood of Indiana 
and Kentucky v. Commissioner of the 
Indiana State Department of Health et al., 
case number 17-1883, in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 
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“Pence’s anti-abortion law could upend Roe v. Wade” 
 
 
Politico 
 
Jennifer Haberkorn 
 
July 23, 2018 
 
An anti-abortion law Vice President Mike 
Pence signed as governor of Indiana could 
become the case that lets the Supreme Court 
reshape abortion rights as soon as next year. 
The Indiana law — which prohibited 
abortion because of the gender, race or 
disability of the fetus, such as Down 
syndrome — was blocked by lower courts 
and is one of three significant anti-abortion 
state statutes that are sitting one level below 
the Supreme Court. If Indiana appeals this 
fall, and the justices accept the case, it could 
be the opening for a broader ruling on Roe v. 
Wade that could redefine abortion rights 
nationwide. 
Pence could then take double credit for the 
anti-abortion movement’s ascendancy: The 
politician whose evangelical credentials 
helped carry conservative religious voters to 
President Donald Trump also helped deliver 
the high court case that could scale back 
access to abortion 45 years after Roe. 
Throwing Roe into the “ash heap of history,” 
as Pence put it, has been his defining mission, 
the core of a political career that took him 
from Congress to the governor’s mansion to 
the vice presidency. 
The Indiana legislation “is a testament to 
Vice President Pence’s long pro-life legacy,” 
said Clarke Forsythe, senior counsel at 
Americans United for Life, which advocates 
against abortion. “He was a leader in 
Congress on defunding Planned Parenthood 
going back to 2005, 2006. He raised the 
profile of the issue.” 
Three months before Trump selected the 
then-governor as his running mate in 2016, 
Pence signed the bill, which pushes new legal 
issues to the forefront. Many of the prior 
court and political fights had centered on 
matters such as mandating waiting periods 
before an abortion, or instituting building 
codes so stringent that many abortion clinics 
would have to shut down. 
Proponents of the ban say a fetus should not 
be aborted because of a disability or fetal 
abnormality. But the Indiana law, and a 
subsequent one passed in Ohio, have sparked 
a fierce and emotional debate about whether 
a woman should be forced to carry or deliver 
a child with a severe or life-threatening 
disability or condition. 
As the legal battle over the Indiana law 
ascended through the court system, so did 
Trump’s candidacy. Pence’s anti-abortion 
bona fides convinced skeptics that Trump — 
a onetime defender of abortion rights — 
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would work to end abortion and put “pro-
life” judges on the Supreme Court. 
The Trump-Pence administration has already 
instituted more conservative policies on 
reproductive health and teen pregnancy. It 
has reshaped the federal judiciary by 
appointing conservatives at all levels, 
including a record number of judges at the 
courts of appeal. Trump elevated Neil 
Gorsuch to the Supreme Court, and if his 
second high court nominee, Brett 
Kavanaugh, is confirmed, he would swing 
the court’s political leaning to the right. 
In the past, the Supreme Court justices 
appeared to be closely divided on abortion, 
and they accepted only a small fraction of the 
abortion-related cases they are asked to hear. 
Activists on both sides of the abortion debate 
believe Kavanaugh would change the court’s 
dynamic and that a challenge to Roeis all but 
inevitable. 
“There is no question that at least one if not 
more [of the three cases] could be there next 
term,” said Helene Krasnoff, senior director 
of public policy, litigation and law at Planned 
Parenthood. “Any case that the court takes 
gives them an opportunity to opine on 
whether or not the Constitution protects” 
access to abortion. 
It is not yet certain whether Indiana will 
appeal, whether the court would accept the 
case or how broadly the justices might rule. 
Rep. Jim Banks (R-Ind.), who sponsored the 
legislation in the Indiana Statehouse, 
certainly favors fighting for it. “I hope the 
attorney general will press it to the Supreme 
Court,” Banks said. “Obviously, Gov. Pence 
at the time signed it and championed it.” 
All three of the key state cases, including 
Indiana’s, directly conflict with 
the Roe ruling, so any one of them would 
give the justices an avenue to reverse or 
significantly narrow the 1973 abortion rights 
decision. In addition, the lower courts are 
filled with reproductive health cases, some 
involving Planned Parenthood funding or the 
federal Teen Pregnancy Prevention Program, 
that could also shape abortion policy. 
Pence and other White House officials say 
Kavanaugh was not asked his opinion 
on Roe as part of the selection process. But 
Kavanaugh’s name was on a list approved by 
the conservative Federalist Society — and 
Trump made a campaign pledge to appoint 
“pro-life” justices to the court. 
A spokesman for Indiana Attorney General 
Curtis Hill, who in recent weeks has been 
accused of inappropriately groping women, 
said the office had no decision to announce 
yet on whether it would appeal lower court 
rulings that have blocked the statute. The 
office has until late September. 
The two other major cases come from 
Alabama and Texas, which both passed bans 
on a common second-trimester abortion 
procedure called dilation and evacuation. If 
upheld, the ban would make abortion after 14 
weeks of gestation almost impossible. Some 
legal experts say those cases might be more 
enticing for the Supreme Court to review. 
There are parallels to how the anti-abortion 
movement, after court fights, successfully 
enacted federal legislation against another 
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second-trimester abortion procedure in the 
early 2000s. 
When he blocked the Indiana law, 7th U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Daniel 
Manion made clear that he wants the 
Supreme Court to weigh in. He noted that in 
the 1992 Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey ruling, which defined how far states 
could go in limiting abortion, “the purported 
right to have a pre-viability abortion is more 
ironclad even than the rights enumerated in 
the Bill of Rights. 
“Only a majority of the Supreme Court or a 
constitutional amendment can permit the 
States to place some limits on abortion,” 
Manion added.  
Legal experts on the anti-abortion side are 
more skeptical that even if given the chance, 
the court would quickly move to undo 
the Roe decision, at least not unless even 
more conservatives are named to the court. 
“I question whether the court is interested in 
revisiting Roe even by five [votes]. I think 
there’s going to need six or more,” said 
Forsythe, the AUL lawyer. 
For Pence, the prospect of an Indiana law 
delivering an abortion debate to the Supreme 
Court could bring his anti-abortion résumé 
full circle. 
As a House member, he introduced the first 
bill to defund Planned Parenthood in 2009. 
As governor, he signed half a dozen anti-
abortion bills. In a CNN interview this 
month, he reiterated unequivocally that he 
wants to see the Roe decision overturned. 
“I do, but I haven’t been nominated to the 
Supreme Court,” he said, adding that he and 
Trump “will continue to be a pro-life 
administration.” 
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“What happens if Roe v. Wade gets overturned?” 
 
 
The Washington Examiner 
 
Kimberly Leonard 
 
July 17, 2018 
 
Hundreds of abortion defenders rallied 
outside the Supreme Court on the night 
President Trump unveiled his choice to 
replace Justice Anthony Kennedy. 
They knew they would oppose Trump’s 
nominee even before he proclaimed Judge 
Brett Kavanaugh’s name. They heard Trump 
during the campaign when he pledged he 
would be “putting pro-life justices on the 
court,” and they believed him. 
Though they realized that national abortion 
policy had hit a bend in the road, the tone of 
the rally among those who think abortion 
should remain legal across the U.S. was 
pointedly optimistic. Since the 
announcement of the retirement of Kennedy, 
who had in the past been the tie-breaking vote 
to uphold Roe v. Wade, they have clung to a 
refrain: When it comes to abortion, the public 
is on their side. During the last year they have 
been bolstered by victories even with 
Republicans enjoying unified control of 
Congress, including stopping lawmakers 
from cutting off federal funds from Planned 
Parenthood and from rolling back 
Obamacare. 
“We are taking this very seriously because 
the stakes are real, but we also know that we 
can and will win,” said Kelley Robinson, 
national organizing director for Planned 
Parenthood Federation of America. “And if 
there is anything the last year has shown us 
it’s that this experiment of democracy is 
working.” 
Should they fail to stop Kavanaugh’s 
confirmation and should he decide to 
overturn Roe, their optimism will be put to 
the test, as the issue of abortion would move 
back to the states, and political trench warfare 
would ensue. 
To organizations such as the Susan B. 
Anthony List, which supports politicians that 
block abortion access, this nomination is a 
rare opportunity. 
Roe and another Supreme Court 
decision, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
allowed abortion until fetal viability, which is 
generally understood as up to 24 weeks, and 
prohibited states from placing an “undue 
burden” on women who seek an abortion. 
More recently, Whole Women’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt took specific restrictions off the 
table that limit how abortion clinics must 
operate. 
“We see that we have got a battle ahead of us, 
and this is the one that the pro-life movement 
has been looking to for decades,” Marjorie 
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Dannenfelser, president of SBA List, told 
reporters on the night of the nomination. 
There is, to be sure, a long and winding road 
to overturning Roe. To start, it’s no guarantee 
that the Senate will confirm Kavanaugh. 
Though his credentials and experience have 
been widely acknowledged, the reality is that 
Republicans have a fragile majority of 51 
seats and can only afford to lose a single vote 
if Democratic opposition holds. Centrist 
GOP Sens. Lisa Murkowski of Alaska and 
Susan Collins of Maine are avowed 
supporters of abortion rights and the health 
status of Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., makes 
it uncertain whether he’d be able to vote. 
Even if Kavanaugh is confirmed, it is far 
from a guarantee that a newly constituted 
Supreme Court would overturn Roe. 
Justice Clarence Thomas is the only member 
of the Supreme Court who has voted to 
overturn Roe. In 1992’s Casey case, Thomas 
sided with the conservative minority that 
stated Roe was “wrongly decided” and “can 
and should be overruled consistently.” The 
dissent rejected the idea that stare decisis, a 
legal principle of being deferential to prior 
precedents, compelled them to uphold it. 
If all other conservative justices are on board 
with overturning the ruling, it’s still not a 
lock that Kavanaugh would cast the deciding 
vote to strike it down. On the one hand, he 
told Congress in 2006, as part of his 
nomination for the D.C. Circuit, that he 
would follow Roe “faithfully and fully” and 
considered it “binding precedent of the 
court.” On the other hand, while praising the 
legacy of the late Justice William Rehnquist 
in a 2017 speech to the conservative 
American Enterprise Institute, he highlighted 
how Rehnquist fought for limits on the 
expansion of unenumerated rights, meaning 
those not explicitly recognized by the 
Constitution. As examples, Kavanaugh 
mentioned how Rehnquist had joined the 
dissent in Roe and later voted to overturn it 
in Casey. 
Neither example reveals with certainty how 
Kavanaugh would vote. When he called Roe 
“binding precedent,” he was speaking as a 
lower court candidate who would be bound 
by prior Supreme Court rulings, something 
that would not be the case if he joins the high 
court. His AEI speech could be viewed as a 
look at the influence that Rehnquist had on 
the court rather than a suggestion that he 
would have ruled the same way in every case. 
Furthermore, even if he agreed with 
Rehnquist’s decision to oppose Roe in the 
past and expressed weariness of expanding 
unenumerated rights, that doesn’t mean he 
wouldn’t vote to preserve a right that has 
been on the books for decades. 
Kavanaugh has ruled in favor of abortion 
limits in at least one case. He dissented in a 
ruling from the D.C. Circuit last year that 
allowed an immigrant teen who was in the 
country illegally, and under government 
custody, to get an abortion. He wrote in his 
opinion that the majority’s position was 
“based on a constitutional principle as novel 
as it is wrong: a new right for unlawful 
immigrant minors in U.S. government 
detention to obtain immediate abortion on 
demand.” 
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Clarke Forsythe, senior counsel at Americans 
United for Life, cautioned that Roe might 
never be overruled, but said that people who 
oppose abortion still had reason to be hopeful 
because he believes in the short term the 
courts will uphold state or federal limits on 
abortion. 
“The 5-4 pro-abortion majority that has been 
on the court ... is changing,” he said. “Justice 
Kennedy was intensively invested in Roe, in 
its future and its perpetuation, staking his 
historic legacy on reaffirming Roe.” 
For the Supreme Court, there are a multitude 
of potential outcomes in between outright 
upholding or fully overturning Roe that 
would allow for more restrictions on 
abortion. 
Justices have significant leeway not only in 
which cases they choose to hear but in how 
they address the issues they are presented 
with. Dozens of abortion restrictions have 
been challenged in court, ranging from who 
is allowed to provide an abortion to how it 
can be performed and when. 
Appellate courts are considering the legality 
of bans on an abortion procedure known as 
dilation and evacuation, in Texas, Alabama, 
and Arkansas. The procedure, in which fetal 
tissue is removed from the womb with 
suction and surgery tools, is used in the 
second trimester. Judges have blocked bans 
from going into effect, but it’s possible they 
could reach the Supreme Court. 
“They are pretty serious challenges to Roe 
because they ban a method to abortion that is 
the primary method to abortion after 12 
weeks,” said Elizabeth Nash, senior state 
issues manager for the Guttmacher Institute, 
which tracks abortion and other reproductive 
policies. “When you ban this method you are 
eliminating access for much of the second 
trimester.” 
Bans on how late into a pregnancy abortions 
are allowed could also move up through the 
courts. Mississippi is facing a court challenge 
over its 15-week ban, which has been 
blocked by a judge because it doesn’t 
meet Roe’s standards. 
“The Supreme Court has been clear that those 
bans are unconstitutional,” said Hillary 
Schneller, staff attorney at the Center for 
Reproductive Rights. “They have been 
blocked everywhere challenged.” 
Other cases touch on abortion without 
outright disputing its legality. A debate over 
whether states should be allowed to cut off 
Medicaid funding from Planned Parenthood, 
for instance, could be heard as early as this 
fall if four justices decide to take it up. 
Cases such as this, Schneller said, are “about 
abortion but don’t as directly relate to Roe or 
Casey or the standards in Whole Women’s 
Health about the constitutional right to 
abortion.” 
A law in Indiana obligating abortion clinics 
to bury fetal remains is another example that 
could be taken up, said Forsythe. 
How abortion cases are challenged, whether 
in federal or state court, will also be at play in 
terms of how far-reaching a policy could 
become. The Supreme Court could narrowly 
uphold state laws without touching 
on Roe, or they could rule in a way that opens 
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the door to states chipping away at abortion 
rights. 
If Roe is overturned, the decision to legalize 
abortion would fall to states and popular 
opinion , and voting patterns would play a 
much larger role in determining abortion 
policy. 
Current polling on abortion is nuanced, 
providing opportunities for both sides to 
claim public sympathy with their position. 
For instance, roughly two-thirds of the public 
does not want to see the Supreme Court 
overturn Roe. A Pew Research 
Center poll found that 57 percent of the 
public said abortion should be legal in most 
or all cases, compared to 40 percent who said 
it should be illegal in all or most cases. 
But additional questioning shows that 
support for abortion breaks down depending 
on the time in the pregnancy and on the 
circumstances. Though 60 percent of 
Americans believe abortion should be legal 
in the first trimester, according to Gallup 
polling, just 28 percent say it should be legal 
in the second trimester, and support drops to 
13 percent in the third trimester. Though 83 
percent favor legalized abortion if a 
pregnant woman’s life is in danger and 77 
percent in the cases of rape or incest, just 45 
percent say abortion should be legal if “the 
woman does not want the child for any 
reason.” These findings suggest 
that outlawing abortion in all cases has 
limited popular support, but so too does the 
idea of allowing abortion at any time and for 
any reason. 
These national numbers can vary widely 
from state to state, and that’s where those 
opposed to abortion see an opportunity 
ahead. In a post- Roe world, the states, they 
say, are poised to be divided into three 
buckets: One that will leave abortion laws in 
place without barriers, another ready to 
further restrict abortion, and a final category 
that would leave open the debate. 
“In the remaining third there is likely to be a 
vigorous debate — previously impeded 
by Roe — to find consensus about how to 
protect unborn children and advance 
women,” said Mallory Quigley, 
spokeswoman for SBA List. “Reaching 
democratic consensus is what this nation is 
all about, and it’s what distinguishes us from 
abortion activists who pretend to have broad 
support but depend on unelected judges to 
impose radical policy on the entire nation.” 
Abortion rights groups counter that women’s 
access to abortion should not be dictated by 
where they happen to live. They say the 
Supreme Court is needed to decide on 
abortion because it should be shielded by the 
Constitution rather than decided by 
politicians, who would have more power to 
make changes if Roe is overturned. 
Should that happen, 22 states could outlaw 
abortion, according to the Center for 
Reproductive Rights. 
Certain states are expected to see no impact. 
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, 
Maine, Maryland, Oregon, Nevada, and 
Washington state have laws that explicitly 
legalize abortion. State lawmakers seeking to 
maintain abortion access in the wake of the 
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Supreme Court vacancy are looking to do the 
same. 
But a handful of states would ban abortion, 
some of which have exceptions to protect a 
pregnant woman’s life, or in cases of 
prosecuted rape. Louisiana, Mississippi, 
North Dakota, and South Dakota all have 
“trigger laws” that would ban abortions 
if Roe is overturned. Ten additional states 
still have pre- Roe bans on the books. 
Depending on the political makeup of the 
presidency and Congress, overturning Roe 
would also open the door to passing federal 
restrictions that previously didn’t meet the 
case’s standards. 
Dr. Hal Lawrence, president of the American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 
warned that making abortion illegal would 
not stop it from happening. Estimates show 
that 5,000 women a year were killed by 
illegal abortions before Roe. 
“When abortion access is restricted or 
criminalized, women do not cease to need 
abortion care,” he said. “They are simply 
forced to look for alternate methods to 
receive care, where there is often little to no 
formal medical expertise or regulation to 
ensure the method is either safe or effective.” 
In many states, abortion is already heavily 
regulated, even with the parameters 
in Roe and Casey. Restrictions in Kentucky, 
Mississippi, North Dakota, South Dakota, 
West Virginia, and Wyoming have 
winnowed down the number of abortion 
clinics to one. 
Abortion foes say restrictions are needed to 
protect women, but those in favor of few 
restrictions on abortion say they are 
medically unnecessary. 
In larger states where abortion is more 
regulated, women tend to need the financial 
resources and the ability to take time off work 
to drive hundreds of miles to a clinic. Some 
states have mandatory waiting periods, which 
could necessitate a hotel stay if a clinic is 
outside town, and some clinics will only 
provide abortions once a week. 
“All of those restrictions can pile up and 
make it so women can’t access abortion 
safely and legally,” Schneller said. 
The restrictions on abortion can have the 
unintended consequence of delaying them 
from happening earlier in a pregnancy, at a 
time that has more public support. One in 
four women will have an abortion by age 45, 
studies suggest, but late-term abortions are 
rare, at roughly 1 percent a year. 
Research suggests that women who have had 
an abortion during the second trimester 
would have preferred to have one earlier, but 
were unable to because of the restrictions in 
their state. Others may have initially wanted 
to have a baby but learn of fetal abnormalities 
or threats to their health or lives. 
“Women seek abortions later in pregnancy 
for the same reasons as they seek it earlier in 
a pregnancy,” Schneller said. “They are often 
delayed because of all the restrictions states 
have passed.” 
Organizations such as SBA List point to the 
passage of laws to limit abortion as evidence 
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that public sentiment on the issue is facing 
unrest. 
“How we treat unborn children isn’t settled in 
the hearts and minds of the American people, 
otherwise states would not have passed 
hundreds of pro-life laws designed to protect 
the unborn, especially in recent years,” 
Quigley said. 
States with already limited access to abortion 
could make the practice even more limited. 
“If Roe is undercut or overturned it really 
exacerbates the disparity we already see,” 
Nash said. “It just makes a difficult situation 
more burdensome and allows states to adopt 
restrictions that may have been struck down 
years ago.” 
This understanding is driving protests across 
the country. On the night Trump announced 
his nominee, outside the Supreme Court, the 
emotional debate was in the spotlight. 
Alternating cries of “Protect Roe!” from 
hundreds of organized protesters and 
“Overturn Roe!” among a smaller group of 
gatherers drowned each other out. 
Were Roe to be overturned, the passion of 
both sides would be transferred to battles at 
the legislative level. The late Justice Antonin 
Scalia’s take on such an outcome, as he 
described in arguing for striking down Roe, 
was that the abortion issue would be, 
“resolved like most important questions in 
our democracy: by citizens trying to persuade 
one another and then voting." 
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“New Supreme Court justice could weigh in on abortion quickly” 
 
 
Politico 
 
Jennifer Haberkorn 
 
July 3, 2018 
 
President Donald Trump’s pick for the 
Supreme Court won’t have to wait long to 
make a potentially historic decision on 
abortion rights. 
 
A slew of abortion-related cases are working 
their way through lower courts, dealing with 
questions about when abortions should be 
allowed, or which procedures doctors can 
perform to terminate a pregnancy. Any of 
these could become opportunities for the 
justices to address fundamental questions 
about the legal right to abortion in the United 
States, putting Roe v. Wade in the Supreme 
Court’s sights. 
 
“This court is going to have a ton of 
opportunities” to address reproductive health, 
said Amy Hagstrom Miller, the founder of 
Whole Woman’s Health abortion clinic, 
which has six lawsuits pending against state 
abortion restrictions across the country. 
“When you have a … case on the table, the 
administration can use that as an opportunity 
to ask the court to do” more to restrict 
abortion. 
 
Legal experts agree that any abortion-related 
case, even a relatively narrow one, that the 
justices accept could turn into a broader 
debate over the 1973 Roe v. Waderuling that 
recognized abortion rights. For instance, the 
George H.W. Bush administration in 1992 
asked the court to rule broadly on Roe when 
it took a case on whether Pennsylvania anti-
abortion laws were valid. That time, the 
administration lost in what became the 
landmark Casey case — with retiring Justice 
Anthony Kennedy co-authoring the majority 
opinion that largely affirmed Roe. 
 
The Supreme Court will look much different 
than it did in 1992, and the next threat 
to Roe could arrive at the Supreme Court in a 
more discrete manner. The justices control 
which cases they accept, so it is impossible to 
know whether they’ll take up an abortion 
case in the next term, which begins in 
October. But they could get at least one 
petition as soon as this fall. 
 
The pending cases in federal courts, some 
just one level below the Supreme Court, fall 
into two categories, either of which could 
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turn into a broader debate about Roe. Some 
of the lawsuits challenge the reasons to allow 
a woman to get an abortion; others debate the 
method a physician could use.  
 
Each of these cases forces the justices to 
weigh the state’s right to protect a fetus 
against a woman’s right to end a pregnancy, 
potentially leading them to reconsider Roe. 
Indiana officials, for instance, need to decide 
this summer whether to ask the justices to 
overturn a 7th Circuit decision that the state 
cannot ban abortion when Down syndrome or 
another fetal abnormality has been 
diagnosed. It was a bill signed into law by 
then-Gov. Mike Pence in 2016. Similar 
litigation against an Ohio ban on abortions 
after a Down syndrome diagnosis is working 
its way through the 6th Circuit. 
 
There are several method-ban-related cases, 
too. The 5th Circuit will consider whether 
Texas can prohibit the common second-
trimester abortion procedure. Two other 
circuits are weighing similar bans in 
Alabama and Arkansas. A related Kentucky 
ban was just challenged in court by the 
American Civil Liberties Union. 
 
“There certainly is a real likelihood that one 
of those will be petitioned” to the justices, 
said Diana Kasdan, a senior staff attorney at 
the Center for Reproductive Rights, which 
has brought several lawsuits against abortion 
restrictions. “It’s a real risk. Trump has said 
that he will appoint justices that are certainly 
not favorable, to say the least. The question is 
if one of those went up, what might happen.” 
 
Opponents of abortion, of course, have 
clamored for an opportunity to go after 
the Roe decision. Ohio lawmakers, for 
instance, introduced a bill this year that 
would ban abortion completely — an 
aggressive measure that would have sparked 
an immediate court challenge had it passed. 
 
"That could ultimately be a bill that 
revisits Roe v. Wade," Ohio state Rep. Ron 
Hood told POLITICO earlier this year. “One 
flip of a Supreme Court justice, and 
revisiting Roe v. Wade looks very, very 
promising.” 
 
If the Supreme Court wants to wade head-on 
into the Roe decision, it is likely to get a case 
in a few years. Mississippi’s only surviving 
abortion clinic, Jackson Women’s Health, is 
suing over the state Legislature’s recent bill 
that would ban abortion after 15 weeks of 
pregnancy, significantly earlier than Supreme 
Court precedent that says states cannot ban it 
before a fetus is viable outside of the womb, 
about 24 weeks. That case is unlikely to 
progress to the Supreme Court level for 
several years, if it ever does. 
Abortion rights advocates warn that even if 
the court doesn’t reverse the Roe ruling, it 
can dramatically expand states’ abilities to 
enact laws that create hurdles to abortion. 
 
“Look at Texas,” said Helene Krasnoff, 
senior director of public policy, litigation and 
law at the Planned Parenthood Action Fund, 
referring to state laws that effectively 
shuttered half the abortion clinics in Texas 
before it was overturned in 2016. “States can 
just as effectively deny access to abortion 
short of an all-out ban.” 
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The Supreme Court accepts very few of the 
cases that come before it; abortion is not an 
exception. But when it does take an abortion 
case, it generally becomes one of the most 
significant cases of the term. That was the 
case when the court, after turning away 
dozens of abortion-related cases for years, 
took up the Texas case. The justices, 
including Kennedy, struck the laws. 
 
That ruling, in Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt, had inspired Whole Woman’s 
Health to participate in a new series of 
lawsuits filed last month against state 
abortion laws in Texas, Virginia and Indiana. 
The idea was to use the 2016 Supreme Court 
ruling to strike other restrictive state laws. 
“With Kennedy on the bench, I was excited 
to leverage the Whole Woman’s Health 
decision,” Hagstrom Miller said. Kennedy’s 
retirement changes the calculus; there is 
significantly more risk for the clinics, though 
Hagstrom Miller said she hasn’t had second 
thoughts. “It doesn’t change my resolve to 
bring lawsuits and … to take a stand for 
what’s right and to try to move the needle 
forward.” 
 
The court will have other opportunities to 
shape reproductive health law. The justices 
this summer will decide whether to take one 
or both of the pending cases that would allow 
states to defund Planned Parenthood. If four 
justices agree, the court would likely hear a 
case this fall or next winter. 
 
Around the country, the courts are also 
hearing cases involving several Trump 
administration changes to reproductive 
health policy, particularly on contraception. 
Several lawsuits challenge the 
administration’s decision to allow employers 
to not cover birth control in employee health 
plans, a requirement of Obamacare. The 
administration has also cut funding for the 
Teen Pregnancy Prevention Program and 
made dramatic changes in favor of 
abstinence-oriented programs under the Title 
X program, which has traditionally helped 
cover contraceptive services for low-income 
women. Several lawsuits have been filed 
against both policies. 
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“How a Supreme Court Shaped by Trump Could Restrict Access to Abortion” 
 
 
New York Times 
 
Adam Liptak, Anjali Singhvi, Natalie Reneau, Robin Stein, Aaron Byrd, and Jonah M. Kessel 
 
August 14, 2018 
 
President Trump has pledged to appoint 
Supreme Court justices who will vote to 
overturn Roe v. Wade, the 1973 decision that 
established a constitutional right to abortion. 
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy was a cautious 
supporter of abortion rights. With his 
departure and the addition of a second Trump 
appointee, the Supreme Court would have a 
conservative majority that would most likely 
sustain sharp restrictions on access to 
abortion in the United States. 
But if the court does hear a case that brings 
up the issue, it is hardly clear that it would 
take the drastic step of overruling Roe. The 
court could instead opt for a more 
incremental strategy, upholding increasingly 
severe restrictions in much of the country but 
stopping short of saying that the Constitution 
has nothing to say about a right to abortion. 
Assuming that there are five justices ready to 
limit abortion rights, how could that happen? 
Here are some of the possible scenarios, each 
of which entails a different degree of legal 
upheaval. 
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“A Kavanaugh Signal on Abortion?” 
 
 
New York Times 
 
Linda Greenhouse 
 
July 18, 2018 
 
We can’t be sure what the substitution of 
Judge Brett Kavanaugh for Justice Anthony 
M. Kennedy means for the Supreme Court’s 
abortion jurisprudence. But we can take a 
page from history to make an educated guess. 
Two pages, actually. Let’s set two judicial 
opinions on the subject of abortion side by 
side to see what they tell us. One, less than a 
year old, is by the current Supreme Court 
nominee. The other was written by another 
appeals court judge, Samuel A. Alito Jr., 15 
years before he became a Supreme Court 
justice. The Kavanaugh opinion may suggest 
what lies ahead if he is confirmed. Justice 
Alito’s opinion told us in no uncertain words. 
I’ll begin there, because no one should have 
been surprised by what happened after 
Justice Alito replaced Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor in 2006. Justice O’Connor had 
voted with the 5-to-4 majority in 2000 to 
declare unconstitutional Nebraska’s criminal 
prohibition on so-called “partial-birth 
abortion,” a second-trimester abortion 
procedure that, while rarely used in practice, 
proved an invaluable gift to anti-abortion 
politicians. 
Seven years later, the court flipped, voting 5 
to 4 to uphold a nearly identical law, this one 
passed by Congress, with Justice Alito in the 
majority. What happened? The court, Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg observed in her acerbic 
dissent in the new case, Gonzales v. Carhart, 
was now “differently composed.” Then, two 
years ago, Justice Alito dissented from the 
court’s decision in Whole Woman’s Health 
v. Hellerstedt, which declared 
unconstitutional a Texas law that would have 
imposed needless requirements on abortion 
clinics and would have caused many clinics 
in the state to close. Justice Alito objected 
that predictions of the devastating effect the 
law would have on the availability of 
abortion in Texas were based on “crude 
inferences.” The vote in that case was 5 to 3, 
with Justice Kennedy in the majority. 
Back in 1991, as a judge on the Philadelphia-
based United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit, Sam Alito had proven his anti-
abortion bona fides with a separate opinion 
in a case that reviewed Pennsylvania’s 
sweeping Abortion Control Act. The three-
judge panel on which he sat upheld all the 
law’s many provisions, including a waiting 
period and mandatory counseling, with a 
single exception: the requirement that a 
married woman notify her husband of her 
intention to terminate her pregnancy. Doctors 
could lose their licenses for performing an 
abortion on a married woman without first 
obtaining her signature attesting that she had 
complied with the notice requirement. 
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Judge Walter Stapleton’s majority opinion, 
taking account of what he called “the real-
world consequences of forced notification,” 
declared that provision unconstitutional. 
Most married women do discuss an abortion 
decision with their husbands, Judge Stapleton 
observed; for them, “a notification 
requirement is unnecessary and serves no 
state interest.” But he added that “the number 
of different situations in which women may 
reasonably fear dire consequences from 
notifying their husbands is potentially 
limitless.” The “relevant burdens to be 
assessed,” he concluded, were not the 
burdens on married women in general, but 
specifically “on women who would choose 
not to notify their husbands in the absence of 
state compulsion to do so.” Because the 
burden on this group of women outweighed 
any interest that the state had in requiring 
notification, the provision was 
unconstitutional. 
It was from this common-sense and 
compassionate analysis that Judge Alito 
dissented. To wave away the majority’s 
concerns about women’s welfare, he used 
arithmetic. Noting that most abortions are 
sought by unmarried women, and that 
according to expert testimony 95 percent of 
married women do notify their husbands, he 
said it was “immediately apparent” that the 
law “cannot affect more than about 5 percent 
of married women seeking abortions or an 
even smaller percentage of all women 
desiring abortions.” 
He went on: “It seems safe to assume 
that some percentage, despite an initial 
inclination not to tell their husbands, would 
notify their husbands without suffering 
substantial ill effects.” (Which “ill effects” 
might be so “insubstantial” that they could 
just be ignored, he didn’t say.) Judge Alito’s 
conclusion was that there were simply not 
enough women for the court to worry about, 
and that in any event, the Pennsylvania 
Legislature could have “reasonably 
concluded” that conversation between 
husband and wife could “properly further a 
husband’s interests in the fetus in a sufficient 
percentage of the affected cases to justify 
enactment of this measure.” 
When the Third Circuit decision, Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, reached the Supreme 
Court in the spring of 1992, the justices 
agreed with Judge Stapleton. The waiting 
period and mandatory counseling were 
constitutional. The spousal notice 
requirement was not. The controlling 
opinion, written jointly by Justices 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and David H. Souter, 
had this to say about that requirement: “The 
analysis does not end with the 1 percent of 
women upon whom the statute operates; it 
begins there. Legislation is measured for 
consistency with the Constitution by its 
impact on those whose conduct it affects.” 
The justices went on: “For the great many 
women who are victims of abuse inflicted by 
their husbands, or whose children are the 
victims of such abuse, a spousal notice 
requirement enables the husband to wield an 
effective veto over the wife’s decision,” 
adding that: “Women do not lose their 
constitutionally protected liberty when they 
marry. The Constitution protects all 
individuals, male or female, married or 
unmarried, from the abuse of governmental 
power, even where that power is employed 
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for the supposed benefit of a member of the 
individual’s family.” 
(In an odd twist of history, Judge Kavanaugh 
was a law clerk for Judge Stapleton while 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey was under 
consideration by the Third Circuit. Did the 
young clerk agree with his judge on the 
spousal notice question, or with Judge Alito? 
Someone on the Senate Judiciary Committee 
should ask him.) 
Justice Alito’s arid analysis as expressed in 
his own words, his refusal to yield to 
persuasion by his colleagues in the majority 
and the eventual rejection of his position by 
three Republican-appointed Supreme Court 
justices all speak volumes. Beyond his 
personal attitude about abortion, which 
should be irrelevant to a judge and about 
which we shouldn’t have to care, his opinion 
revealed his view of the judicial role when it 
comes to enforcing — or, in this case, even 
making a good-faith effort to understand — 
individual rights. 
This brings me to Judge Kavanaugh and last 
fall’s case of the pregnant immigrant 
teenager whom the Trump administration 
tried to block from exercising her right to an 
abortion. The young woman, J.D., detained 
as an undocumented “unaccompanied minor” 
in the custody of an overtly anti-abortion 
bureaucrat in the Department of Health and 
Human Services, had jumped through every 
available hoop, including persuading a Texas 
judge that she was sufficiently mature to 
make the abortion decision. Volunteers had 
arranged and would pay for the procedure. 
The contract shelter in South Texas where 
she was being held would handle the logistics 
as it would for any other medical procedure, 
with no cost to the federal government. But 
in the Trump administration’s view, to permit 
the private actors to carry out their plan 
would be to force the government to 
“facilitate” abortion. By the time J.D. went to 
federal court, she was well into her second 
trimester and approaching the point when 
abortion would be unavailable in Texas. 
Last Oct. 18, a federal district judge in 
Washington, D.C., Tanya Chutkan, issued an 
order to prohibit the administration from 
blocking J.D.’s access to an abortion. The 
judge found that further delay would cause 
the teenager to “suffer irreparable injury in 
the form of, at a minimum, increased risk to 
her health, and perhaps the permanent 
inability to obtain a desired abortion to which 
she is legally entitled.” 
The administration appealed, and two days 
later, a panel of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
voted 2 to 1 to vacate Judge Chutkan’s 
order and to give the administration an 
additional 11 days to find a sponsor who 
would assume custody of J.D. Presumably, if 
the government no longer had custody, it 
would not be “facilitating” an abortion that 
might then take place. The problem, left 
unacknowledged in the court’s order, was 
that the Department of Health and Human 
Services, which necessarily vets would-be 
sponsors carefully, had been looking for one 
for J.D. for six weeks without success. 
Judge Kavanaugh was presumably the author 
of the unsigned order, given that the other 
judge in the majority, Karen LeCraft 
Henderson, wrote separately, and the third 
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member of the panel, Patricia Millett, wrote 
a stinging dissent. “The government says it 
does not want to ‘facilitate’ the abortion,” 
Judge Millett wrote. “But there is nothing for 
it to facilitate” because everything would be 
handled by others. She added: “So what the 
government really claims here is not a right 
to avoid subsidizing the abortion decision; it 
claims a right to use immigration custody to 
nullify J.D.’s constitutional right to 
reproductive autonomy prior to viability.” It 
was, Judge Millett continued, “an astonishing 
power grab, and it flies in the teeth of decades 
of Supreme Court precedent preserving and 
protecting the fundamental right of a woman 
to make an informed choice whether to 
continue a pregnancy at this early stage.” 
The teenager’s lawyers appealed to the full 
appeals court. By a vote of 6 to 3, the court 
vacated the panel’s order. The abortion could 
proceed (which it did, the next day.) Judge 
Kavanaugh wrote for the dissenters. His 
language was strong. He accused the majority 
of having created “a new right for unlawful 
immigrant minors in U.S. government 
detention to obtain immediate abortion on 
demand,” which he called “a radical 
extension of the Supreme Court’s abortion 
jurisprudence.” 
Three times in his nine-page opinion, Judge 
Kavanaugh used the phrase “abortion on 
demand,” a famous dog whistle for those 
opposed to abortion, as odd as it is brutal-
sounding. What does this phrase actually 
mean? We don’t say “rhinoplasty on 
demand” or even, for a medical emergency, 
“appendectomy on demand.” Here was Judge 
Millett’s response in her own separate 
opinion: 
“Abortion on demand? Hardly. Here is what 
this case holds: a pregnant minor who (i) has 
an unquestioned constitutional right to 
choose a pre-viability abortion, and (ii) has 
satisfied every requirement of state law to 
obtain an abortion, need not wait additional 
weeks just because she — in the 
government’s inimitably ironic phrasing — 
‘refuses to leave’ its custody. That sure does 
not sound like ‘on demand’ to me. Unless 
Judge Kavanaugh’s dissenting opinion 
means the demands of the Constitution and 
Texas law. With that I would agree.” 
In his opinion, Judge Kavanaugh argued that 
the government was behaving reasonably. 
“She is 17 years old. She is pregnant and has 
to make a major life decision. Is it really 
absurd for the United States to think that the 
minor should be transferred to her 
immigration sponsor — ordinarily a family 
member, relative, or friend — before she 
makes that decision? And keep in mind that 
the government is not forcing the minor to 
talk to the sponsor about the decision, or to 
obtain consent. It is merely seeking to place 
the minor in a better place when deciding 
whether to have an abortion.” 
In the abstract, that does sound reasonable. 
But in fact, J.D. had already decided that at 
age 17, alone and without resources, she did 
not want to become a mother. She had 
already received the permission of a state 
judge and counseling from a clinic physician. 
And every day, she was a day more pregnant. 
The case, Azar v. Garza, ultimately made no 
law. In June, the Supreme Court issued a 
unanimous order vacating the appeals court’s 
ruling as moot. But the issue has not gone 
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away. A class-action lawsuit is proceeding on 
behalf of all immigrant teenagers in federal 
custody who may seek abortions. 
And there will be other abortion cases, lots of 
them, propelled to the court in the belief that 
a long-awaited moment — the dismantling of 
Roe v. Wade — is finally at hand. We have 
no crystal ball to tell us for sure what a new 
Supreme Court justice will do. But we have 
words, and we can read. 
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“Here’s What Brett Kavanaugh Has Said About Roe v. Wade” 
 
 
Rolling Stone  
 
Tessa Stuart 
  
July 13, 2018 
 
Last fall, an undocumented 17-year-old was 
arrested while crossing the U.S.-Mexico 
border. The girl, referred to in court 
documents as Jane Doe, was sent to a private 
Texas detention center under contract with 
the Office of Refugee Resettlement. Shortly 
after her arrival, she learned she was eight 
weeks pregnant and decided to terminate. 
The teen had money to pay for her procedure, 
transportation and the approval of a Texas 
judge who deemed her “mature and 
sufficiently well informed to make the 
decision to have an abortion” (a requirement 
for minors seeking an abortion in Texas 
without parental consent). 
The only thing standing in the girl’s way was 
the Trump administration, which refused to 
allow her to leave the detention center for the 
appointment. Government lawyers argued 
that letting her go would violate a decree 
issued a few months earlier that forbade 
shelters from taking “any action that 
facilitates” an abortion without the express 
permission of the ORR director – a Trump 
appointee who also happens to be a pro-life 
zealot. 
 
ACLU lawyers sued the government on the 
girl’s behalf and the case, Garza v. Hargan, 
landed in front of a three-judge panel on the 
D.C. circuit court. One judge believed that 
because the girl was undocumented she 
didn’t have any Constitutional rights. 
Another said she did have rights and that the 
government was violating them by blocking 
her from obtaining the abortion. The third 
judge, Brett Kavanaugh, President Trump’s 
newest Supreme Court nominee, didn’t 
dispute the girl’s right to have an abortion. 
Instead, he proposed a solution that would 
have trapped her in legal limbo for a few 
more weeks, running out the clock as her 
pregnancy advanced and approached Texas’ 
20-week cut-off for all legal abortions. The 
full circuit court ultimately ruled in the 
ACLU’s favor, and the teenager received her 
abortion when she was more than 15 weeks 
pregnant. But if it had been left up to 
Kavanaugh alone, she probably would have 
been forced to carry the baby to term against 
her wishes. 
 
Trump’s nomination of Kavanaugh to the 
Supreme Court seat vacated by retiring 
Justice Anthony Kennedy could put the judge 
in a position to redefine reproductive rights in 
America for decades to come. That’s an 
alarming prospect for pro-choice Americans, 
because in both legal opinions and public 
speeches, Kavanaugh has left little doubt 
about the fact that he does not believe in a 
constitutional right to an abortion. That 
probably won’t stop him from trying to 
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convince skeptical senators during his 
confirmation hearings, though. 
 
With a razor-thin Republican margin in the 
Senate, Kavanaugh’s confirmation will hinge 
on locking down support from Suan Collins 
(R-ME) and her colleague Lisa Murkowski 
(R-AK), who are both pro-choice. As they’ve 
done in the past, these senators will scrutinize 
Kavanaugh’s record, paying particular 
attention to one code-word: precedent. “I 
view Roe v. Wade as being settled law,” 
Collins told reporters shortly after 
Kennedy’s retirement. “It’s clearly precedent 
and I always look for judges who respect 
precedent.” (Approached for comment, 
Collins’ press secretary forwarded Rolling 
Stone the senator’s boilerplate statement on 
Kavanaugh’s nomination; it declares the 
judge has “impressive credentials and 
extensive experience,” but promises Collins 
will nonetheless “conduct a careful, thorough 
vetting” of his record.) 
 
During last year’s confirmation hearings, 
Trump’s other Supreme Court pick, Justice 
Neil Gorsuch, repeatedly and ardently 
declared his deep respect for legal 
precedence. “I’m sworn as a sitting judge to 
give the full weight and respect to due 
precedent;” “I follow precedent;” “I will 
follow the law of judicial precedent in this 
and in every other area, senator, it’s my 
promise to you;” Gorsuch said at that time. 
 
Gorsuch’s personal assurances about 
precedent were crucial to securing Collins’ 
vote. “I had a very long discussion with 
Justice Gorsuch in my office,” Collins 
recently told CNN’s Jake Tapper. “And he 
pointed out to me that he is a co-author of a 
whole book on precedent.” 
 
Among Gorsuch’s co-authors in that same 
book? Brett Kavanaugh. 
 
But, as Brianne Gorod, former clerk to 
Justice Stephen Breyer, has pointed out, all 
those promises weren’t worth much. In his 
first year on the court, Gorsuch voted to 
overrule past Supreme Court decisions 
in Janus v. AFSCME, Abbott v. 
Perez and South Dakota v. Wayfair – a 
decision in which he expressed a willingness 
to overturn even more precedents in the 
future. 
 
Taking Kavanaugh at his word that he 
respects precedent would be a similarly grave 
error, because the judge has an unusual and 
radical interpretation of what abortion 
precedent actually is, as evidenced by his 
dissent in Garza v. Hargan in which he 
employed the word “precedent” 19 times in 
just 10 pages. 
 
In his dissent, Kavanaugh tried to make the 
case that the Supreme Court has typically 
taken a conservative perspective on abortion, 
citing “many precedents holding that the 
Government has permissible interests in 
favoring fetal life, protecting the best 
interests of a minor, and refraining from 
facilitating abortion.” He failed to point out 
that the Supreme Court has consistently 
ruled that any restriction constituting “a 
unilateral veto” – like the 
government unilaterally deciding that a 
teenage girl cannot have an abortion after she 
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met the state’s legal requirements – is 
unconstitutional. 
 
He went on to contrast his view with the 
majority’s “radical” interpretation of the law, 
which he said would only have been 
supported by history’s most extreme justices. 
He called three of them out by name – 
William J. Brennan, Thurgood Marshall and 
Harry Blackmun – casting those justices as 
extremists whose abortion views were far 
outside the mainstream and decidedly “not 
with the many majority opinions of the 
Supreme Court that have repeatedly upheld 
reasonable regulations that do not impose an 
undue burden on the abortion right 
recognized by the Supreme Court in Roe v. 
Wade.” 
 
He returned to those three justices later in his 
dissent, in a passage that should be extremely 
concerning for anyone holding out hope that 
if confirmed, Kavanaugh would 
leave Roe untouched. “From one perspective, 
some disagree with cases that allow the 
Government to refuse to fund abortions and 
that allow the Government to impose 
regulations such as parental consent, 
informed consent, and waiting periods,” 
Kavanaugh wrote. “That was certainly the 
position of Justices Brennan, Marshall, and 
Blackmun. From the other perspective, some 
disagree with cases holding that the U.S. 
Constitution provides a right to an abortion.” 
 
Kavanaugh presented this as a binary choice. 
If there is room for more than two opinions 
on the matter of abortion, Kavanaugh did not 
account for it. The fact that he already cast 
Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun as the 
radical fringe effectively places Kavanaugh 
squarely in the other camp – the camp that 
disagrees that the Constitution provides a 
right to an abortion. 
 
The opinion that Roe should be overturned is 
a radical one, and it should be treated as such. 
It’s not only a departure from 45 years of 
Supreme Court precedent, it’s also wildly 
outside the mainstream public opinion: 67 
percent of Americans do not want to 
see Roe overturned, according to a recent 
poll taken by the Kaiser Family Foundation. 
 
Judges with Supreme Court dreams usually 
take great pains to keep their true feelings 
about issues like abortion private out of fear 
that these statements could come back to 
haunt them in confirmation hearings. It’s 
probably not a coincidence that Kavanaugh 
became more bold in airing his views after 
Trump – who promised to appoint justices 
that would overturn Roe v. Wade – was 
elected. 
 
In a speech he gave last year, Kavanaugh 
praised the late Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist – one of the two dissenting justices 
to vote against Roe – as his “first judicial 
hero.” Kavanaugh bemoaned the fact that 
Rehnquist was “not successful in convincing 
a majority of the justices in the context of 
abortion either in Roe itself or in the later 
cases such as Casey… But he was successful 
in stemming the general tide of freewheeling 
judicial creation of unenumerated rights that 
were not rooted in the nation’s history and 
tradition.” Here, with his choice of words – 
“freewheeling judicial creation of 
unenumerated rights” – Kavanaugh again 
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indicated his belief that abortion is not a 
constitutional right guaranteed by the 14th 
amendment. After his speech, an audience 
member, while posing a question, said 
Kavanaugh agreed with 
Rehnquist’s Roe dissent. Kavanaugh did not 
correct him, and in answering, affirmed his 
belief that Rehnquist was right.  
 
Back in 2006, when Kavanaugh was 
nominated for his current position, Sen. 
Chuck Schumer (D-NY) asked him point 
blank: “Do you consider Roe v. Wade to be 
an abomination?” The judge, a Catholic, 
didn’t answer the question directly. He 
replied, “If confirmed to the D.C. Circuit, I 
would follow Roe v. Wade faithfully and 
fully. That would be binding precedent of the 
Court. It’s been decided by the Supreme 
Court.” 
 
That’s true. But it’s important to keep in mind 
that, unlike lower court judges who only get 
to interpret precedent, Supreme Court 
justices get to decide what qualifies and what 
doesn’t. As Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-IA) put 
it when explaining why he wouldn’t vote to 
confirm Justice Sonia Sotomayor to the 
Supreme Court in 2009, even though he 
supported her nomination to a lower court: 
“Supreme Court Justices have the last say 
with respect to the law and have the ability to 
make precedent, they do not have the same 
kinds of restraints lower court judges have. 
So we need to be convinced these nominees 
have judicial restraint – in other words, the 
self-restraint to resist interpreting the 
Constitution to satisfy their personal beliefs 
and preferences.” 
 
Collins and Murkowski, both of whom 
previously voted to confirm Kavanaugh to 
the D.C. Circuit, would do well to keep that 
in mind during his Supreme Court 
confirmation hearings.
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“Supreme Court wipes out appeals court ruling in immigrant abortion case” 
 
 
Politico 
 
Josh Gerstein and Renuka Rayasam 
 
June 4, 2018 
 
The Supreme Court has granted the Trump 
administration’s request to wipe out a federal 
appeals court’s ruling upholding the right of 
teens in immigration custody to seek 
abortions. 
 
The high court said the dispute was moot 
because the 17-year-old at the center of the 
legal fight had an abortion before the case 
reached the justices. The Supreme Court, 
acting in an unsigned order and without 
recorded dissent, didn’t signal a view on the 
underlying legal issue. 
 
The action means the question is all but 
certain to arise again, particularly given the 
Trump administration’s policy of resisting 
actions it views as facilitating abortions for 
minors 
 
The high-profile case, which dates back to 
last fall, was the first in a series of court 
battles over abortion policy in the relatively 
obscure Health and Human Services’ Office 
of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), which is 
responsible for the care of unaccompanied 
minors who enter the country illegally. 
Monday’s court order, one of the first of 
abortion cases with Supreme Court Justice 
Neil Gorsuch on the bench, comes after 
weeks of delay suggesting that there might 
have been conflicting opinions behind the 
scenes of the court, but no dissenting opinion 
was issued. 
 
The Trump administration had asked the 
Supreme Court in November to reverse the 
D.C. Circuit Court’s decision that allowed 
the teenage girl in an immigration shelter to 
obtain an abortion. It also asked the high 
court to dismiss a class-action suit 
challenging the administration's policy of 
blocking abortions for minors in the care of 
HHS. 
 
The high court indicated it would not act on 
the Justice Department’s request to impose 
sanctions on American Civil Liberties Union 
attorneys over their actions in the case. The 
federal government's lawyers argued that the 
ACLU, which is leading the class-action suit 
against the administration, and the girl’s 
lawyers deceived HHS officials about when 
her abortion would take place, rushing the 
procedure before the Trump administration 
appealed to the Supreme Court. 
 
The teen, known as Jane Doe in court 
documents, had requested an abortion in 
September after she was detained by 
immigration authorities for illegally crossing 
the border into Texas. The ACLU and the 
Texas attorneys representing her said the 
HHS refugee office intervened to block the 
procedure even though she had private funds 
and, in accordance with state law, obtained a 
judge's permission without parental consent. 
 
The full bench of the U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled 
that ORR would have to immediately release 
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Doe, who was about 16 weeks pregnant at the 
time, to obtain an abortion. The next 
morning, the girl’s lawyers arranged for the 
procedure to take place. The ACLU told the 
Supreme Court that the girl’s lawyers acted 
in her best interests. 
 
The administration argued it wanted more 
time to find a sponsor for Doe so she could 
seek an abortion outside of federal custody. 
The Justice Department has not yet taken a 
position on whether undocumented minors 
have a constitutional right to an abortion. 
 
U.S. District Court Judge Tanya Chutkan in 
March told the Trump administration it can't 
interfere with the ability of undocumented 
teens in federal custody to obtain abortions. 
She also allowed the ACLU case to move 
forward as a class- action suit.  
 
Martin Lederman, an associate professor at 
Georgetown Law, said the Trump 
administration's request for the Supreme 
Court to consider the class-action suit before 
it fully progresses through lower courts, as 
well as its call to discipline opposing 
attorneys, was "extraordinarily unusual.“ He 
said the Supreme Court’s action on the Doe 
case was unlikely to affect the proceedings of 
a class-action suit.
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“AGs Urge DC Circ. To OK Block On Detainee Abortion Rules” 
 
 
Law360 
 
Tiffany Hu 
 
August 7, 2018 
 
A coalition of attorneys general on Tuesday 
urged the D.C. Circuit to uphold a District of 
Columbia federal court's ruling that 
temporarily paused a federal agency's policy 
of blocking detained immigrant girls from 
accessing abortion services, saying such a 
policy violates the rights of both the states 
and women. 
New York Attorney General Barbara D. 
Underwood, leading a group of 19 attorneys 
general, asked the appellate court to keep 
intact a lower court's decision granting a 
preliminary injunction against the Office of 
Refugee Resettlement's policy of barring the 
facilitation of abortions. Although states 
differ as to how minors can get an abortion, 
the agency cannot simply override state 
procedures and judgments, the attorneys 
general said. 
"Permitting a federal agency to unilaterally 
substitute its policy judgment for the 
determinations of state legislatures and courts 
— as well as for the independent decision-
making of the minors living in those states — 
tramples on both the federalism interests of 
amici states and individual constitutional 
rights," the brief says. 
In March 2017, the agency adopted a policy 
that gave agency Director Scott Lloyd the 
authority to personally decide on all requests 
for abortion by detained immigrant minors, 
according to the filing. 
In addition to refusing to allow the girls to 
secure judicial bypass in lieu of parental 
consent, the director also instructed shelters 
to notify a minor's parents about her 
pregnancy without her consent, even in cases 
where such policy violated state law, the 
coalition said. 
By attempting to be the "final voice" on how 
a minor can obtain an abortion — either by 
rejecting her request, even with parental 
consent, or by rejecting her request when she 
seeks to use the state's bypass process — the 
agency ignores the fact that states in which 
the minors are located already have laws and 
policies in place, according to the brief. 
 
"Contrary to [the Office of Refugee 
Resettlement]'s assertions, its statutory 
responsibility for the health and welfare of 
children in its custody does not justify the 
challenged policy," the attorneys general 
said. "[The Office of Refugee Resettlement]'s 
custodial role does not authorize limitless 
control; rather, the agency's authority is 
'subject, of course, to the restrictions 
governing natural parents.'" 
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Citing a U.S. Supreme Court decision 
called Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey , which found unconstitutional statutes 
that created a "substantial obstacle" for 
women seeking abortions, the attorneys 
general said the Office of Refugee 
Resettlement's policy similarly imposes an 
"unconstitutional undue burden." 
"All women have a constitutionally protected 
right to access safe and effective abortion 
services — including unaccompanied 
minors," Underwood said in a statement on 
Tuesday. "The Trump administration simply 
does not have the authority to force their 
personal views on these young women by 
requiring them to carry pregnancies against 
their will. The federal policy is 
unconstitutional and inhumane, and we will 
continue to fight it." 
The brief was also signed by the attorneys 
general of California, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Vermont, Virginia, Washington and the 
District of Columbia. 
A representative for the Office of Refugee 
Resettlement did not immediately respond to 
a request for comment on Tuesday. 
In April, U.S. District Judge Tanya S. 
Chutkan determined that the federal 
government had not required any policy or 
legal justifications from Lloyd for his 
personal determination that abortion would 
not be in any pregnant immigrant girl’s best 
interests. 
The policy steps on the girls' Fifth 
Amendment rights, among others, in part 
because the decision to implement the policy 
was based on Lloyd’s ideological opposition 
to abortion, without regard to the girls' 
circumstances or right to choose, the judge 
found. 
Garza is represented by Brigitte Amiri and 
Arthur B. Spitzer of the American Civil 
Liberties Union. 
Azar is represented by August Edward 
Flentje and Michael Christopher Heyse of 
the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The case is Rochelle Garza et al. v. Alex Azar 
II et al., case number 18-5093, in the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit.
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 “Gov. Threaten Legal Action If Title X Changes Become Law” 
 
 
Law360 
 
Shayna Possess 
 
July 31, 3018 
 
The Democratic governors of New York, 
Oregon and Washington said Monday that 
they would have no choice but to take legal 
action if the Trump administration moves 
forward with proposed changes to the Title X 
family-planning program that would pull 
funding for Planned Parenthood. 
 
New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo, Oregon 
Gov. Kate Brown and Washington Gov. Jay 
Inslee spoke out in advance of the Tuesday 
cutoff for public comments regarding the 
proposal, urging the administration to reverse 
course on policy changes that would yank 
federal funding for health care providers that 
perform abortions, along with other reforms 
the leaders say will have dangerous 
consequences for women. 
 
Otherwise, Cuomo and Inslee said, they will 
have no choice but to pursue all possible 
options, including legal action, to block the 
policy from depriving the women of their 
respective states with critical health care 
options. 
 
"I believe the rule as written will not 
withstand legal challenge, and I'll do all I can 
to prevent it," Inslee said in a Monday 
statement issued after a visit to the new 
Planned Parenthood clinic in Spokane, 
Washington. 
Inslee and Brown pledged to withdraw their 
participation from Title X if the proposal is 
adopted, with the latter governor saying 
doing so would be in the best interests of 
Oregon’s citizens and state law. 
 
While Cuomo stopped short of explicitly 
saying his state wouldn't be involved in the 
revamped program, he did note in a Monday 
letter to U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services Secretary Alex Azar that "it 
will be impossible for New York to continue 
its comprehensive Title X program" if the 
rules are enacted as proposed. 
 
In May, HHS revealed its proposed updates 
to the Title X program, which provides 
family-planning services to low-income 
Americans, serving roughly four million 
people every year. 
 
The agency explained that the new proposal 
would make a number of changes to Title X's 
governing regulations, which were last 
revised 18 years ago, including cutting 
funding for programs and facilities that 
perform abortions and barring participating 
health providers from giving abortion 
referrals. 
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Before the proposal was even published in 
the Federal Register, which ultimately 
occurred on June 1, the Democratic 
Governors Association blasted the policy, 
telling Azar that they were "deeply 
concerned." 
 
The May 31 letter said Title X has enjoyed 
bipartisan support for more than 40 years, 
serving as an important partnership between 
the federal government and states that 
ensures women receive quality health care 
and comprehensive, medically accurate 
information. 
 
"We strongly urge you to reconsider this 
plan, which is nothing more than a domestic 
'gag rule' that poses serious risks to women's 
health," the governors said. 
 
But with the public comment period closing, 
Cuomo, Brown and Inslee — who had all 
signed onto the Democratic Governors 
Association letter — reiterated their concerns 
Monday. 
 
Cuomo, for instance, said in his letter to Azar 
that the proposal would decrease the quality 
of care provided to those who rely on Title X, 
particularly low-income and uninsured 
individuals, and deny women the information 
they need to make crucial decisions about 
their health. 
However, if the policy moves forward and 
legal challenges prove unsuccessful, the 
governors said they will do everything in 
their power to ensure the continued well-
being of their citizens, including, if 
necessary, withdrawing their involvement in 
Title X. 
 
The National Family Planning and 
Reproductive Health Association, along with 
several branches of Planned Parenthood, had 
launched early May litigation challenging the 
policy before it was officially unveiled, but a 
D.C. federal court axed the action earlier this 
month. 
 
U.S. District Judge Trevor N. McFadden 
granted the government's bid for a quick win 
on July 16, saying the challenge came too 
soon because nothing of legal effect had yet 
occurred. 
 
However, the judge said that even if he 
reached the merits, the government's 
challenged priorities were in line with Title 
X's mission to aid with projects offering a 
"broad range of acceptable and effective 
family planning methods and services." 
 
That decision is currently being appealed to 
the D.C. Circuit. 
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“As Affirmative Action Is Targeted, Higher Ed Must Respond” 
 
 
Law360 
 
Sarah Moore 
 
July 26, 2018 
 
With the first day of college only weeks 
away, many institutions of higher education 
must now make a significant decision: 
Comply with the current U.S. Department of 
Justice position on race-neutral admissions, 
or face being targeted as the first in a likely 
series of test cases by the U.S. attorney 
general’s newly constituted admissions 
litigation force. The administration’s latest 
act of disruption has hit colleges and 
universities. How will our institutions 
respond? What does this mean for students 
with acceptance letters? 
 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions recently 
announced that 24 Justice Department 
guidance documents are now deemed 
“unnecessary, outdated, inconsistent with 
existing law, or otherwise improper.” That 
includes all of President Barack Obama’s 
guidance on voluntary affirmative action 
admission plans. 
 
During the George W. Bush administration, 
schools had been encouraged to only use 
“race-neutral methods for assigning students 
to elementary and secondary schools” largely 
based on the U.S. Supreme Court Grutter v. 
Bollinger ruling in 2003. That case held that 
it was “patently unconstitutional” for a 
school to use affirmative action plans to 
achieve racial balance. In a significant shift, 
the Obama administration’s Education and 
Justice departments issued guidance to 
support colleges and universities in 
establishing voluntary affirmative action 
admission policies that fit within the 
Supreme Court parameters. 
 
Specifically, admission policies became 
more narrowly tailored by only taking the 
race of an applicant into account based on the 
compelling interest of avoiding racial 
isolation and to achieve diversity in schools. 
In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court in Fisher v. 
University of Texas at Austin recognized that 
colleges and universities had a compelling 
interest to ensure student body diversity; that 
case decided that an admissions program was 
constitutional if it remained narrowly tailored 
to achieve this compelling interest. 
 
Justice Anthony Kennedy authored the 4-3 
decision in Fisher, noting that “considerable 
deference is owed to a university in defining 
those intangible characteristics, like student 
body diversity, that are central to its identity 
and educational mission. But still, it remains 
an enduring challenge to our Nation’s 
education system to reconcile the pursuit of 
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diversity with the constitutional premise of 
equal treatment and dignity.” 
 
Now, the Trump administration is targeting 
affirmative action programs in higher 
education, in a move that had been expected 
since at least last fall when the Justice 
Department officially sought to hire attorneys 
for a new project regarding “intentional race-
based discrimination in college and 
university admissions.” It appears the 
attorneys hired last fall for the “new project” 
were hired and, we expect, are ready to roll. 
 
Following the attorney general’s 
announcement, the U.S. Department of 
Education tweeted that “ED & DOJ are 
rescinding documents that advocate specific 
policies and procedures beyond what the 
Constitution, Title IV, or Title VI require. 
The protections from discrimination on the 
basis of race guaranteed by the Constitution, 
Title IV, and Title VI remain in place. OCR 
is firmly committed to vigorously enforcing 
these protections on behalf of all students.” 
 
Even though the affirmative action admission 
programs at issue are voluntary, the 
government is still positioned to step in and 
stop higher education institutions from 
making determinations regarding individual 
student admissions based on race and to 
review decisions that have been made. The 
details of what lies ahead are difficult to 
predict. But, with the rollback by AG 
Sessions, the Bush administration’s position 
that schools should use race-neutral methods 
and can only consider race where essential to 
educational mission within constitutional 
parameters is revived and it will certainly roil 
higher education. 
 
Assuming colleges utilized the Obama 
administration guidance, it is likely their 
voluntary affirmative action admission 
programs would pass constitutional muster. 
That said, it is one thing to believe they 
would. Being entangled in a lawsuit 
defending that position is an entirely different 
matter, particularly when the Justice 
Department has identified it has a priority of 
addressing these cases and prepared its 
resources accordingly. The anticipated 
aggressive pursuit of these cases by the 
Justice Department without any apparent 
consideration of providing higher education 
the considerable deference to which it is 
entitled according to our Supreme Court 
should not be easily dismissed. 
 
The fact is, our colleges are in for a fight. And 
it is one that is worthwhile to defend, because 
the educational mission of our institutions of 
higher education is at stake. The colleges 
need to be prepared for a long battle (and 
much legal expense), starting immediately 
with conducting thorough analysis of current 
admissions programs to ensure institutions 
continue their obligation to analyze the 
constitutionality of these programs on an 
annual basis. This is critical, as the 
constitutionality of these programs is not just 
based upon a snapshot at the date of creation, 
but upon the state of the program today and 
whether the institution has a compelling 
interest now. 
 
For any college with a voluntary affirmative 
action program in place, the most important 
thing to do right now is for counsel to conduct 
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a review of the program since its inception, 
with attention paid to preserving all data 
supporting the institution’s decision to 
institute and maintain the program. Particular 
attention should be paid to tracking the effect 
of the implementation on effectuating the 
objective of student diversity, and how that 
has quantifiably enriched the institution. 
 
Next, the current program should be 
evaluated in light of the action by Attorney 
General Sessions on July 3, 2018. A review 
done close in time should be memorialized, 
with the administration’s shift in perspective, 
to ensure there is a record of due diligence. 
To the extent the current program deviates in 
any manner under the new standard, it will be 
necessary to identify whether to modify the 
program accordingly, or if it is more prudent 
to place the program in abeyance until further 
clarification is provided by Congress or the 
courts.
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 “Brett Kavanaugh once predicted ‘one race’ in the eyes of government. Would he 
end affirmative action?” 
 
 
The Washington Post 
 
Ann E. Marimow and Robert Barnes  
 
August 7, 2018 
 
In the spring of 2015, Brett M. Kavanaugh 
returned to his alma mater in New Haven, 
Conn., to address the Black Law Students 
Association. The student who introduced him 
said Kavanaugh was concerned that African 
Americans and other minorities were being 
shut out of coveted clerkships with federal 
judges like him. 
Kavanaugh concluded the session by handing 
out his email address and phone number and 
encouraging the Yale students to apply. 
Indeed, two of Kavanaugh’s four law clerks 
this year were African American students he 
met during annual visits to Yale, and 
Kavanaugh and his supporters have touted 
his record of hiring young lawyers from 
diverse backgrounds to work with him at the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit. 
“It was important to him that everyone have 
access,” recalled Rakim Brooks, who 
introduced the judge that day and 
completed a year-long clerkship with 
him this summer just as President Trump 
announced Kavanaugh’s nomination to the 
Supreme Court. 
Yet even as Kavanaugh has taken steps to 
open up an elite, historically white and male 
network, civil rights advocates cite legal 
opinions, interviews and writings that 
suggest he would weaken broad legal 
protections for minorities. Interest groups on 
both sides say Kavanaugh could be the vote 
conservatives have been looking for to speed 
the demise of affirmative action in college 
admissions. 
Civil rights advocates and Democratic 
lawmakers point in particular to an opinion 
he wrote in 2012 delaying but ultimately 
allowing voter identification requirements in 
South Carolina that were opposed by the 
Justice Department, and to his description in 
1999, when he was a lawyer in private 
practice, of a government program for Native 
Hawaiians as a “naked racial-spoils system.” 
In that case, embracing the language of 
Justice Antonin Scalia, Kavanaugh wrote in a 
newspaper column that the Supreme Court 
would eventually, inevitably find that “in the 
eyes of government, we are just one race.” 
Vanita Gupta, president of the Leadership 
Conference on Civil and Human Rights, said, 
“That kind of statement really signals that he 
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will bring an anti-civil-rights agenda to the 
Supreme Court and fails to recognize the 
current reality of being a person of color in 
this country and the history of 
discrimination.” 
“Kavanaugh’s worldview is not 
demonstrated by the fact that he’s appeared 
before black law students and hired diverse 
clerks,” she said, noting that he has also 
appeared nearly 50 times before chapters of 
the Federalist Society, the conservative legal 
group that has helped shape Trump’s list of 
potential Supreme Court nominees, including 
Kavanaugh. 
The stakes are high because the man 
Kavanaugh would replace, Justice Anthony 
M. Kennedy, cast the deciding vote on a key 
affirmative action case two years ago. He 
joined the court’s liberal justices to 
uphold the University of Texas’s limited use 
of race as a factor in admissions. In an earlier 
case involving the racial makeup of public 
school districts, Kennedy declined to join 
conservatives in saying race could not be 
considered. These issues seem certain to 
return to the Supreme Court because 
admissions practices at Harvard University 
and the University of North Carolina are 
already facing legal challenges. 
During his 12 years on the bench, few cases 
have required Kavanaugh to take positions on 
matters directly involving race. Speculation 
about how he would approach these types of 
cases is based in part on his work as a lawyer 
at Kirkland & Ellis. There, Kavanaugh 
teamed with conservative lawyer Robert H. 
Bork and the Center for Equal Opportunity, a 
conservative think tank, in arguing that it was 
unconstitutional to bar people who were 
not Native Hawaiians from voting 
for trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs. 
While working on that case, Kavanaugh in a 
1999 Wall Street Journal column urged the 
court to adhere to the constitutional principle 
that, he wrote, was most clearly articulated 
by Scalia in an earlier case involving racial 
preferences in hiring: “Under our 
Constitution there can be no such thing as 
either a creditor or a debtor race. . . . In the 
eyes of government, we are just one race 
here.” 
The Supreme Court struck down the race-
based voting qualification in a 7-to-2 
decision written by Kennedy. 
Roger Clegg of the Center for Equal 
Opportunity, who joined with Kavanaugh 
and Bork to submit an amicus brief in that 
case, said he suspects that Kavanaugh as a 
justice would “be hospitable to the kinds of 
arguments he was making.” 
“Our hope is that he is correct in his 
prediction that the government will get out of 
the business of playing favorites on the basis 
of race and ethnicity, and that the court will 
recognize that it’s plainly prohibited.” 
Clegg stressed that the way to end 
discrimination is for the government to stop 
categorizing Americans by race, a practice 
that he said is untenable in a multiethnic, 
multiracial society. 
Still, Clegg said his expectations for 
Kavanaugh are tempered somewhat because 
he was acting then as a private attorney, not 
as a judge. 
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Civil rights advocates, however, say that 
Kavanaugh’s rhetoric about a “racial-spoils 
system” and his embrace of Scalia’s “one 
race” prediction leave little room for surprise 
when it comes to affirmative action. 
“He’s not someone for whom you have to 
guess about,” said Thomas Saenz, president 
and general counsel of the Mexican 
American Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund. Saenz said he views Kavanaugh’s 
statements as particularly troubling at a time 
when white-supremacist groups and anti-
immigrant sentiment are on the rise. 
Justin Driver, a University of Chicago law 
professor , cautioned that affirmative action 
has been administered “last rites many 
times,” only to be saved by an improbable list 
of conservative justices. But he said that 
Kavanaugh’s language “signals great 
hostility to racial classifications.” 
In a 2003 decision upholding the University 
of Michigan Law School admissions policy, 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote, “We 
expect that 25 years from now, the use of 
racial preferences will no longer be necessary 
to further the interest approved today.” 
“We’re 10 years away from 2028,” said 
Driver, who clerked for O’Connor. If 
Kavanaugh joins the court, “it may well not 
last another 10 years.” 
Through his hiring and in his public 
statements, Kavanaugh has made clear that 
the topic of racial discrimination is often on 
his mind. When he was introduced as 
Trump’s nominee at the White House in 
June, one of the first things he mentioned was 
his mother’s work as a public high school 
teacher in Washington in predominantly 
African American schools. 
“Her example taught me the importance of 
equality for all Americans,” Kavanaugh said. 
In response to questions from the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, Kavanaugh listed what 
he considered his 10 most important 
decisions. He identified nine that went to the 
high court and a 10th involving a Fannie Mae 
employee who was fired shortly after 
complaining about an executive’s use of a 
racial slur to refer to him. Kavanaugh sided 
with the employee and wrote a separate 
opinion to which he called attention in his 
questionnaire. 
“Calling someone the n-word, even once, 
creates a hostile work environment,” he 
wrote. “My opinion explained: ‘No other 
word in the English language so powerfully 
or instantly calls to mind our country’s long 
and brutal struggle to overcome racism and 
discrimination against African-Americans.’ ” 
In the 2012 case reviewing a South Carolina 
voter identification law, Kavanaugh 
acknowledged concerns from the Justice 
Department and civil rights groups about the 
disproportionate impact on black voters, who 
were less likely to have an acceptable photo 
ID, according to court filings. 
“Racial insensitivity, racial bias, and indeed 
outright racism are still problems throughout 
the United States as of 2012,” Kavanaugh 
wrote. “. . . The long march for equality for 
African-Americans is not finished.” 
Kavanaugh joined with two other judges to 
delay for one year implementation of the 
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voter-ID requirement. But their unanimous 
decision cleared the law to take effect after 
the 2012 election. 
“The rhetoric is a lot less significant than the 
ruling itself,” said Todd A. Cox, director of 
policy at the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. 
“That is the thing that has the impact on real 
people’s lives.” 
Civil rights advocates say it is telling that 
Kavanaugh did not join the other judges — 
Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, a Clinton nominee, 
and John D. Bates, a George W. Bush 
nominee — in a separate opinion in which 
they noted the “vital function” of the Voting 
Rights Act provision that required federal 
oversight of election laws in states with a 
history of discriminatory practices. 
The following year, the Supreme 
Court invalidated that provision, known as 
Section 5. 
Throughout his tenure on the bench in 
Washington, Kavanaugh has returned six 
times to Yale to speak to the black law 
students’ group. Of the 48 clerks he has hired, 
13 are minorities. Nine of the 13 have gone 
on to Supreme Court clerkships, according to 
statistics compiled by his former clerks and 
first reported by the National Law Journal. 
Rakim Brooks credits Kavanaugh for his 
efforts to diversify the elite clerkship track. 
He signed a letter submitted this month to the 
Senate from the judge’s former clerks that 
praises Kavanaugh as a mentor, friend, 
intellect and highly qualified nominee. 
But Brooks, who grew up in public housing 
in East Harlem and was the first in his family 
to attend college, is concerned about the 
future of civil rights. His feelings about the 
nomination fight are complicated. 
He said his respect and admiration for the 
judge don’t “mean people shouldn’t fight and 
challenge Judge Kavanaugh’s nomination if 
they disagree. I think they should.” 
“There was no one that President Trump was 
going to appoint who was likely to advance 
the civil rights agenda beyond where Justice 
Kennedy is leaving it,” Brooks said. 
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“Asian-Americans Suing Harvard Say Admissions Files Show Discrimination” 
 
 
New York Times  
 
Anemona Hartocollis 
 
April 4, 2018  
 
A group that is suing Harvard University is 
demanding that it publicly release admissions 
data on hundreds of thousands of applicants, 
saying the records show a pattern of 
discrimination against Asian-Americans 
going back decades. 
The group was able to view the documents 
through its lawsuit, which was filed in 2014 
and challenges Harvard’s admissions 
policies. The plaintiffs said in a letter to the 
court last week that the documents were so 
compelling that there was no need for a trial, 
and that they would ask the judge to rule 
summarily in their favor based on the 
documents alone. 
The plaintiffs also say that the public — 
which provides more than half a billion 
dollars a year in federal funding to Harvard 
— has a right to see the evidence that the 
judge will consider in her decision. 
Harvard counters that the documents are 
tantamount to trade secrets, and that even in 
the unlikely event that the judge agrees to 
decide the case without a trial, she is likely to 
use only a fraction of the evidence in her 
decision. Only that portion, the university 
says, should be released. 
“This is an important and closely watched 
civil rights case,” William S. Consovoy, the 
lawyer for the group, Students for Fair 
Admissions, said in his letter to the court. 
“The public has a right to know exactly what 
is going on at Harvard. Even if this were a 
commercial issue — as Harvard would like to 
portray it — the public would have a right to 
know if the product is defective or if a fraud 
is being perpetrated.” 
At stake in the dispute is the secrecy of the 
university admissions process, especially at 
elite institutions like Harvard that are 
competing for a small pool of highly 
qualified students, and whether and how race 
and ethnicity play a role. 
Students for Fair Admissions includes more 
than a dozen Asian-American students who 
applied to Harvard and were rejected. They 
contend in their lawsuit that Harvard 
systematically and unconstitutionally 
discriminates against Asian-American 
applicants by penalizing their high 
achievement as a group, while giving 
preferences to other racial and ethnic 
minorities. They say that Harvard’s 
admission process amounts to an illegal 
quota system. 
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A spokeswoman for Harvard, Rachael Dane, 
while declining to comment on the specifics 
of the litigation, said: “Harvard College does 
not discriminate against applicants from any 
group in its admissions processes. We will 
continue to vigorously defend the right of 
Harvard, and other universities, to seek the 
educational benefits that come from a class 
that is diverse on multiple dimensions.” 
Harvard gave the court the documents in 
question, which include six years of 
admissions data on hundreds of thousands of 
high school students, as part of the pretrial 
discovery process. About 40,000 students 
apply to Harvard each year. 
The judge in the case, Allison D. Burroughs 
of the Federal District Court in Boston, has 
scheduled a hearing on April 10 for both sides 
to present oral arguments on whether the 
documents should be made public. 
The two sides provided lengthy letters to 
Judge Burroughs, giving a preview of their 
arguments. The judge has set a trial date for 
next January, though Harvard in its letter said 
it was prepared to go to trial as soon as 
October. 
The contents of the documents have been 
only roughly sketched out in court papers. 
But Harvard said in its letter that the parties 
have exchanged more than 90,000 pages, 
including “deeply personal and highly 
sensitive information about applicants to and 
students at Harvard and the inner workings of 
Harvard’s admissions process.” 
“Harvard understands that there is a public 
interest in this case and that the public has 
certain — though not unfettered — interests 
in access to judicial materials,” the university 
said. “Those interests, however, must be 
balanced against the need to protect 
individual privacy and confidential and 
proprietary information about the admissions 
process.” 
The leader of Students for Fair Admissions 
and the architect of the case against Harvard 
is Edward Blum, a longtime crusader against 
affirmative action who has recruited 
plaintiffs, hired sympathetic lawyers and 
raised millions of dollars from conservative 
groups to challenge voting rights laws and 
affirmative action policies, often 
successfully. 
One of Mr. Blum’s landmark cases was a 
lawsuit by Abigail Fisher, a white applicant 
who said she was denied admission to the 
University of Texas at Austin because of her 
race. The United States Supreme Court ruled 
4-3 in favor of the university in 2016, saying 
that it is constitutional to use race as one of 
many factors in admissions decisions. 
Critics have seen the lawsuit against Harvard, 
which seems intended to go to the Supreme 
Court, as an attempt to reignite that battle. 
The Trump administration has taken an 
interest in the issue, opening a parallel 
investigation based on a separate 2015 
complaint to the Justice Department by a 
coalition of Asian-American organizations. 
In its letter to the judge, Harvard said that it 
had an obligation to protect the identities of 
applicants, who take it on faith that their 
applications will remain private. While 
names and other information that could 
directly identify applicants have been 
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redacted from the documents, the university 
said that hometowns, awards and other 
elements could reveal applicants’ identities 
through simple internet searches. 
The documents also include deposition 
testimony concerning the procedures 
Harvard used to evaluate applications; 
internal correspondence among admissions 
officers about applicants’ qualities; and 
statements by admissions officers about why 
they liked some applicants better than others. 
“That information is highly proprietary to 
Harvard and of great interest to college 
admissions consultants and others who seek 
any advantage they can muster in the highly 
competitive admissions process,” Harvard 
said in its letter. Releasing it “would put 
Harvard at a severe competitive 
disadvantage,” the university said, and would 
prompt applicants to try to game the system. 
Students for Fair Admissions scoffed at the 
notion that the admissions procedure was 
akin to a trade secret. “This case does not 
involve anything like ‘national security, the 
formula for Coca-Cola or embarrassing 
details of private life,’ ” the group said, citing 
case law. 
The group noted that Harvard officials have 
repeatedly said that there is no formula for 
being admitted, and that books and articles 
have been written about how the Harvard 
admissions process works. 
The plaintiffs cited a landmark affirmative 
action case, Gratz v. Bollinger, in which the 
Supreme Court ruled in 2003 that the 
University of Michigan was using an 
unconstitutional scoring system for 
undergraduate admissions. The system 
automatically awarded 20 out of 150 points 
toward admission to members of 
underrepresented minorities. 
“There is no way the public could have 
understood the dispute,” the group said, “if 
the facts had been hidden.” 
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“Harvard Rated Asian-American Applicants Lower on Personality Traits, Suit 
Says” 
 
 
New York Times 
 
Anemona Hartocollis 
 
June 15, 2018 
  
Harvard consistently rated Asian-American 
applicants lower than others on traits like 
“positive personality,” likability, courage, 
kindness and being “widely respected,” 
according to an analysis of more than 
160,000 student records filed Friday by a 
group representing Asian-American students 
in a lawsuit against the university. 
Asian-Americans scored higher than 
applicants of any other racial or ethnic group 
on admissions measures like test scores, 
grades and extracurricular activities, 
according to the analysis commissioned by a 
group that opposes all race-based admissions 
criteria. But the students’ personal ratings 
significantly dragged down their chances of 
being admitted, the analysis found. 
The court documents, filed in federal court in 
Boston, also showed that Harvard conducted 
an internal investigation into its admissions 
policies in 2013 and found a bias against 
Asian-American applicants. But Harvard 
never made the findings public or acted on 
them. 
Harvard, one of the most sought-after and 
selective universities in the country, admitted 
only 4.6 percent of its applicants this year. 
That has led to intense interest in the 
university’s closely guarded admissions 
process. Harvard had fought furiously over 
the last few months to keep secret the 
documents that were unsealed Friday. 
The documents came out as part of a lawsuit 
charging Harvard with systematically 
discriminating against Asian-Americans, in 
violation of civil rights law. The suit says that 
Harvard imposes what is in effect a soft quota 
of “racial balancing.” This keeps the numbers 
of Asian-Americans artificially low, while 
advancing less qualified white, black and 
Hispanic applicants, the plaintiffs contend. 
The findings come at a time when issues of 
race, ethnicity, admission, testing and equal 
access to education are confronting schools 
across the country, from selective public high 
schools like Stuyvesant High School in New 
York to elite private colleges. Many Ivy 
League schools, not just Harvard, have had 
similar ratios of Asian-American, black, 
white and Hispanic students for years, despite 
fluctuations in application rates and 
qualifications, raising questions about how 
those numbers are arrived at and whether 
they represent unspoken quotas. 
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Harvard and the group suing it have 
presented sharply divergent views of what 
constitutes a fair admissions process. 
“It turns out that the suspicions of Asian-
American alumni, students and applicants 
were right all along,” the group, Students for 
Fair Admissions, said in a court document 
laying out the analysis. “Harvard today 
engages in the same kind of discrimination 
and stereotyping that it used to justify quotas 
on Jewish applicants in the 1920s and 
1930s.” 
Harvard vigorously disagreed on Friday, 
saying that its own expert analysis showed no 
discrimination and that seeking diversity is a 
valuable part of student selection. The 
university lashed out at the founder of 
Students for Fair Admissions, Edward Blum, 
accusing him of using Harvard to replay a 
previous challenge to affirmative action in 
college admissions, Fisher v. the University 
of Texas at Austin. In its 2016 decision in that 
case, the Supreme Court ruled that race could 
be used as one of many factors in admissions. 
“Thorough and comprehensive analysis of 
the data and evidence makes clear that 
Harvard College does not discriminate 
against applicants from any group, including 
Asian-Americans, whose rate of admission 
has grown 29 percent over the last decade,” 
Harvard said in a statement. “Mr. Blum and 
his organization’s incomplete and misleading 
data analysis paint a dangerously inaccurate 
picture of Harvard College’s whole-person 
admissions process by omitting critical data 
and information factors.” 
In court papers, Harvard said that a statistical 
analysis could not capture the many 
intangible factors that go into Harvard 
admissions. Harvard said that the plaintiffs’ 
expert, Peter Arcidiacono, a Duke University 
economist, had mined the data to his 
advantage by taking out applicants who were 
favored because they were legacies, athletes, 
the children of staff and the like, including 
Asian-Americans. In response, the plaintiffs 
said their expert had factored out these 
applicants because he wanted to look at the 
pure effect of race on admissions, unclouded 
by other factors. 
Both sides filed papers Friday asking for 
summary judgment, an immediate ruling in 
their favor. If the judge denies those requests, 
as is likely, a trial has been scheduled for 
October. If it goes on to the Supreme Court, 
it could upend decades of affirmative action 
policies at colleges and universities across 
the country. 
Harvard is not the only Ivy League school 
facing pressure to admit more Asian-
American students. Princeton and Cornell 
and others also have high numbers of Asian-
American applicants. Yet their share of 
Asian-Americans students is comparable 
with Harvard’s. 
In Friday’s court papers, the plaintiffs 
describe a shaping process that begins before 
students even apply, when Harvard buys data 
about PSAT scores and G.P.A.s, according to 
the plaintiffs’ motion. It is well documented 
that these scores vary by race. 
The plaintiffs’ analysis was based on data 
extracted from the records of more than 
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160,000 applicants who applied for 
admission over six cycles from 2000 to 2015. 
  
 558 
 
 
“Asian-American groups take opposing sides in Harvard affirmative action case” 
 
 
NBC 
 
Chris Fuchs 
 
August 3, 2018 
 
Battle lines were drawn this week as Asian-
American groups took sides in an ongoing 
lawsuit that accuses Harvard of 
discriminating against Asian-American 
applicants. 
Current Harvard students, alumni and 
applicants who defend the school’s 
consideration of race in admissions — and 
organizations like the Asian American 
Coalition for Education, which accuses 
Harvard of “unfairly rejecting many top 
performing Asian American students” — 
were among those who filed friend-of-the-
court briefs in Boston federal court on 
Monday and Tuesday, as a judge weighs 
whether the case should go to trial. 
In the wake of the lawsuit brought by 
Students for Fair Admissions in 2014, Asian 
Americans, often stereotyped as model 
minorities, have found themselves in the 
center of the debate on affirmative action. 
One group of students, represented by Asian 
Americans Advancing Justice-L.A. and two 
other civil rights groups, contends in their 
brief that Harvard’s race-conscious, holistic 
admissions policy is constitutional. They also 
maintain that the school needs to do more to 
ensure even greater diversity, which the brief 
says enhances learning for all students. 
But the Asian American Coalition for 
Education and the Asian American Legal 
Foundation, both nonprofit advocacy groups, 
argue in their brief that Harvard, in order to 
maintain racial quotas, makes Asian-
American applicants surmount a higher bar 
than others. 
They allege that Asian Americans today 
encounter the same “formal and hidden 
quotas” faced by Jewish applicants to 
Harvard and other Ivy Leagues during the 
first half of the 20th century. 
While Asian-Americans appear divided on 
affirmative action, backing for the policy 
among the group has actually held steady, 
except for Chinese Americans, according to 
Karthick Ramakrishnan, founder and director 
of AAPI Data and a public policy professor 
at the University of California, Riverside. 
National survey figures analyzed by AAPI 
Data showed that from 2012 to 2016, Asian-
American support for affirmative action 
hovered around 70 percent, though for 
Chinese it dropped from 78 percent to 41 
percent. 
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“This has been a major issue within the 
Chinese-American community and 
predominantly driven by the concerns and 
anxieties of Chinese immigrants,” 
Ramakrishnan said. 
The group suing Harvard, Students for Fair 
Admissions, which is led by conservative 
activist Edward Blum, includes Asian 
Americans who have been denied admission 
to Harvard. It alleges that the 
college intentionally discriminates 
against Asian-American applicants by 
limiting their admissions numbers each year. 
Harvard denies the claims. It says it believes 
the evidence shows that it does not use quotas 
or racial balancing and that race is just one of 
many factors it considers in admissions 
decisions. 
The Supreme Court has ruled that colleges 
cannot use racial quotas because they violate 
the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, 
but may take race into account when deciding 
whom to admit. 
In Harvard’s class of 2021, 22 percent of 
students were Asian, 15 percent African 
American, 12 percent Hispanic or Latino, and 
3 percent Native American or Pacific 
Islander. 
Nicole Gon Ochi, an attorney with Asian 
Americans Advancing Justice-L.A., said she 
believes everyone benefits from diversity. 
She said their brief stands out from the others 
in that it captures the full range of student 
voices, including prospective and current 
ones, as well as alumni. 
“We have a Chinese-American and 
Vietnamese-American student who actually 
believe that they got into Harvard because of 
affirmative action,” Ochi said. 
Nicole Gon Ochi, an attorney with Asian 
Americans Advancing Justice-L.A., said she 
believes everyone benefits from diversity. 
She said their brief stands out from the others 
in that it captures the full range of student 
voices, including prospective and current 
ones, as well as alumni. 
“We have a Chinese-American and 
Vietnamese-American student who actually 
believe that they got into Harvard because of 
affirmative action,” Ochi said. 
“There’s others for whom race may not have 
played a role, but once they got to Harvard, it 
really greatly enhanced their educational 
experience, kind of transformed them as 
people into caring a lot about social justice ... 
helped them to see their own prejudices,” she 
added. 
Ochi said the students in the amicus brief 
were also troubled by the prospect of not 
having their race — which they believe to be 
a core part of their identity — taken into 
account for admissions when every other 
aspect of who they are is considered. 
“For many of our Asian-American students, 
they actually have been told don’t talk about 
your race, don’t disclose that you’re Asian, 
it’s going to hurt you in the admissions 
process,” she said. “And all of them 
considered that advice and rejected it, 
because they said we can’t represent 
ourselves authentically without that.” 
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But Yukong Zhao, president of the Asian 
American Coalition for Education, said race 
should play no role in who’s admitted to 
Harvard. 
“We want to really point out that the Harvard 
admission model ... actually is illegal,” Zhao 
said. He added that the school’s admissions’ 
practice is “totally immoral” and “creates so 
much harm to Asian-American communities 
and also undermines the American merit-
based college admissions system.” 
Zhao’s coalition said it represents 156 Asian-
American organizations across the country, 
among them the Asian American GOP 
Coalition, Asian Americans Against 
Affirmative Action and the Michigan 
Chinese Conservatives Alliance, according to 
their friend-of-the-court brief. 
The brief, which contends Harvard sets the 
admissions bar higher for Asian Americans, 
argued that by doing so Asian-American 
applicants must study and excel more than 
other candidates to have the same shot at 
getting in. 
“This vicious cycle forces Asian-American 
students into behavior closer to the negative 
stereotype that they are nothing but 
personality-less ‘nerds,’ making it easier for 
admissions officers to apply unfair 
stereotypes and deny them admission,” the 
brief argued. 
In addition to Harvard, Students for Fair 
Admissions has also sued the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the 
University of Texas at Austin in separate 
cases, alleging they use discriminatory 
admissions policies. 
Blum, the group’s president, recruited 
Abigail Fisher, the lead plaintiff in Fisher v. 
University of Texas. 
Fisher, who is white, first sued the University 
of Texas at Austin in 2008, arguing that its 
holistic-review process, which considers race 
along with other factors, put her at a 
disadvantage to other applicants. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in June 2016 ruled 
4-3 in that case to uphold the school’s 
affirmative action policy. 
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“U.S. says it might enter Harvard affirmative action court battle” 
 
 
Reuters 
 
Nate Raymond 
 
April 6, 2018 
 
The U.S. Justice Department said on Friday 
it might formally enter a lawsuit accusing 
Harvard University of discriminating against 
Asian-American applicants as the agency 
probes its admissions policies for potential 
civil rights violations. 
 
The department disclosed its plan in a brief 
urging a federal judge in Boston to not allow 
the Ivy League school to file pre-trial court 
papers and documents provisionally under 
seal.  
 
Harvard had cited the need to protect the 
privacy of applicants and students as well as 
the inner workings of its admissions process, 
arguing that various documents should be 
initially filed under seal pending the judge’s 
review. 
 
The Justice Department said it opposed 
Harvard’s request, joining Students for Fair 
Admissions (SFFA), the group behind the 
case, which has urged the disclosure of 
“powerful” evidence showing Cambridge, 
Massachusetts-based Harvard is violating 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.  
 
“Harvard College is responsible for 
protecting the confidential and highly 
sensitive personal information that 
prospective students - none of whom asked to 
be involved in this dispute - entrust to us 
every year in their applications,” Harvard 
spokeswoman Rachael Dane said in a 
statement.  
 
“We are committed to safeguarding their 
privacy while also ensuring that the public 
has the access that it is entitled to under the 
law,” Dane said.  
 
William Consovoy, a lawyer for SFFA, 
declined to comment. 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled 
universities may use affirmative action to 
help minority applicants get into college. 
Conservatives have said such programs can 
hurt white people and Asian-Americans.  
 
The Justice Department under Republican 
President Donald Trump has been 
investigating a complaint by more than 60 
Asian-American organizations which say 
Harvard’s policies are discriminatory 
because they limit the acceptance of Asian-
Americans.  
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“The public funds Harvard at a cost of 
millions of dollars each year, and thus has a 
paramount interest in any proof of these 
allegations, Harvard’s responses to them, and 
the Court’s resolution of this dispute,” Justice 
Department lawyers wrote in Friday’s filing.  
The department said that while it had 
obtained much of the case’s evidence through 
its own separate probe, it wanted to review 
the court records as it considers whether to 
file a “statement of interest” arguing a 
position in the case.  
 
A hearing before U.S. District Judge Allison 
Burroughs is scheduled for Tuesday.  
 
Harvard says its admissions policies comply 
with U.S. laws and that it has worked to 
increase the financial aid it offers to ensure 
economic, as well as racial, diversity in its 
classes.
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“Trump Officials Reverse Obama’s Policy on Affirmative Action in Schools” 
 
 
New York Times 
 
Erica L. Green, Matt Apuzzo, and Katie Benner 
 
July 3, 2018 
 
The Trump administration said Tuesday that 
it was abandoning Obama administration 
policies that called on universities to consider 
race as a factor in diversifying their 
campuses, signaling that the administration 
will champion race-blind admissions 
standards. 
In a joint letter, the Education and Justice 
Departments announced that they had 
rescinded seven Obama-era policy guidelines 
on affirmative action, which, the departments 
said, “advocate policy preferences and 
positions beyond the requirements of the 
Constitution.” 
“The executive branch cannot circumvent 
Congress or the courts by creating guidance 
that goes beyond the law and — in some 
instances — stays on the books for decades,” 
said Devin M. O’Malley, a Justice 
Department spokesman. 
Striking a softer tone, Education Secretary 
Betsy DeVos wrote in a separate statement: 
“The Supreme Court has determined what 
affirmative action policies are constitutional, 
and the court’s written decisions are the best 
guide for navigating this complex issue. 
Schools should continue to offer equal 
opportunities for all students while abiding 
by the law.” 
The Trump administration’s moves come 
with affirmative action at a crossroads. Hard-
liners in the Justice and Education 
Departments are moving against any use of 
race as a measurement of diversity in 
education. And the retirement of Justice 
Anthony M. Kennedy at the end of this 
month will leave the Supreme Court without 
its swing vote on affirmative action while 
allowing President Trump to nominate a 
justice opposed to policies that for decades 
have tried to integrate elite educational 
institutions. 
A highly anticipated case is pitting Harvard 
against Asian-American students who say 
one of the nation’s most prestigious 
institutions has systematically excluded some 
Asian-American applicants to maintain slots 
for students of other races. That case is 
clearly aimed at the Supreme Court. 
“The whole issue of using race in education 
is being looked at with a new eye in light of 
the fact that it’s not just white students being 
discriminated against, but Asians and others 
as well,” said Roger Clegg, the president and 
general counsel of the conservative Center 
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for Equal Opportunity. “As the demographics 
of the country change, it becomes more and 
more problematic.” 
Democrats and civil rights organizations 
denounced the administration’s decisions. 
Representative Nancy Pelosi of California, 
the House Democratic leader, said the 
“rollback of vital affirmative action guidance 
offends our nation’s values” and called it “yet 
another clear Trump administration attack on 
communities of color.” 
Guidance documents like those rescinded on 
Tuesday do not have the force of law, but 
they amount to the official view of the federal 
government. School officials who keep their 
race-conscious admissions policies intact 
would do so knowing that they could face a 
Justice Department investigation or lawsuit, 
or lose funding from the Education 
Department. 
The Obama administration believed that 
students benefited from being surrounded by 
diverse classmates, so in 2011, the 
administration offered schools a potential 
road map to establishing affirmative action 
policies and race-based considerations that 
could withstand legal scrutiny from an 
increasingly skeptical Supreme Court. 
In a pair of policy guidance documents issued 
in 2011, the Obama Education and Justice 
Departments informed elementary and 
secondary schools and college campuses of 
“the compelling interests” established by the 
Supreme Court to achieve diversity. They 
concluded that the court “has made clear such 
steps can include taking account of the race 
of individual students in a narrowly tailored 
manner.” 
But Trump Justice Department officials 
identified those documents as particularly 
problematic and full of “hypotheticals” 
intended to allow schools to skirt the law. 
The Trump administration’s decision 
returned the government’s policies to the 
George W. Bush era. The administration did 
not formally reissue the Bush-era guidance 
but in recent days did repost a Bush 
administration affirmative action policy 
document online. That document states, 
“The Department of Education strongly 
encourages the use of race-neutral methods 
for assigning students to elementary and 
secondary schools.” For several years, that 
document had been replaced by a note 
declaring that the policy had been withdrawn. 
The Education Department had last 
reaffirmed its position on affirmative action 
in schools in 2016 after a Supreme Court 
ruling said schools could consider race as one 
factor among many. In that case, Fisher v. 
University of Texas at Austin, a white 
woman claimed she was denied admission 
because of her race. 
“It remains an enduring challenge to our 
nation’s education system to reconcile the 
pursuit of diversity with the constitutional 
promise of equal treatment and dignity,” 
Justice Kennedy wrote for the 4-to-3 
majority. 
Some colleges, such as Duke and Bucknell 
universities, said they would wait to see how 
the Education Department proceeds in 
issuing new guidance. Other colleges said 
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they would proceed with diversifying their 
campuses as the Supreme Court intended. 
Melodie Jackson, a Harvard spokeswoman, 
said the university would “continue to 
vigorously defend its right, and that of all 
colleges and universities, to consider race as 
one factor among many in college 
admissions, which has been upheld by the 
Supreme Court for more than 40 years.” 
A spokeswoman for the University of 
Michigan, which won a major Supreme 
Court case in 2003, suggested that the 
flagship university would like more freedom 
to consider race, not less. But it is already 
constrained by state law. After the case, 
Michigan voters enacted a constitutional ban 
on race-conscious college admissions 
policies. 
“We believe the U.S. Supreme Court got it 
right in 2003 when it affirmed our law 
school’s approach at the time, which allowed 
consideration of race as one of many factors 
in the admissions process,” said Kim 
Broekhuizen, the Michigan spokeswoman. 
“We still believe that.” 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions has indicated 
that he will take a tough line against such 
views. Federal prosecutors will investigate 
and sue universities over discriminatory 
admissions policies, he said. 
But a senior Justice Department official 
denied that these decisions were rolling back 
protections for minorities. He said they were 
instead hewing the department closer to the 
letter of the law. In the departments’ letter, 
officials wrote that “the protections from 
discrimination on the basis of race remain in 
place.” 
“The departments are firmly committed to 
vigorously enforcing these protections on 
behalf of all students,” the letter said. 
Anurima Bhargava, who headed civil rights 
enforcement in schools for the Justice 
Department under President Barack Obama 
and helped write that administration’s 
guidance, said the withdrawal of the 
guidelines was timed for brief filings in the 
Harvard litigation, due at the end of the 
month. 
“This is a wholly political attack,” Ms. 
Bhargava said. “And our schools are the 
place where our communities come together, 
so our schools have to continue to promote 
diversity and address segregation, as the U.S. 
Constitution demands.” 
Catherine Lhamon, who served as the 
Education Department’s head of civil rights 
under Mr. Obama, called the departments’ 
move confusing. 
“There’s no reason to rethink or reconsider 
this, as the Supreme Court is the highest court 
in the land and has spoken on this issue,” Ms. 
Lhamon said. 
On Friday, the Education Department began 
laying the groundwork for the shift, when 
it restored on its civil rights website the 
Bush-era guidance. Conservative advocacy 
groups saw that as promising. Mr. Clegg, of 
the Center for Equal Opportunity, said that 
preserving the Obama-era guidance would be 
akin to “the F.B.I. issuing a document on how 
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you can engage in racial profiling in a way 
where you won’t get caught.” 
Ms. DeVos has seemed hesitant to wade in on 
the fate of affirmative action policies, which 
date back to a 57-year-old executive order by 
President John F. Kennedy, who recognized 
systemic and discriminatory disadvantages 
for women and minorities. The Education 
Department did not partake in the Justice 
Department’s formal interest in Harvard’s 
litigation. 
“I think this has been a question before the 
courts and the courts have opined,” Ms. 
DeVos told The Associated Press. 
But Ms. DeVos’s new head of civil rights, 
Kenneth L. Marcus, may disagree. A vocal 
opponent of affirmative action, Mr. Marcus 
was confirmed last month on a party-line 
Senate vote, and it was Mr. Marcus who 
signed Tuesday’s letter. 
Under Mr. Marcus’s leadership, the Louis D. 
Brandeis Center, a human rights organization 
that champions Jewish causes, filed 
an amicus brief in 2012, the first time the 
Supreme Court heard Fisher v. University of 
Texas at Austin. In the brief, the organization 
argued that “race conscious admission 
standards are unfair to individuals, and 
unhealthy for society at large.” 
The organization argued that Asian-
American students were particularly 
victimized by race “quotas” that were once 
used to exclude Jewish people. 
As the implications for affirmative action for 
college admissions play out in court, it is 
unclear what the decision holds for 
elementary and secondary schools. New 
York City is embroiled in a debate 
about whether to change its entrance standard 
— currently a single test — for its most 
prestigious high schools to allow for more 
black and Latino students.
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